AL-GHAZÀLÏ
ON DIVINE ESSENCE: A TRANSLATION FROM
THE IQTISÂD
Fl AL-FTIQAD WITH
NOTES
AND COMMENTARY
by
Dennis
Morgan Davis Jr.
A
dissertation submitted to the faculty of
The University of Utah
in
partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor
of Philosophy
in
Middle
East Studies/Arabic
Department
of Languages and Literature
The
University of Utah
May
2005
Copyright © Dennis Morgan Davis Jr. 2005
All
Rights Reserved
THE
UNIVERSITY OF UTAH GRADUATE SCHOOL
SUPERVISORY COMMITTEE APPROVAL
of a
dissertation submitted by
Dennis
Morgan Davis Jr.
This
dissertation has been read by each member of the following supervisory
committee and by majority vote has been found to be satisfactory
THE
UNIVERSITY OF UTAH GRADUATE SCHOOL
To
the Graduate Council of the University of Utah:
I
have read the dissertation of Dennis Morgan Davis in its final form and have
found that (1) its format, citations, and bibliographic style are consistent
and acceptable; (2) its illustrative materials including figures, tables, and
charts are in place; and (3) the final manuscript is satisfactory to the
supervisory committee and is ready for submission to The Graduate School.
ABSTRACT
A translation into English of the first sections of Al-Iqtisad
fï al-ictiqad (Moderation in Belief), the major theological work
of the Muslim thinker al- Ghazali (d. 1111) is presented, with introduction,
notes, and glossary.
To
the memory of George and Betty Davis
who could not wait to see this work completed.
TABLE
OF CONTENTS
ABSTRACT.................................................................................................................... iv
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS.......................................................................................... viii
NOTE ON CONVENTIONS........................................................................................ x
AN INTRODUCTION TO AL-IQTISÂD FI AL-ITIQAD.......................................... 1
The Iqtisdd fi al-itiqdd......................................................................................... 2
The Iqtisdd in Translation.................................................................................. 5
Organization and Content of the Iqtisdd......................................................... 7
The First Introduction....................................................................................... 8
The Second and Third Introductions............................................................ 10
The Fourth Introduction................................................................................. 14
The First Proposition....................................................................................... 20
The Second and Third Propositions.............................................................. 35
The Fourth through Eighth Propositions..................................................... 40
The Ninth Proposition.................................................................................... 44
The Tenth Proposition..................................................................................... 50
Ghazâlï on the Essence of God...................................................................... 57
Notes.................................................................................................................. 60
[EXORDIUM]................................................................................................................ 71
Notes.................................................................................................................. 75
[EXPLANATORY] CHAPTER................................................................................... 79
Notes.................................................................................................................. 83
FIRST INTRODUCTION............................................................................................. 85
Notes.................................................................................................................. 90
SECOND INTRODUCTION...................................................................................... 92
Notes.................................................................................................................. 98
THIRD INTRODUCTION........................................................................................ 100
Notes................................................................................................................ 104
FOURTH INTRODUCTION.................................................................................... 105
Notes................................................................................................................ 120
PART ONE.................................................................................................................. 123
The First Proposition..................................................................................... 123
The Second Proposition................................................................................ 141
The Third Proposition................................................................................... 142
The Fourth Proposition................................................................................. 147
The Fifth Proposition..................................................................................... 149
The Sixth Proposition.................................................................................... 150
The Seventh Proposition............................................................................... 152
The Eighth Proposition................................................................................. 166
The Ninth Proposition.................................................................................. 180
The Tenth Proposition................................................................................... 199
Notes................................................................................................................ 209
GLOSSARY................................................................................................................. 225
Notes.................................................................................................................. 234
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY................................................................................... 236
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I wish to thank my parents, Dennis and Anita Davis, for the
love and support they have always shown me. Their courage and faith opened my
eyes to how vast and wonderful the world was and is. I am also grateful for the
many teachers, leaders, and mentors who have guided and helped me over the
years— both academically and personally. Professor Daniel C. Peterson has given
me some of the greatest opportunities of my life as it has been my privilege to
work with him in developing the Islamic Translation Series at Brigham Young
University. Professor Michael E. Marmura, with whom I have also been privileged
to associate on that project, has been exceptionally patient with me and
generous in sharing his unparalleled expertise. And professor Bernard Weiss,
the chair of my committee, has gone out of his way to be helpful more times
than I can tell and, I suspect, more times than I am even aware of. For his
patient and careful supervision of my work I am truly grateful.
This dissertation has been a labor of love in more ways
than one. Each of my children has suffered long and been kind, and no person,
including myself, has sacrificed more to see it through to completion than my
wife and their mother,
Kristina.
She and they have shown me what pure love is.
NOTE
ON CONVENTIONS
Works cited in the notes and commentary herein are always
given in short form. Primary texts in translation are cited under the
translator's name rather than that of the original author. Full information on
each work is provided in the selected bibliography. Words of Arabic origin
which appear in The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary are not
italicized but are spelled and treated as regular English words. In quotations
from the work of other scholars, however, I have retained their treatment of
those terms.
There are two separate sequences of numbers set in square brackets
throughout the translation text. Those marked with an "A" refer to
the page numbers of the Spanish translation of Miguel Asín Palacios. Those with
no letter refer to the critical Arabic text of Ghazali's Iqtisad
produced by Çubukçu and Atay, for which page and line numbers are given. In the
translation, I have occasionally divided paragraphs differently than the Arabic
text. In cases where I have combined paragraphs, I have retained the page and
line number where the assimilated paragraph began. Parentheses are occasionally
used as punctuation, but square brackets are used only for page references and
around words or phrases that have no direct correspondents in the Arabic but
which are understood to be indicated there, or are my interpolations so as to
render what I take to be the meaning of the text more clearly. Because Arabic
is a language that typically relies heavily on conjunctions rather than
punctuation to demarcate sentences, I have often begun sentences in the
translation with conjunctions in order to preserve, at least to some degree,
the tone and internal cohesion of the original text.
AN
INTRODUCTION TO AL-IQTISÂD FI AL-FTIQAD
Abu Hâmid Muhammad al-Ghazâlï (d. 1111 C.E.)
ranks as one of the most prominent figures in the history of Islamic thought.
His works have been published, studied, and commented upon widely by Muslims
and non-Muslims alike. In the Western tradition of orientalist scholarship,
Ghazâli has received no small amount of attention, and, as is often the case
when a variety of perspectives and talents are brought to bear upon a
particular subject, the amount of controversy has tended to increase while what
can be affirmed with certainty or without opposition has commensurately
diminished. The raft of questions and debates about Ghazâli's basic beliefs and
attitudes, their origins, and their impact on subsequent thinkers is, by now,
robust. At the same time, there are large portions of Ghazâli's oeuvre that
remain inaccessible to those who might be interested in these questions but who
lack the necessary familiarity with classical Arabic to read them. In this
dissertation I will provide an English translation of a significant portion of
Ghazâli's lengthiest and most systematic work of kalam,
Al-Iqtisad
fï nl-dliqild. It is hoped that
the translation, together with the notes and commentary that accompany it, will
be a further contribution to the ongoing conversation about al-Ghazali and his
thought.
The
Iqtisad ft al-itiqad
The Iqtisad is the fulfillment of an intention
Ghazali stated in Tahdfut al- falasifah to write a constructive work of
theology. Michael E. Marmura has argued, on the basis of George Hourani's
revised chronology,1 that although the descriptor Ghazali uses to
forecast the work he will write is Qawa^ïd al-caqâ^id, which
became the title of a later treatise he incorporated into the Hn/tP culüm
al- dïn, the Iqtisad, coming as soon after the Tahafut as it
does, actually fulfils the commitment better.2 In fact, Ghazali even
uses a phrase that recalls the titles of both works on the first page of the Iqtisad.
He writes, "Indeed, the norm that must needs be followed in principles of
belief (qawa^ïd al-ictiqad) is moderation (iqtisad)
and restraint upon the straight path" (1.14-15).
The Iqtisad has been called Ghazali's "chief
work of dogmatics." W. Montgomery Watt, following Maurice Bouges,
indicates that it was "probably composed shortly before or shortly after
his departure from Baghdad [c. CE 1095]."3
In his revised chronology of Ghazali's works, George F. Hourani argued that the
Itiqsad along with Mïzan al-camal was completed before
or during Ghazali's crisis of faith which led him to abandon his prestigious
post at the Nizamiyya school in Baghdad and enter upon the Sufi path in a
personal quest for authentic religious certitude. Hourani plausibly reasons
that it was unlikely Ghazali composed the Iqtisad after he began his
journey, "for it is hard to believe that this prosaic piece of kalam
was one of the first products of his new life as a Süfi."4 In
fact, he argues, the likelihood was that Mïzan was composed even after Iqtisad
and still in the final year before Ghazali left Baghdad. The seeming lack of
coherence in Mïzan might even be an indication of Ghazali's troubled
state of mind at that time.5 To this evidence we would add that the
pedagogical nature of the Iqtisad—it is addressed to students—also
argues for its completion while Ghazali was still in his profession at the
Nizamiyya.
In any event, Hourani argued,
now that both Itiqsad and Mïzan have been
placed with some confidence in the period when Ghazali was approaching or
actually immersed in the intense spiritual crisis of his life, the importance
of these two works for understanding the evolution of his thought will readily
be understood.
Both of them therefore deserve more serious studies than
they have hitherto received, and they should be read in the context of the
author's revealing account of this state of mind at the time, narrated in Munqïdh
[mïn al-dalal], 122-30.6
The
study of Ghazali's Iqtisad presented here is intended to be a first
small step in that direction. Though a full treatment of what the Iqtisad
reveals about its author's state of mind at the time he wrote it must be
deferred to later studies, a few preliminary observations are included in the
comments that follow. Before that and many other questions can be properly
addressed, however, the Iqtisad— "prosaic" though it may
be—deserves to be studied and understood as a work in its own right.
Toward the end of his career, long after he had crossed
what may be called the ascetic meridian of his life and had become an advocate
for Sufi modes of "knowing" about things divine, Ghazali still held a
positive regard for his Iqtisad. Ghazali claims the Iqtisad has a
greater potential benefit for the prepared reader than the usual works of
kalam.
It is an independent, self-contained, work that contains
the essentials of the science of the mutakallimün. But it is more
adequate in its proofs and more apt to knock at the doors of knowledge (wa
aqrab ila qarc abwab al- macrifa) than the scholastic
jargon (al-kalam al-rasmiyy) encountered in the books of the mutakallimiünJ
Both
Watt and Marmura are correct, I believe, in seeing this statement as
significant because it is a late endorsement by Ghazali of his much earlier
work on kalam, expressed "long after he had become a Sufi and after he had
written such works as the Ihya}.."'' It is therefore
evidence that he "never ceased to be an Ashcari in dogmatics,
even though he came to hold that intellectual discussions in religion should
range far beyond the limited field of dogmatics."9 Thus, too
much should not be made of the fact that Ghazali in some places discusses the
limitations of kalam; for though it does have its limitations—and, as he says
in the Iqtisad itself, it is not incumbent upon all believers—still, it
has its place as an antidote to erroneous beliefs or doubts arising within the
Islamic community.
There has never been a full English translation of Al-Iqtisad
fl al-itiqad, but most of its second part has been translated into English
by cAbdu-r-Rahmân Abu Zayd and published under the title, Al-Ghazall
on Divine Predicates and their Properties; Michael E. Marmura has published
a translation of the first chapter of part two in his article
"Al-Ghazali's Chapter on Divine Power in the Iqtisad"; and
there is a full Spanish translation of the Iqtisad, published in 1929 by
Miguel Asín Palacios as El justo medio en la creencia. I have been
unable to find evidence of published translations of the Iqtisad
(whether in whole or major sections) in any other language.
Abü Zayd's translation covers most but not all of the
second of four major parts into which the Iqtisad is divided.
This section, as Abü Zayd's title indicates, contains Ghazali's explication of
the divine attributes and of the properties common to them all. In his second
introduction to Divine Predicates, Abü Zayd also has an important
analysis of Ghazali's adaptation of the syllogistic method to the kalam genre.
He also translates Ghazali's later stated opinions about the importance of the Iqtisad
as given in both the Ihyâ> culüm al-dïn and Jawahir al-
QuDân. For some reason that he does not explain, he does not translate the
discussion on God's power (the first of the divine attributes), nor does he
translate Ghazali's discussion of the first property of the attributes.
Marmura's translation provides much of what is missing here, together with an
insightful commentary on Ghazali's discussion of divine will.
Though dated and rather free as translations go, Asin's
Spanish rendition of the Iqtisad nevertheless follows the gist of
Ghazali's treatise quite well in most cases. Asín's extensive translations of
and (admittedly Christian-biased) expertise on Ghazali's works (among many others)
remain underappreciated and even unknown among many Western scholars today.10
The translation from the Iqtisad offered herein
covers all of Ghazali's introductory material and the first of the four main
parts into which he divided his treatise. In terms of volume, it covers just
under half of the total content of the book but none of the sections that have
previously been translated into English by the other scholars noted above.
The Arabic text of the Iqtisad I have used is the
critical edition prepared by Çubuçu and Atay (Ankara, 1962). Although it is by
far the best edition of the text, and entirely adequate for our purposes here,
Marmura has shown that it is not yet definitive.11
Organization and Content of the Iqtisad
The Iqtisad is written with students in mind. Its
organization and tone reflect both a pedagogical and a polemical concern. It is
composed as a primer on how to conduct a debate with one's ideological rivals.
It is intended not so much for the actual convincing of real opponents but for
study by the qualified believer who will one day, ostensibly, present similar
arguments in actual debates or contests of ideology. For an audience Ghazali
presumably had in mind his students at the Nizamiyya where he was head lecturer
in legal theory. In the course of his exposition, Ghazali takes positions,
mostly along Ashcarite lines, on a number of basic theological
issues, dialectically presenting and then answering challenges to each of his
claims—challenges such as had been or might have been raised by an incredulous
"opponent." In most cases Ghazali is specifically envisioning an
opponent either from among the extreme literalists (whom he identifies with the
Hashwiyya), the falasifah, or the Muctazilites. He offers his
arguments and rebuttals, taking care to show at key moments that the soundness
and superiority of his position derive from striking a successful balance
between reason and revelation. This is the "moderation in belief" for
which the work as a whole is named.
"Moderation in Belief" is the most widely
accepted and accurate translation
of
the title of this work into English. The term iqtisâd derives from a
root that means to move in a straightforward, direct path, and means prudence
or economy of use—hence, "moderation." Some translators have, by
their choice of terms for this title, connected Ghazali's work to the classical
Greek idea of the "golden mean." Asín's justo medio, carrying
the connotation of the "happy medium," is one example of this, and
Richard J. McCarthy's gloss "The Golden Mean in Belief," which
has been followed by others, is obviously another (see Deliverance, 106
n. 62). Abü Zayd prefers this as the most accurate translation (On Divine
Predicates, xxxix), but his position by no means reflects a unanimous
consensus. Furthermore, it is not at all clear, either from the connotation of
the word iqtisdd or the substance of the work itself, that Ghazali had
any notion of the golden mean in mind; thus, the idea of a "just
balance," is better reserved for glosses of another work of his, Al-Qistas
al-mustaqïm.
Ghazali begins his treatise with praise for God and those
orthodox believers who have been guided to reconcile the requirements of reason
with the claims of revelation, avoiding the pitfalls of unquestioningly
accepting the extremes of the literalists on the one hand and the
intellectualists on the other.12 The one, he says, misunderstand the
revelations because they will not be guided by reason. The others exceed the
limits of orthodoxy by adopting rationalized positions that unnecessarily
contradict the plain meaning of or obvious inferences from revelation. The
right course, he says, is one that puts reason at the service of understanding
and properly interpreting of the revelations. "Reason, together with the
Qur’an, is light upon light" (2.11).
Next comes an explanatory chapter (bab) that amounts
to an annotated outline of the book with its four introductions and four main
sections. Ghazali's principal topic throughout, he announces, will be "God
most high," thus explicitly situating his treatise as a work of theology.
The first introduction (muqadimah) (at 6.5 ff.) is
written to establish that the subject of the treatise is deserving of human
attention, since to waste time on pointless or frivolous topics while salvation
hangs in the balance would be a grave error. It is here that Ghazali makes what
is perhaps the most direct allusion to his own state of mind as he composes the
Iqtisad. He says (6-7) that reports of prophets coming with signs and
wonders, showing evidence that there might indeed be a God who rewards and
punishes people with heaven or hell, have the power to tear peaceful security
from the heart and to fill it with fear and trembling and to move it to study
and pondering. [They can] snatch [the heart] from peace and stillness, and
frighten it with the danger to which one is exposed while living in negligent
ease.
This
passage bears a strong resonance with the personal account Ghazali later
gave
of his six-month struggle to commit himself fully to the Sufi path of
knowledge, a struggle that was underway, as best we can ascertain, during the writing
of the Iqtisad, while Ghazali was still in his teaching position at the
Nizamiyya.
Recalling that period in Munqïdh, Ghazali wrote:
One day I would firmly resolve to leave Baghdad
and disengage myself from those circumstances, and another day I would revoke
my resolution. . . . Mundane desires began tugging me with their chains to
remain as I was, while the herald of faith was crying out: "Away! Up and
away! Only a little is left of your life, and a long journey lies before you!
All the theory and practice in which you are engrossed is eyeservice and
fakery! If you do not prepare now for the afterlife, when will you do so?
And if you do not sever these attachments now, then when will you sever them?
At such thoughts the call would reassert itself
and I would make an irrevocable decision to run off and escape. Then Satan
would return to the attack and say: "This is a passing state: beware, then
of yielding to it! For it will quickly vanish. Once you have given in to it and
given up your present renown and splendid position free from vexation and
renounced your secure situation untroubled by the contention of your
adversaries, your soul might again look longingly at all that—but it would not
be easy to return to it!"13
Ghazali
does not directly say in the Munqïdh that he was in search of salvation,
but rather that his quest was for "sure and certain knowledge."14
The unstated assumption behind all that he says, however, is that any quest for
certainty about anything must find its premise and terminus in God. A belief in
God was so basic to and inseparable from Ghazali's quest for truth that to seek
the one was to seek the other.
It was God, he says, who showed him that there are certain
primary truths that cannot be proven or found out by any rational or empirical
means, they are simply "present in the mind."15 Foremost
of these primary truths is the source that discovers them to the soul in the
first place—that is, God. Thus, for Ghazali, a conviction of the existence of
God and of the other fundamental tenets of the Islamic creed were not just end
points resulting from successful arguments and proofs, but indispensable and
irreducible premises for the acquisition of knowledge by means of the various
human disciplines.
If read in this context, the first introduction to the Iqtisâd
shows contemporary evidence of Ghazali's growing sense of spiritual
malaise—that to know of the existence of God and of the punishment or reward of
the afterlife was not enough; he was responsible to do something about
this knowledge by renouncing the world, seeking purity, and obtaining a more
direct knowledge of God. He writes:
Once all of this has become clear for us, we would then
undoubtedly be obliged—if we were prudent—to take our precautions and look to
our souls and to despise this transitory world in comparison with that other,
everlasting realm. Thus, the reasonable man sees to his destiny and is not
deceived by his own works. . . .
There is no other course, once the impulse to
find out [about these things] has occurred, than to instigate a quest for
salvation (8).
Ghazali's
first introduction to the Iqtisad may thus be read as a poignant
meditation upon his own soul's predicament and evidence of the life-changing
course of action he was contemplating when he wrote it. Less than a year after
completing the Iqtisad he would renounce his position at the Nizamiyya
and embark on the life of a Sufi ascetic. He would journey to Damascus and
submit to the tutorship of one of the Sufi masters there; he would go to
Jerusalem and meditate for many days in the grotto within the Dome of the Rock;
and he would perform the Haj.16 Ten years later he would return to
public life and write his magnum opus, the Ilii/tT culüm al-dïn
(Revival of the Religious Sciences), a comprehensive treatment of what he
believed true Islam entailed—not only in creed and outward practice but, at
least as significantly, in private, inward sincerity of intent and devotion.
The Second and Third Introductions
In the second introduction (9.2 ff.), Ghazali compares rational
arguments to the physician's medications, which can do more harm than good if
not employed judiciously. He then divides people into four different classes.
The first group are what we might call the simple
believers, who accept the revelations and prophethood of Muhammad on simple,
untroubled faith. He respectfully includes the first generation of Muslims in
this category, writing with a sense of admiration for those whose faith is not
clouded by sophistical pretensions.
The second group (10.5) are the unbelievers and innovators.
It is significant that he puts the two in the same group, but his intent here
is somewhat difficult to discern, for he does not specify who or what precisely
he means by "unbeliever" or "innovator" (al-mubtadacah).
However, in the Faysal al-tafriqa bayna al-islam wal-zandaqa
(Distinguishing the Difference between Islam and Heresy), Ghazali offers this
advice:
[R]estrain your tongue, to the best of your ability, from
indicting the people who face Mecca (on charges of Unbelief) as long as they
say, "There is no god but God, Muhammad is the messenger of God,"
without categorically contradicting this. And for them to contradict this
categorically is for them to affirm the possibility that the Prophet, with or
without an excuse, delivered lies. Indeed branding people Unbelievers is a
serious matter. Remaining silent, on the other hand, entails no liability at
all.17
In
other words, Ghazâlï held that anyone who sincerely made the profession of
faith
should not be classed as an unbeliever unless they in one way or another
demonstrated that they believed Muhammad to be false in his claim to prophecy.
Of
those facing Mecca to pray, he implies, this ought to be a small group indeed.
Relative to charging with the lesser but still serious
transgression of
"innovation"
(bida}a)—which means to introduce teachings or practices that
are
not
warranted by the canonical authorities of the Qur’an, Hadith, and learned
consensus
(ijmacah)—Ghazâlï says that one case in which the charge is
merited is when the claims made by a person or party are not sufficiently
buttressed by the logical proofs they adduce.
If. . . the logical proof is not definitive but gives rise
to a preponderance of probability while not posing any known threat to
religion, such as (that underlying) the Muctazilites' negation of
the beatific vision, then this constitutes an unsanctioned innovation, not an
act of Unbelief.18
Ghazâlï
deals with the specifics of this example in part one, proposition nine of the Iqtisad,
which we will discuss in its place.
Ghazali composed the Faysal as a response to what he
felt was an over- zealous attitude among the various dogmatic schools; they
were too prone to accuse one another of unbelief over theological
disagreements. His tone there is more conciliatory and magnanimous than it is
here in the Iqtisad. In this section, for example, he frankly says (10.5
ff.) that the innovators and unbelievers are boorish, lacking the intelligence
to follow the plainly revealed truth, let alone the kinds of arguments made in
kalam. The whip or the sword might convince them, but even the most spot-on
arguments will not, he says in this rather convoluted passage. In fact, logical
arguments will only tend to set such ignorant folk deeper in their erroneous
views.
The third group (11.3) is subdivided into two further
groups. Individuals in each group are acquainted with orthodoxy, but they are
troubled by doubts or uncertainty regarding their beliefs. One doubts because
of questions their own analytical natures have led them to ask. The other
doubts because of acquaintance with doubt-promoting assertions or arguments
from others.
Ghazali
says that the remedy to such doubts should be carefully calibrated to the needs
and capacities of the "patients" to whom it is applied, with the
strong medicine of demonstrative proofs being used as a last resort, and with
reserve even then.
The fourth group (11.14) are "people in error"
(which is presumably more than just having doubts, as those in the third group
have) who might with the proper, benevolent treatment be led to accept the
truth. In this context Ghazali gives a pointed warning against fanaticism or
harshness in contending for the faith. Such antagonism, he says, only leads
people to resist correction, "so their false beliefs take even deeper root
in their souls." Those who lend such counterproductive "help,"
he says, "will be held to account on the day of judgment."
In the third introduction (13.3) Ghazali states his
position that the discipline of kalam is a community rather than an individual
obligation. He also famously states his opinion that of the three
disciplines—kalam, canon law (al-fiqh), and medicine—canon law is the
most important because it is needed by both the well and the sick, doubter and
believer alike. Ghazâli's position is an unusual one in that it reverses the
priority often found in the writings of jurist-theologians who held that kalam (usül
al-dîn) was logically prior to legal theory (usül al-fiqh). The
postulates upon which legal theory was built were typically supplied by kalam.
It was within kalam that fundamental truth claims and principles were
established, and upon these the more prosaic or mundane judgments of the
Islamic law were based. Ghazali's attitude seems to have been that this did not
necessarily have to be so. The fact that he included discussions of logic in
his works on legal theory might be read as an indication that he thought the
fundamentals for legal reasoning such as kalam usually provided could be
workout within the science itself, without any further resort to kalam.19
At the very least it might be said that Ghazali approached the question of the
relative merits of the sciences from a pragmatic rather than theoretical
perspective. He simply asked which of the professions would be needed by the
most number of people, and the answer was canon law.
Ghazali's attitude toward kalam has been much discussed by
scholars. To be sure, Ghazali does say that kalam is important, even essential,
but it is so for a more narrow reason than jurisprudence is. McCarthy uses this
as evidence that
Ghazali
"almost regarded [kalam] as a necessary evil.
He recognized its essential character of a defensive
apologetic and countenanced its use in certain limited cases as a possible
remedy for those beset with doubts about the faith. Interestingly enough, his
very last work, completed a few days before his death, was Iljam al-cawâmm
'an al- khawd fl cIlm al-kalam [Curbing the Masses from Engaging
in the Science of Kalam].20
Late
in his career, as he wrote his autobiographical Munquidh mln al-dalal,
Ghazali
recalled that for him personally the science of kalam had not been
adequate
to his spiritual needs because
they based their arguments on premises which they took from
their opponents and which they were compelled to admit by naïve belief (taqlidd),
or the consensus of the community, or bare acceptance of the Qur’an and
Traditions. . . .
This was of
little use in the case of one who admitted nothing at all save logically
necessary truths. Theology was not adequate to my case and was unable to cure
the malady of which I complained.............
[T]hey did not deal with the question thoroughly
in their thinking and consequently did not arrive at results sufficient to
dispel universally the darkness of confusion due to the different views of men.
I do not exclude the possibility that for others than myself these results have
been sufficient; indeed, I do not doubt that this has been so for quite a
number. But these results were mingled with naïve belief in certain matters
which are not included among first principles.
My purpose here, however, is to describe my own
case, not to disparage those who sought a remedy thereby, for the healing drugs
vary with the disease. How often one sick man's medicine proves to be another's
poison!21
Ghazali
continued to affirm a place and a need for the science of kalam within
the
Islamic community to the end of his life, but he also continued to believe that
the scope of its relevance and usefulness was limited. One could be a devout
Muslim and find "success" in obtaining salvation without it.
In the fourth introduction (15.8), Ghazali presents the
methods of proof that he will be using throughout the treatise. This section is
valuable in its own right as a précis of demonstrative methods, perhaps the
briefest of several that Ghazali penned over the span of his career. He himself
mentions, for example, the Mihakk al-nazar fl al-mantiq and the Micyar
al-cilm. Asín gives an analysis of the contents of these two
manuals on logic in the second appendix to his translation of the Iqtisad.
He also notes that in the introduction to Al-Mustasfa min (ilm
al-usul, Ghazali summarizes the doctrine of the aforementioned manuals and
that in the first seven chapters of Qistas he also discusses the rules
of the categorical, hypothetical, and disjunctive syllogisms—the same kinds of
syllogisms he reviews here. Finally, the first book of Maqasid al-falasifah
is dedicated to logic per
„ 22 se.
In the Mihak, Micyar, and Maqasid,
Ghazali discusses the conditions for syllogistic reasoning, beginning with
definitions of terms and categories (including grammar and lexical analysis),
continuing with propositions and conclusions, and finally discussing various
kinds of syllogism and proof, all based on the Aristotelian system. In Quistas,
Mustasfa, and the Iqtisad he forgoes any formal presentation of
preliminaries to the syllogism and simply discusses kinds of demonstration. Of
these latter three works, the Quistas has the most detailed discussion
of the several kinds of syllogism, ranging over a number of chapters. The summary
in the Iqtisad is more concise.
In this section of the Iqtisâd Ghazali follows a
pattern common to his discussions of logic in other works—that is, he uses the
argument for the temporal creation of the world as the example to illustrate
his demonstrative methodology. He offers more detailed arguments against the
eternity of the world later in the treatise (see 27.7, ff.).
The first method of proof Ghazali discusses (15.12-16.10)
is called sabr w'al- taqsïm, which I have translated as "disjunctive
reasoning." Some clarification of what Ghazali intended here is wanted. As
defined in general terms, sabr w'al- taqsïm is "a demonstrative
method in which the question is divided into all possible cases and then each
case is rejected until one 'valid' case remains."23 It is thus
a kind of argument through elimination (called burhân al-tamanuc
by al- Juwayni).24 There is some question as to whether this should
be called a syllogism in the technical sense, since the first term can
technically contain more than two disjuncts; nevertheless, it is still possible
to phrase the entire argument in syllogistic form. Thus, for example, either A
or B or C or D; but not A, not B, and not D; therefore C. In any event, the
example Ghazali gives of sabra w'al- taqsïm still employs a disjunct
with only two alternatives and a conclusion, thus conforming fully to the
classical form of the disjunctive syllogism.
Asín, for his part, translates Ghazali's sabra wa
al-taqsïm as "exploracíon dilemática," meaning "dilemmatic
speculation." This choice of words however, seems to miss the mark.
Dilematic reasoning has been defined as a form of disjunctive proof. The basic
disjunctive syllogism has two moods. One is to affirm one part of the
disjunction in the minor and deny the other in the conclusion; e.g. the earth
is either at rest or in motion; now the earth is in motion; therefore it is not
at rest.25
The
second is to
deny one part of the disjunction in the minor and affirm
the other in the conclusion; e.g. the earth is either at rest or in motion; now
the earth is not
at rest; therefore it is in motion.26
In
either of these moods the truth claim of the minor term is either an
affirmation or a denial of one disjunct of the major, yielding its opposite as
a conclusion. But in the dilemmatic mode there is no conclusion per se. Rather,
the major term provides two alternatives in a disjunctive proposition, as
usual, but then, rather than a minor term that denies or affirms one of the
disjuncts and yields the other as the conclusion, both parts of the
disjunct are answered in a way unfavorable to the opponent.27 This
is not Ghazali's method, however. As he himself states it, his aim is to so
construct the syllogism so that "no matter what the opponent admits of the
two root premises, he will also necessarily and unavoidably have to admit the
branch [conclusion] that derives from both of them, and that is the truth of
the claim." Thus, Ghazali's example: "The world is either temporal or
it is eternal; but it is absurd [or impossible] that it should be eternal;
therefore it is temporal" is not a dilemmatic syllogism in the strict
sense because it has a single major premise and a conclusion rather than two
conditional minor premises. It is disjunctive syllogism.
The second method Ghazali mentions (16.11) is the
categorical syllogism. He does not say so, but it may be presumed that any of
the various moods of the categorical are intended. He discusses each of these
in detail in the section on logic of the Maqasid.
The third method (17.2) is reductio ad absurdum. It
is a fairly explicit statement of the method Ghazali used throughout much of
the Tahdfut. Marmura has noted that in some arguments made in the Tahafut
Ghazali adopts, or seems to adopt, positions that he later repudiates in the Iqtisdd.
The reason for this, as Marmura persuasively argues, is not that Ghazali had
changed his mind or was being inconsistent in his beliefs, but rather that he
was resorting to this method of adopting his opponents' own premises for the
sake of an argument ad absurdum2
Ghazâli's example at this point is not easy to follow and
seems a rather weak demonstration of the method. Summarized, the argument seems
to be: If the revolutions of the sphere have no end [as the opponent claims],
then that which has no end has come to an end; this result is absurd;
therefore, the premise is absurd. But Ghazali does not explain what he has in
mind when he states that something that has no end has ended, or what his basis
is for asserting that such has been the case. Without that explanation, the
example remains ambiguous. It would seem that Ghazâlï simply intends give a
foretaste of the kind of reductio ad absurdum argument he will be using,
without making any attempt at this point to answer the various objections and
ambiguities that his chosen example seems to contain—problems he would have to
address if he were really trying to establish his claim. He does acknowledge
the possibility and even likelihood of objections to both premises of his
example; that he does not answer them immediately might be forgiven if it is
assumed he is giving it only for purposes of illustration here. However, when
Ghazâlï raises the example again (32.9) in the context of proving the
temporality (or origination in time) of the world, he does no more at that
point than in his introduction to explain what he means when he says "something
that has no end has ended." His version of the same argument in the Tahafut
is equally as vague.29 We are left to make the best interpretation
of it that we can.
I suggest that he might be playing on the distinction
between actual and potential infinites (as Aristotle discussed them—or actual
and improper infinites as Hegel would later write of them). The revolutions of
the spheres as described here are at best potential infinites, since at any
given moment the spheres are at a particular point in their path and have not yet
completed their endless revolutions, and in that sense they may be thought of
as stopped, their position finite and measured with finite numbers. The
potential infinite presupposes the ability to enumerate the revolutions up to
any given point and thereby, effectively, stop or cut off what was supposed to
have been infinite. To be actually infinite, those unending revolutions must
already be actual and therefore beyond measure—because they are infinite.
Ghazali seems to be saying that such an actual infinite is not possible.30
Ghazali, like others of his school, is clearly
uncomfortable with the idea of anything other than God having infinite
duration, motion, or extension. He rejects the infinite divisibility of atoms,
any infinite regress of accident in substrate, and the infinite motion of the
spheres, all in the interest of denying any coeternal being with God, a
position which is in turn demanded by his commitment to a straightforward
reading of the revealed word, that God is the creator—that is, the
originator—of the world (cosmos).
Before continuing Ghazali pauses (18.10 ff.) to chide those
who get bogged down in arguments over semantics rather than coming to a clear
understanding of the basic concepts involved and moving forward. In this regard
he also entertains an ostensible objection raised by a pupil who wonders if it
may not be important to know the precise ways that different schools employ the
various technical terms. Ghazali's conviction that underlying ideas are more
important than the language used to expresses them and that becoming fixated on
terminology will only lead to confusion and unnecessary wrangling is a hallmark
of his approach in the Iqtisad. Lazarus-Yafeh has shown that in some of
his earliest works, such as Mi'yâr al-cilm and Mihakk
al-nazar, Ghazali can be seen using the "commonly accepted
terminology" of the science of logic, but that "he seems to discard
it completely from the Itiqsad on."31 Lazarus-Yafeh
identifies a number of passages in Ghazali's oeuvre where Ghazali states
that he is interested in the content, the ideas ("Macani"),
rather than in the correct expressions ("Alfaz") of his writings, and
he seems to include technical terminology ("Istilah") among the
latter. Already in his introduction to the "Tahafut" he mentions that
he will use in this book technical terminology only to address his
philosophical opponents in order to impress them with his own mastery of, and
familiarity with, their subject. Later on, however, he developed a certain
contempt for accurate terminology, maintaining that fastidiousness of
expression distracts the reader's attention from the intrinsic, real meaning
("Haqa’iq") of the content.32
As
evidence, Lazarus-Yafeh cites the passage mentioned above from Tahafut,
the passage mentioned here from the fourth introduction to the Itiqsad,
three others from Ihya>, and one from Mishkat al-anwar (ibid.,
260-61). In the notes to the translation I mention a number of further
instances where Ghazali seems to be changing terms while still referencing the
same concepts. This emphasis on ideas rather than terminology may well be a
further reason for Ghazali's later favorable appraisal of the Iqtisad
over other works of kalam as "coming closer to the doors of
knowledge" than they.33 It was more important to see to the
heart of a matter and understand the true meaning of something than to merely
have a command of the jargon. It was his quest to discover the truth of things
that drove Ghazali across the ascetic meridian of his life, and it is no small
factor in the style of his writing in the Iqtisad.
Ghazali concludes this section with an interesting
discussion of the mental activity involved in the construction of a logical argument
that proves a desired proposition. It is significant that he is teaching a
system in which the "desired result" comes first and determines the
argument to be made in support of it. But how does one determine what the
"desired result" ought to be in the first place?
On my
reading, Ghazali derives these logical targets from the claims of the revealed,
divine word, the reality and veracity of which are themselves sustained by
logical proofs. That there is a God and that he reveals his word by chosen messengers—chief
among them the Prophet Muhammad—are claims that do not rely on faith alone for
their acceptance. They are subject to logical demonstration, and, once
demonstrated, they inform the further arguments to be made, such as that the
world is created, not pre-eternal, that God is visible, and that miracles are
simply the operation of the divine will to enact events that do not conform to
the usual pattern. The claims of revelation also inform the counter arguments
to be made against those whose reasoning or uncritical acceptance of tradition
have led them to conclusions incompatible with the revelations.
Ghazali enumerates six sources of cognition (mudarik).
I take these to mean, the starting points for logical arguments. The first of
these he calls the evidence of the senses and includes both that which is
perceived externally (al-mushahidah al-zahirah) and internally (al-mushahidah
al-batinah). In a later treatise, the Mustasfa, Ghazali elaborates
these two modes separately, but here and in the Miycar, he
combines them under the single rubric of that which is perceived by the senses.34
The second source is "purely intellectual" (al-caql
al-mahd), which recognizes such a priori truths as constitute the very
foundations of logical reasoning. The third is "corroborative
reports" (al-mutawatir) which was most often invoked and explained
in works of jurisprudence, a discipline in which Ghazali distinguished himself.
Based on Ghazali's discussion of it in his late work on jurisprudence, Mustasfa,
the theory of tawatur has been stated by Weiss as follows:
the widespread recurrence of true statements about past
events produces in the minds of hearers a knowledge that these statements are
true.35
Weiss
goes on to explain that
"widespread" must. . . be understood to
mean "on a scale sufficient to rule out the possibility of collaborative
fabrication." From this statement of the theory two corollaries follow:
(1) a recurrence of true statements about past events which is not widespread
does not produce in the minds of hearers a knowledge that these statements are
true, and likewise (2) the widespread recurrence of false statements about past
events does not produce in the minds of hearers a knowledge that they are true................................ What
the second corollary is meant to say is that knowledge,
though a subjective state, cannot exist apart from its proper object. . . . If
the statement is false, one cannot have the knowledge that it is true.36
In
the Iqtisâd Ghazali gives an instructive example of a use for tawatur
having to do with a foreigner who will not accept the veracity of the Prophet
Muhammad's revelation of the Qur’an. It is significant because of the light it
sheds on how Ghazâlï understood tawatur. In the example (23.7), the
foreigner has not heard of Muhammad's call as a prophet and cannot, therefore,
be expected to accept his revelation of the Qur’an until he has had
"sufficient time to be informed by those corroborative reports" of
the Prophet's existence, his calling, and revelations. Implicit in his statement,
though, is the assumption that, "God willing," such a person will
eventually be exposed to a sufficient (kamil) number37 of
witnesses to the veracity of Muhammad's prophetic mission that a certainty that
such a man did in fact live and did in fact reveal the Qur’an will become
established in his mind. This certainty will take hold not just because of the
large number of witnesses to it, but because, in addition, and crucially, it is
in fact true. If it were not, it would not take hold, Ghazâlï says, despite the
number of witnesses. As Weiss has put it:
The theory expounded by Ghazzali [in Mustasfa]
affirms simply that if a statement about a past event is true in the sense of
being empirically based and if it is sufficiently widely circulated to rule out
the possibility of collaborative fabrication there will occur spontaneously in
the mind of the hearer, i.e. without any logical antecedents, a knowledge that
the statement is true.38
This
is obviously a problematic position as viewed from modern norms of empiricism
and logic. One is tempted to ask, for example, what Ghazâlï would do with the
Christians and Jews who "know" widely and persistently attested yet,
from his perspective, erroneous things about the sacred past? Would he say that
they in fact doubt the veracity of their faith claims because it is simply not
possible to really believe a falsehood? Ghazali seems to offer no answer. He
simply classifies knowledge based on corroborative reports as primary knowledge
because it has no logical antecedents. It simply occurs within the soul, given
the right conditions, through a process that remains unconscious,
"hidden." "The logic entailed in the 'hidden' reasoning,"
Weiss observes, "is obscure at best, and Ghazali does not choose to
elaborate upon it."39
Nevertheless, because he does
say that it comes about without any logical or empirical antecedents, it is to
be classed, in his system, among the sources of primary rather than derivative
knowledge.
With the fifth and sixth sources of knowledge, which we
examine further below, Ghazali differs significantly from his other, later
enumeration of the sources of knowledge (i.e., in the Mustasfa). In
particular, there is no mention here of induction (al-tajribîyah), while
in the Mustasfa the fifth and sixth sources discussed here are omitted.
The fifth source (22.5) he calls "things
that are heard" (al-samciyydt). In one sense this term
corresponds roughly to Aristotle's concept of legomena (things commonly said),
but is understood within a more formal framework. Weiss has pointed out that
this is roughly synonymous with naqliyyat ("things that are
transmitted") and manqulat ("things that are reported"),
the idea in all of these cases being to indicate knowledge that derives from an
historical or traditional authority and has been handed down from one person to
the next. "Samciyyat represents tradition from the point
of view of the hearer.....
Included under this
heading
are things like the events of the latter days and the hereafter
(eschatology)—things that can only be known from tradition, not through
reason."40 Ghazali later acknowledges that premises from things
that are heard "are not useful except for persons who accept them as valid
criteria" (23.15).
The sixth and last source (22.12) is the premise taken from
the propositions that the opponent concedes. This kind of premise is
interesting because of its tactical nature. Here is an explicit statement of
one of the methods Ghazali famously used in Tahâfut al-falâsifa, arguing
from premises that he himself did not accept, but which his opponents did.
Michael Marmura has discussed this kind of argument by Ghazâlï, showing that
what has sometimes been mistaken for inconsistency or vacillation on Ghazali's
part is really simply attributable to this tactic.41 It might be
asked how this method differs from the second— argumentum ad absurdum.
After all, the point of adopting the propositions of one's opponent is
ostensibly to show them to be untenable—that is, absurd. A partial answer might
be that this sixth mode is more restricted still, because, as Ghazali puts it,
it is "not useful for rational speculation except to be used in reasoning
with someone who adheres to that school of thought"—in other words,
someone who holds the premises to be valid (23.14). This is different from argumentum
ad absurdum which might proceed from hypothetical premises that neither
party to the discussion concedes but which nevertheless ultimately serve to
establish one's position. In the sixth method Ghazali does not necessarily say
that the point of the argument is to invalidate the premises the opponent
accepts. The point might not be to reach a conclusion that is valid, but simply
one that can be used to refute the opponent. It might even be that Ghazali had ad
hominem arguments in mind here.42
Ghazâlï's first proposition concerning God's essence is
that God exists. Ghazâlï begins immediately with the argument for a cause for
the existence of the temporal world—which cause must be nontemporal. In the
process of setting up the argument, Ghazâlï pauses to define key terms such as
"world," "substance," and "body." Ghazâlï defines
the world as "every existent other than God most high" which, in
turn, he defines as "all bodies and their accidents." It bears noting
here that God is exempted from the temporality of the world on the basis that
he has neither body nor accidents. However, this has not yet been proven. In
fact, as the context makes clear, Ghazâlï is proceeding on the basis that God
is by definition the only non-corporeal and non-temporal existent.
But the basis for such a definition is not provided here. That the world and
things in it are temporal may be observed by the senses, but that God is beyond
the world and outside of time are still not established and will not be
established in this section, but rather in the next four propositions.
Ghazâlï's proof for God as the Maker of the world quickly
becomes involved in a complex of ancillary arguments and proofs having to do
with the terms and supporting arguments needed to establish the main syllogism,
which he concludes only at the very end of the chapter (34.14). The definitions
and explanations of basic terms in physical theory ("world,"
"substance," "body," etc.) that Ghazali proffers during the
course of this chapter are admittedly sparse relative to the size and
complexity of the issues they involve. This may well be attributable to his
view of kalam as a limited means to a narrowly defined end (resolving doubts
among a certain segment of the Muslim community) rather than a comprehensive
ontology.43 Certainly it can be said that other kalam thinkers wrote
at much greater length on these topics and covered other subjects (such as the
nature of space and movement) that Ghazali remains almost entirely silent on in
the Iqtisad. Nevertheless, what he does have to say about the various
topics he visits in this and other chapters constitute important statements of
his position on several basic matters; and those positions serve to establish
his affiliation with the Ashcarite school of thought and his
opposition to the ideas of both the Muctazilites and the falasifah4
One of the most important terms Ghazali raises at this
point is jawhar, which I usually translate as "substance,"
since the discussion often refers to jawhar as the substrate for
accident. Lane writes that "in the conventional language of scholastic
theology jawhar signifies Substance, as opposed to accident"
(Lexicon, 476a). In his translation of the second part of the Iqtisad,
where the context again is usually a discussion of accidents and their
substrates, Abu Zayd (Divine Predicates) also uses "substance"
to render jawhar (see, for example, pp. 3-4). The first time Ghazali
uses the term (24.10) he adds the qualifying term fard, meaning
"simple," thus giving "single substance." Ghazali defines
"single substance" as that which occupies space but cannot be differentiated
within itself (in other words, is indivisible). This indicates the most
irreducible form of substance that is, the atom.
Although other Ashcarites proffered other
definitions for jawhar (Juwayni, for example, offered several
definitions, including "that which occupies space," "that which
has volume [hajrn]," and "that which receives accidents")45
the basic idea seems to hold that, within kalam, jawhar meant
indivisible substance. In any event, Ghazali's view is in distinct contrast to
the falsafah definition which affirmed the divisibility of physical
entities ad infinitum. This was a fundamental difference between the schools of
kalam and the falasifah. Ghazali's teacher, al-
Juwayni,
wrote that
Among the most important foundations of religion (aczam
arkan al-dïn) is denying an infinite regress of temporally created objects (hawadith).
The proof (dalala) for the temporal creation of the world cannot
continue to stand without the establishment of this [premise].46
The
kalam denial of the infinite divisibility of the atom was required by their
commitment to the temporal origination of the world and of all material bodies
(which are composed of atoms). To admit the infinite divisibility of an atom
would be to allow the possibility of other kinds of infinite regress, including
an infinite regress of time and causation, which threatened the argument for
God as the origin of temporal matter.
In recent years a debate has emerged over aspects of
Ghazâll's view of God's causality, and though much of the evidence used in the
various readings and arguments derives from the second part of the Iqtisad
and is therefore somewhat outside the scope of this study, a brief overview of
the issues is warranted. For though the minutiae of the arguments have to do
with God's causality, the larger issue is whether Ghazâli owed greater
allegiance to the Ashcarite school of kalam or to the peripatetic
school of the falasifah. Richard Frank first raises the subject in a
1991 monograph entitled Creation and the Cosmic System where he argues
that Ghazâlï, while rejecting certain tenets of Avicennan-style philosophy,
nevertheless seems to adopt the falsafah position on matters that are
even more fundamental, such as whether God is or is not the direct cause
of every event, regardless of any appearance to the contrary (such as the
regular operation of forces in nature, the actions of angels or humans, etc.).
The Ashcarite occasionalist position held staunchly that God is the
direct cause of every event, but Frank adduces evidence that Ghazâlï tacitly
did not hold this, concluding that
from a theological standpoint, most of the [falsafah]
theses which [Ghazâlï] rejected are relatively tame and inconsequential
compared to some of those in which he follows the philosopher.47
This
position was elaborated further by Frank in a second book, Al-Ghazâlï and
the Ashcarite School, to which further reference is made in the
notes to the translation.
To this position (particularly as first put forward in Creation
and the Cosmic System) Marmura has responded with a careful and
well-informed analysis of the evidence from Ghazâlï's oeuvre. He has shown that
Frank's critical points in
Creation
and the Cosmic System are based
either on questionable readings in the original, on prejudiced translations of
his own, or on ambiguous passages that might be interpreted one way or another
but where Ghazali's established pattern of thought would argue for the reading
that Frank wants to overthrow.48 Further evidence that in Al-Ghazal!
and the Ashcarite School Frank continues to read
Ghazali
as a sometime crypto-Aristotelian, a theory that he attempts to buttress with
sometimes forced and even inaccurate readings, is offered in the notes to the
translation of the first proposition.49
The Second and Third Propositions
In the second and third propositions Ghazali argues for the
eternity of God a parte ante and a parte post respectively. His
discussion of proposition two (35.4— 11) is very brief, based on the argument
that if God is the origin of the world he must have no beginning himself or
else he would in turn have an originator and so on ad infinitum. Based on this
same argument, Ghazali adds that God's preeternity is essential and not
something superadded to his nature (as the attributes are).
The third proposition, on God's eternal duration is more
involved, in part because Ghazali draws up the discussion to include the
quarrel with the Muctazilites over whether nonbeing is a positive
reality in the same sense as being, and again because he pauses (37.5) to set
forth his occasionalist doctrine of substances and accidents being continually
originated and annihilated in their essence, in contrast to God, whose essence
is to be and to remain from eternity to eternity. As Dhanani has shown, the
occasionalism of the Ashcarites, which we find alive and well in
Ghazali's writings, seems to be based on a "lattice" model wherein
not only space, but also time is composed of minimal units that are not
susceptible of any further division, much like matter is composed of
irreducible substances (atoms). On this model, from instant to instant God is
continually creating and annihilating the substances that constitute the world.
Something that is said to be at rest is really a new version of that thing from
instant to instant, created by God with substances appearing same arrangement,
filling the same places in the lattice as the ones previous, which have just
been annihilated. Something in motion is undergoing the same process of
continual creation and annihilation of its component substances (atoms), only
these are created by God in cells of the lattice that are contiguous to the
cells where the substance existed in the previous instant. The strong
determinism of the occasionalist model entails problems—including such fundamental
questions as the meaning or purpose of anything's existence other than God, the
meaning of human agency, and the notion of possible worlds (if God annihilates
and originates everything instant by instant, is each instant tantamount to a
new world?). A more detailed and careful analysis of these questions is
warranted but lies outside the scope of this survey.
In discussing the pre- and post- eternity of God as aspects
of his essence, Ghazali differs from his teacher, Juwayini, and the Ashcarite
school more generally where nearly every aspect—whether positive or negative—of
God's existence (and sometimes even his existence) was characterized in one way
or another as attribute. Juwayni, for example, speaks of essential attributes (sifat
nafsiyya) and conceptual attributes (sifat mac nawiyyah).
He does not discuss God's existence as an attribute because, as he says,
"existence is the essence itself."50 However, among the
essential attributes, Juwayni says, are God's pre-eternity, omnipotence,
difference from contingent beings, and oneness.51 Significantly,
Juwayni holds that God's post eternity, rather than being an essential
attribute like God's pre-eternity, is not an attribute additional to God's
essence but is identical with his continued existence. In this he, too,
departed from the usual Ashcarite position which held that God's
post-eternity was a conceptual attribute like knowledge and power. But
Juwayni's position here seems problematic within the context of his own
thought. In arguing that post-eternity is not an attribute, he says that
"if we accepted such an eternal attribute, it would also necessarily be
pre-eternal, and this leads to an infinite regress"52 which
then begs the question as to why he has already characterized God's
pre-eternity as an attribute. Ghazali avoids these and other problems by
establishing a more consistent position with respect to God's pre- and
post-eternity and by (apparently) using the criteria of what applies to God's
existence as the way to differentiate between aspects of his essence and the
attributes that are applied to him. The difference is between aspects (or
concepts relating to) God's existence and the accidents that pertain to him
not just his existence. This difference might be best expressed in terms of the
language that must be used to apply the various concepts to God. Thus, for
example, God is eternal (or, his existence is eternal); he is
noncorporeal (or, his existence is noncorporeal); and he is visible (his
existence is visible), etc.; but God does live, does speak, does
will, etc. and it is not his existence that does these things, but God
himself. The aspects of his existence are affirmed of what he is, the
accidents are affirmed of what he does. More will be said on this
subject below, in the concluding section of the introduction.
However
much is said on this subject, though, the problem remains that Ghazali himself
does not explicitly explain why he has made the distinctions he has and taken
such a different approach to the question of God's essence and attributes than
any of his predecessors.
The Fourth through Eighth Propositions
The next three propositions Ghazali discusses all share in
Ghazali's via negativa approach, denying any physical aspect of God.
Thus, God is neither substance, body, nor accident as those terms are typically
understood. The argument that God is not body (39.7 ff.) depends on the
argument that he is not substance, which Ghazali argues in turn based on God's
eternal essence (38.2 ff.), for if he were to occupy space (as he would by
definition if a substance or body), he would be subject to movement or rest,
which are temporal in essence and therefore have nothing to do with God.
The proposition that God is not accident (40.2 ff.) relies
in turn on the claim that accident by definition cannot exist independently of
a substrate—that is, something that is essentially body or corporeal substance.
Again the semantic definition of the terms is critical, and Ghazali allows that
if accident is taken to mean an attribute that has no temporal or corporeal
basis, the nature of the argument shifts from one about whether God has
attributes (called accidents) to one about whether such attributes apply to his
essence or are additional to it (40.9 ff.). Given these parameters, Ghazali
still opts for the via negativa, denying any attribute of God's essence
but allowing that attributes may be superadded to the divine essence.
With the seventh proposition (41.2) Ghazali continues his
contention that there is no spatial aspect to God: He is neither "up"
nor "down," nor on any other "side," if these terms are
taken to refer to three dimensional space. Furthermore, God is no
"state" residing in any corporeal substance (such as the celestial
spheres?)53 whereby he would be in any or all of their spatial
sides. Thus this claim, too, is based on those preceding it—specifically, that
God is not body and God is not accident.
In reply to questions about what must therefore be the
meaning of facing the qibla or bowing to the dust if God is in no particular
place (44.3 ff.), Ghazali digresses into a lucid explanation of the spiritual
reasons for such revealed requirements. It may be that such sections as this by
Ghazali are part of the reason he opined of the Iqtisâd that it brought
men closer to the gates of gnosis than other works of kalam. At least, Ghazali
attributes the aptness of his discussion to the virtue of seeing beyond the
superficial and delving "more deeply into the mysteries of the
hearts." It is a discussion much like those found in the Ihya\
which he was to compose only after a long period of personal cleansing and
meditation.
Ghazali then resumes the discussion of God having no
spatial aspect and reiterates an argument, the premises of which he has
previously established. Every being that occupies place is temporal; every
temporal being ultimately requires a nontemporal agent for its existence;
therefore, there must be a being that does not occupy place. The conclusion is
based on the equivalence of temporality and dimensionality. If what exists in
time and space must ultimately be traced to an originator devoid of either, and
if God is that originator, then God must be devoid of any temporal or spatial
aspect.
Finally, in response to another objection, Ghazali offers
some statements on the conceivability and intelligibility of God (49.8 ff.).54
God, he says, cannot be fully comprehended by the limited, human mind, but his
existence and other aspects of his essence can be shown through logical proofs.
Ghazali's final move down the via negativa is to
address certain problems raised for his positions by the anthropomorphic
imagery of the Qur’an. In this he followed the model of his teacher in kalam,
al-Juwayni, though the kind of arguments he offers are different from Juwayni's
in significant ways.55 Ghazali specifically singles out the imagery
of God sitting upon a throne for discussion in this, his eighth proposition
(50.15 ff.).
Invoking the points he has just made about God having no
spatial or temporal aspect (including accident), Ghazali argues against the
literal interpretation of God sitting on a throne. He must then offer an
alternative explanation for the meaning of such passages as indicate that God
has any kind of relation to temporal or spatial objects (51.7 ff.). It is in
this context that Ghazali becomes most explicit about his doctrine of
withholding intellectual or allegorical interpretations of the sacred texts
from the common person and only imparting them to those who are intellectually
capable of receiving them. Here he is referring to any problematical,
anthropomorphic allusion that someone might ask about, not just those about the
sitting on the throne.
As for his own position, Ghazali says a proper response
"should conform to what some of the forefathers (salâf) said"
(52.4). The dictum Ghazali reports from the "forefathers" is:
"That he is seated is known, in what manner (al-kayfiyya) is not
known. . . ." Asin's translation of this passage has Ghazali naming the
author of the quote here as Malik ibn Anas. Asin's basis for doing this is
uncertain on one level at least, since none of the manuscript traditions name
Malik but simply refer to "some of the forefathers." On the
other hand, it is possible that Ghazali, though a Shafi ci jurist,
did have Malik or someone of the school named for him in mind here, for it
conforms to the early traditionist reading attributed variously to the
Hanbalites or to Malik, who wrote that "God sits on His Throne (istiwa3),
descends towards the earth, has eyes, has a hand, because the text says so.
But no one knows the acceptation given by God to these terms."56
Thus, Malik and his followers refused to interpret the texts in any way, while
the Muctazilites did so liberally, using metaphorical analogy and
philology to rationalize the meaning of anthropomorphic passages. The early Ashcarites
accepted the attitude of Malik and formalized their position in the bi la
kayfa doctrine, which stated that the anthropomorphic language of the
revelations was to be accepted as true without speculating how, it
nevertheless being understood that it had to be true in some way other than the
literal sense of God having a body. But, as Gardet observes, another position
later was admitted into kalam thought, this time from the unlikely quarters of
the Muctazila and the falasifa. This was
a metaphorical interpretation into which allegory may
creep, if need be, and which comes very close to the Muctazilite
legacy, with the following differences: 1) the attitude of the "ancients"
is regarded as valid. . . ; 2) only the specifically anthropomorphic passages
are accepted as metaphors; where the "apparent" (zahir) sense
would lead to a real impossibility. . . .57
One
of the early "moderns" or proponents of this idea was Ghazali's own
teacher, al-Juwayni,58 and it is clear from the Iqtisad and
later treatises such as the Miskhat and especially the very late work Iljam
al-awwam that Ghazali adopted this line of thought and maintained it
throughout his life. In the chapter under consideration here (at 53.3 ff.),
Ghazali offers metaphorical interpretations of a number of Qur’anic verses and
prophetic sayings of Muhammad before returning to the original topic of God
seated upon the throne (at 55.8 ff.), which he also interprets metaphorically.
This is one of the lengthiest sections of the entire Iqtisad. Ghazâlï
gives numerous examples and discusses in considerable detail how the correct
interpretation of several of them is derived. All of this would indicate that
Ghazâlï was committed to further establishing this "modern" approach
to exegesis of the Muslim canon. Iljam al-awwam, contains the fullest
development of his metaphorical readings of the anthropomorphic passages, and a
comparison between that work and this section of the Iqtisad would
undoubtedly be a valuable contribution.
With the ninth proposition (60.9 ff.) Ghazâlï makes a
significant departure from the via negativa and offers another positive
argument that is striking and curious in its own right, particularly in light
of the discussion just concluded. There, Ghazâlï had advocated and demonstrated
the uses of metaphorical interpretation when confronted with anthropomorphic
passages referring to the being of God. Now, however, with respect to God's
visibility, he strenuously resists doing so and specifically opposes the Muctazilites
who do employ ta^wil (metaphorical interpretation)59 rather
than allow that God might be visible in some straightforward sense of that
term. Ghazâlï is attempting to show that God is "visible in his being, by
the existence of his essence and not by reason of some of his acts or
attributes." It is because Ghazali affirms that God is visible by his
essence, by virtue of being an existent, that he sees fit to include it here in
this first section of his treatise, which is dedicated to explaining the
essence of God.
The critical qualifier Ghazali posits in this case is that
it is possible to see God, because he is real and all real beings are by
definition visible and cognizable in some sense at least. However, that God is
potentially visible does not necessarily imply that any vision of him has
actually taken place or will take place for any given potential
"viewer."
Ghazali begins by offering two arguments to show that it is
logically possible that God is visible (61.8 ff.). The first argument is a line
of reasoning which states that it is appropriate to affirm of God the same
things that are affirmed of any other being except those qualities or
attributes that are specific to temporal/spatial beings. God is cognizable just
as other beings are, and "vision is a kind of knowledge that does not
imply any kind of alteration in the attributes of the object that is seen, nor
does it suggest temporality; therefore, [the possibility of vision with respect
to God] must be admitted just as with respect to
every
other being."
To the objection that what is visible must be spatial/
corporeal, Ghazâlï makes several replies. First is an argument from silence:
Just because we have no experience of a being that is visible despite being
without extension or location does not prove the impossibility of such (and
after all, it is only possibility that Ghazâlï claims for the visibility
of God). Next is the argument that since most everyone agrees that God can see
himself and the world, he must be visible, and this argument is buttressed or
complicated, as the case may be, with a lengthy and somewhat inconclusive
digression on the example of a man who sees himself in a mirror. Ghazâlï does
not get down to the physics of how a person does actually see himself in the
mirror. Rather, he simply agrees with his opponent in disallowing several
would-be explanations, but then disagrees with him in his contention (65) that
"if I am not in front of myself I cannot see myself." The unstated
conclusion is that the opponent may not be able to explain how he sees
himself, or his various explanations may be incorrect, but the fact of what he
sees remains. This line of explanation might therefore be understood as another
use, albeit a very tacit one, of the bi la kayf doctrine.
Next Ghazâlï turns to the evidence from revelation that God
has been seen
(65.8
ff.) even if this cannot be taken in the same sense as seeing a corporeal
substances
with accidents. To explain how this might be so, Ghazâlï proposes to discuss
all of the different possible meanings "vision" might have, and
eliminate those which cannot be applied a the vision of a being without body or
accidents.
Then,
he says,
if there should remain of those meanings one that is not
incompatible with the essence of God most high and that can be called
"vision" in all truth, then we shall affirm it with respect to God
most high and we shall conclude that he is truly visible. On the other hand, if
it is not possible to use the name "vision" except in a metaphorical
sense, then we shall use that word when revelation enjoins us to, but
understanding it in the sense that reason indicates to us that it should be
understood.
In
other words, Ghazâlï wants, if possible, to claim a more literal reading for
the
word
"vision" than the Muctazilites do. They take it
metaphorically in some way, but Ghazâlï, if he can, would prefer to find a commonly
accepted meaning of the
word
"vision" that will allow him to say that God is—in that sense, at
least—
truly
visible. Failing that, he says, he will settle, as the Muctazilites
before him,
for a
metaphorical interpretation. This passage is thus a valuable summary of
Ghazâli's
exegetical methodology. The language of revelation should be taken at face
value wherever possible. However, the constraints of what is possible in that
regard are supplied by logical reasoning. When the plain meaning of the language
of revelation is determined to be logically impossible—given the premises upon
which that logic is constructed—then a metaphorical rather than literal
interpretation of the revelation may be warranted.
Ghazali begins by noting that the eye is not the only organ
of the body that is commonly said to be capable of vision; the heart and the
mind are also (66.10). Next, he shows that the object of vision may be any of a
number of things or a combination thereof and so there is nothing essential to
vision in its object. "Thus," he concludes, "the basis upon
which the word "vision" depends will be. . . the reality of the
meaning without any relation to its subject [that is, its locus in the viewer]
or its object" (67.5). The question of what the "reality" of vision
is, then, Ghazali answers by comparing it, using examples, to imagination. He
says that vision is more complete and perfect than something that is merely
imaged or conceptualized within the soul through imagination. It is more exact
and more immediate than latent knowledge. The vision is "knowledge most
perfect and clear" and as such is not granted in this world because the
soul, preoccupied in the governance of the body, its native purity and
cleanliness tainted by the impurities of the world, is hindered as though by a
veil from having such perception.60
Ghazali
concludes that once the soul is freed from the body, its temporal attachments,
and veils of misunderstanding, it should be able "see" God in this
sense.
Having shown that there is, in fact, a proper sense of the
word "vision" that can be applied to human knowledge of God, Ghazali
next turns to the revelations (69.14) to show that they do not rule out the
vision of God according the meaning he has posited. Then he discusses the position
of other sects on this question (72.11 ff.). The Hashwiyya are basically
corporealists, which presumably solves the problem of God's visibility for
them, but—from the "orthodox" perspective— at the considerable
expense of tashbih, conceiving of God in terms comparable to human. Of
greater interest is Ghazali's attitude towards the Muctazilites whom
he accuses of "openly contradict[ing] the revealed doctrine on this
point." In their fervor to avoid anthropomorphism, he says, they have
taken the via negativa (tanzih) too far by unnecessarily denying the
visibility of God. This is another significant point of disagreement between
Ghazali and both the Muctazilites and the falasifah, one that
must be taken into account by those who would argue that
Ghazâlï
was a committed though cagey Aristotelian.61
A passage, from the Faysal, throws several elements
of this section into greater relief. Ghazâlï sets forth a "rule for
figurative interpretation" in which he enumerates a succession of levels
of interpretation that ought to be observed when considering problematical
passages. His rule states that
the permissibility of engaging in figurative interpretation
is contingent upon having established the logical impossibility of the apparent
meaning (zahir) of a text. The first level of apparent meaning
corresponds to ontological (dhatï) existence. Whenever this is conceded,
the remaining levels are entailed. If this proves (logically) impossible,
however, one moves to the level of sensory existence (hissï), for it too
embraces those levels below it. If this proves impossible, one moves to the
level of conceptual (khayalï) or noetic (caqlï)
existence. And if this proves impossible, one moves to the level of analogous,
allegorical existence (al- wujüd al-shabahï al-majazï).
Now, no one is permitted to move from one level
(of interpretation) to a level beneath it without being compelled by logical
proof (burhan). Thus, in reality, the differences among the various
parties revert to (differences regarding) logical proofs. In other words, the
Hanbalite says that there is no logical proof affirming the impossibility of
the Creator being specified by the direction of "above."62
And the Ashcarite says that there is no logical proof affirming the
impossibility of the beatific vision. In other words, it is as if each party is
simply dissatisfied with the justification adduced by its opponent and does not
deem it to constitute a definitive proof. But however the matter may be,
neither party should brand its opponent an Unbeliever simply because it deems
the latter to be mistaken in what it holds to be a logical proof.63
Significantly,
Ghazâlï includes the matter of the vision of God as an example of a question
over which there could be disagreement as to how to logically approach it. The fact
that the Muctazilites err in denying the reality of the vision of
God, Ghazâlï elaborates, merits them the charge of innovation. But the fact
that this error poses no immediate danger to the community of believers and
because the proof that is adduced (by any party, presumably) "is not
decisive but leads to a more probable conjecture" exempts them from the
charge of unbelief.64 Though Ghazâlï's criteria for innovation or
unbelief are stated with greater clarity in the Faysal,65 and
his tone there is more conciliatory than it is in the Iqtisad, still
nothing he says here would seem to contradict his later position as to what
constitutes unbelief, innovation, and so forth. Ghazâlï disagrees strongly with
the Muctazilies, but he still allows that they are believers in
contrast to the falasifah, whom he declared to be unbelievers in the Tahafut,
a position he also reiterates later in the Iqtisad and which he
maintained throughout his career.66
In the tenth proposition (73.9 ff.) Ghazâlï aims to show
what it means to say that God is one in his essence. He argues that God can
have no peer since he is by definition the originator of all things and there
cannot be two such beings, otherwise the very notion of a truly supreme being
becomes meaningless. Meaningless also is any argument that God is more than one
in his essence or attributes since that would mean that he is identical to
himself (since, by definition, there can be no being greater than himself), and
being identical in every respect means to have no distinguishable duality or
plurality. Ghazali wields this argument also to counter the suggestion that two
creators might have cooperated in the creation of the world. He argues that any
being with power to create the heavens could also create the earth and anything
else, therefore any being with absolute power and of the essence previously
posited would be indistinguishable from and therefore identical to another such
being. Therefore there must only be one such being. The next suggestion is that
there might be two creators, one of substances, one of accidents, and that they
cooperate in creation. This Ghazali counters by saying that since substances
and accidents require each other for actualization, there might arise a case in
which one creator would be compelled by the other in bringing something into
existence, or conversely, the one might frustrate the creative intention of the
other.
One might take a number of further exceptions to the line
of reasoning developed by Ghazali in this chapter. For another example it might
be suggested that there are two creators, but what distinguishes them is an
ontological, essential difference, even though they are absolutely equal in
power and even will, which will is to act cooperatively, one agent refraining
from some aspect of creative action (of which he is nevertheless fully capable)
in order to accommodate that very action on the part of the other. Ghazali, we
suppose, might make any of several replies to this. First, he might say it
defies comprehension that two ontologically distinct beings of universal power
and dominion should be distinguishable one from another. It is absurd. Second,
Ghazali could contend that even if this proposition is granted (if the judgment
that it is absurd is suspended and we allow that there may be two such beings,
though we cannot say how), then it must also be admitted that there may be more
than two such beings, and that, in fact, there may be an infinite number of
them, and this is another absurdity. Finally, Ghazali would have recourse to
the plain meaning of the revealed word, the Prophetic utterances, and the
unanimous consensus of the ahl al-haq, to whit, that God is one and that
this must be understood in an absolute sense: he is the only one of his unique
kind. This is, in fact, the kind of step that he does take at the conclusion of
the chapter when he quotes Qur’an 21:22 to the effect that "if there were
in both [the heavens and earth] other gods besides God, [surely both] would be
destroyed." It is ultimately upon the basis of authority that Ghazali
rests his contention of the oneness of God, saying "nothing exceeds the
Qur’an in clarity" (79.5).
With that Ghazali concludes the first part of the Iqtisad,
treating the essence of God. In the next section he will deal with the
attributes that apply (being superadded) to God's essence. These are the seven
attributes that are typically posited of God: knowledge, power, will, life,
sight, hearing, and speech. Ghazali's treatment of these topics is beyond the
scope of this study, but it still appropriate here to inquire as to the
difference between the attributes enumerated there and the essence just
discussed. What criterion is Ghazali using to distinguish between what is
essential and what is superadded to the divine essence?
There are a number of questions to be asked of the first
chapters of the Iqtisad, not the least of which is, What did Ghazali
understand to be the essence of God? This would seem to be a question that
ought to have a straightforward answer, since the entire first part of the
treatise is devoted to that one topic, to whit: God exists, is eternal a
parte ante, is everlasting, is not atom, is not corporeal, is not accident,
is not bounded, has no spatial locus such as a throne, is visible in the sense
of being cognizable, and is one. However, when we ask what it is about these
propositions that relates them uniquely to God's essence, it becomes difficult
to articulate a defining criteria. And when these propositions are juxtaposed
with those from the next part of the Iqtisad, dealing with God's seven
cardinal attributes, the problem becomes more complex still.
It might be that this is a problem larger than Ghazali.
After all, in writing the Iqtisad he was following in a tradition that
had been established by previous theologians of his Ashcarite school
and which, at the very least, he could not dismiss lightly. But as has already
been noted, Ghazali was not an uncritical Ash'arite. Even before he chose the
path of the Sufi and in the Iqtisad itself he showed that he was
prepared to set aside convention or go beyond it when it suited his purpose to
do so. Therefore, absent any compelling reason not to, we must in fairness take
what we are given in the Iqtisad to be genuine Ghazali, reflective of
his actual beliefs—at least to that point in his career—however much it might
resemble the work of others before him.
The Arabic term I am translating as "essence"
also deserves attention at this point. Is "essence" indeed the right
gloss for Ghazali's use of "dhat"? A useful opening discussion
of this term is given by Fazlur Rahman in the Encyclopaedia of Islam. He
notes that there are indeed a number of meanings that have come to be
associated with it. In general usage it can mean "thing,"
"being," "self," or even "ego." "But most
commonly," he says, it "is employed in the two different meanings of
'substance' and 'essence.'"67 Used in the first of those two
senses, he continues, "it is the equivalent of the subject or substratum.
. . and is contrasted with qualities or predicates attributed to it and
inhering in it." Used in the other sense, however, it "signifies the
essential or constitutive qualities of a thing as a member of a species, and is
contrasted with its accidental attributes." I translate dhat as
"essence" in the Iqtisad because Ghazali consistently
distinguishes between essence and substance and refers to the latter—that which
forms the substrate for accidents (farad)—using the term jawhar,
never dhat. In addition, he devotes the second part of the Iqdisad
to a discussion of God's accidental attributes (arad), juxtaposing them
with the characteristics of dhat, just as one would expect, given
Rahman's characterization of dhat as essence.68
Rahman goes on to observe, however, that the meanings of
"essence" and "substance" are sometimes conflated,
especially in theological or philosophical discussions about God, "because
essence is regarded as being constitutive of the substance which is a substance
only in so far as it is constituted by this essence." The theologians
Rahman has particularly in mind, as he points out, are the Muctazila,
who, like the falasifah, but for different reasons than they, denied the
existence of divine attributes and declared God to be "simple substance
and simple essence," basically identifying the two. As will be seen in
what follows, Ghazali did not subscribe to this view and in fact argued
forcefully against it on the grounds that it simply contradicted the plain meaning
of revelation. As a result, Ghazali was never tempted to confuse substance and
essence, and does not do so in this work.
The question of what was essential to God and what was
distinguishable from his essence was one to which a number of answers were
posed in kalam.
The
Muctazilites evolved one line of response, the Ashcarites
another. Within the Ashcarite school, al-Juwaynï developed his own
thought on the subject distinct from that of other Ashcarites, and
Ghazali, his pupil, here offers yet another answer to the question.69
These differences were seldom explained or defended as differences by their
various proponents, and Ghazali offers no straightforward explanation of the
criterion by which he determined the difference between what was essential and
what was superadded to God. However, it seems reasonable to suggest that the
criterion has to do with what may be said of God's existence as opposed to what
may be said of his activity. The first aspect of God's essence as discussed by
Ghazali (that God exists) is a special case in that it is first in a list of
aspects the rest of which refer back to that first premise of God's existence.
That is, every other aspect of the essence may be formulated as a description—
negative or positive—of God's existence70 while none of the
attributes can be. Thus, God's existence is eternal a parte ante and a
parte post, is non-spatial, non- corporeal, and without accident, is
visible, and is one; while it is not said that God's existence is powerful,
knowing, willing, living, seeing, hearing, or speaking. These are terms that
are said of what God does rather than what he is and are to be dealt with in
the next section of the Iqtisad.
1 Hourani, "Revised
Chronology."
2
Marmura, "Al-Ghazâlï on Bodily Resurrection,"
49-51.
4
Hourani, "Revised Chronology," 294.
5
Hourani, "Revised Chronology," 295.
6
Hourani, "Revised Chronology," 294.
7 From Kitâb al-arbacln
fl usul al-dln, (pp. 21-2 in the edition by M. M. Abu al- Ala [Cairo,
1964]). The version here is my amalgam based on translations by Marmura
("Ghazâlï and Ashcarism Revisited," 91-110) and Abu Zayd (Al-
Ghazâlï on Divine Predicates, xxix).
8
Marmura, "Ghazâlï and Ashcarism," 101.
10 See, however, James T.
Monroe's Islam and the Arabs in Spanish Scholarship, which gives an
excellent survey of the field generally and of Asin's work in particular. See
especially pp. 191 ff.
11
See Marmura, "Al-Ghazâlï on Bodily Resurrection,"
296 n. 38.
12 Ghazâlï's terminology here
includes "taqlld" (uncritical assent to teachings) and Ktiqad
(belief). The use of these and other important terms within Ashcarite
contexts has been explored by Richard Frank in "Knowledge and
Taqlïd."
13
McCarthy, Deliverance, 79, emphasis added.
16 This chronology is based on
Hourani, "Revised Chronology," 294-295 and Ghazali's own account as
given in the Munqïdh.
17
Translation from Jackson, Limits, 112.
18
Translation from Jackson, Limits, 114.
19
These comments have been enriched by suggestions from
Bernard Weiss.
21
Watt, Faith and Practice, 28-29.
22 This last work was known to
the scholastics, having been translated into Latin at Toledo.
23
Saflo, Al-Juwaynï's Thought, 133.
24
Saflo, Al-Juwaynï's Thought, 133.
25
Cotter, Scholastic Philosophy, 84.
26
Cotter, Scholastic Philosophy, 84.
27
Cotter, Scholastic Philosophy, 84.
28 See Marmura, "Ghazali
on Bodily Resurrection and Causality in Tahâfut and The Iqtisâd."
29
See Marmura, Incoherence, 54 f.
30
My thanks to Peter von Sivers for his insights into this
problem.
31
Lazarus-Yafeh, Studies, 251.
32
Lazarus-Yafeh, Studies, 253.
33 See the fuller quote and
citation above, in the discussion of the second and third introductions.
34
See Weiss, "Knowledge of the Past," 101.
35
Weiss, "Knowledge of the Past," 96.
36 Bernard Weiss has discussed
Ghazali's use of this important concept at length in "Knowledge of the
Past." For a less nuanced definition of tawdtur in the context of
Ghazali's writings, see Jackson, Boundaries, 47. Jackson translates the
concept as "diffuse congruence" (ibid., 112-13).
37
See Weiss, "Knowledge of the Past," 93-94.
38
Weiss, "Knowledge of the Past," 92.
39
Weiss, "Knowledge of the Past," 103.
40
Weiss, email correspondence.
41
Marmura, "Al-Ghazali on Bodily Resurrection and
Causality."
42
My thanks to Bernard Weiss for his observations on this
subject.
43
See Dhanani, "Al-Ghazali's Attitude," 18.
44
Dhanani, "Al-Ghazali's Attitude," 1.
45
Dhanani, "Al-Ghazali's Attitude," 4; Saflo, Al-Juwayni's
Thought, 174-75.
46
Juwayni, al-Shdmil, 148, as translated in Dhanani, Physical
Theory, 189-190.
47
Frank, Creation and the Cosmic System, 86.
48
Marmura, "Ghazalian Causes."
49 See note 150 and, in
particular, note 171, herein. For a more systematic critical treatment of
Frank's heavy handed method in Al-Ghazalï and the Ashcarite
School, see Dallal, "Perils of Interpretation."
50
Juwaynï, al-Irshad, 31, as translated in Saflo, Al-Juwaynï's
Thought, 130.
51
Saflo, Al-Juwaynï's Thought, 129-134.
52
Juwaynï, al-Irshad, 139, as translated in Saflo, Al-Juwaynï's
Thought, 148-49.
53 Ghazalï gives no example
along these lines, but the argument would seem to be most properly warranted if
it is supposed that Ghazalï is responding to the idea that God might be a
celestial body of some kind. If this supposition is accepted, it still has
nothing to imply about whether Ghazalï himself did or did not subscribe to the
emanationist cosmology of the falasifah.
54 Though also outside of the
scope of this study, these statements have relevance to the discussion of God's
unknowability (or otherwise), for which see, Burrell, "Unknowability of
God," and Shehadi, Ghazalï's Unique Unknowable God.
55 For a discussion of the
superiority of Ghazalï's methodology here to Juwaynï's, and it's
ground-breaking rigor, see Watt, Muslim Intellectual, 120-25.
56 L. Gardet,
"Allah," 412. See also Abrahamov, "The bi-la kayfa
Doctrine," for a discussion of its possible origins.
57
L. Gardet, "Allah," 412-13.
59 By using ta^wïl,
Gardet says, the Muctazilites could deny the vision of God without
contradicting the Qur’an. (See L. Gardedt, "Allah," 412; and D.
Gimaret,
"Muctazila,"
792.)
61 This would be particularly
true if this doctrine turns out to be original to Ghazâlï (and not just his
following pro forma the Ashcarite position). However, confronted
with this kind of evidence a scholar who holds this view, such as Richard
Frank, would likely dismiss it as unimportant relative to the larger questions,
where, he asserts, Ghazâlï aligns himself with the falasifah. Ghazâlï himself
implies that the issue is not of fundamental importance when he says it poses
no threat to the Islamic community (see the quotation, below).
62 It will be remembered that
Ghazâlï treats this question under his seventh proposition of the Iqtisad
(41.2 ff.).
63 This passage is based
primarily on Sherman Jackson's translation of the Faysal (Boundaries,
104) with some words grafted from McCarthy (Deliverance, 135) where his
reading is less awkward and closer to the language of my translation of the Iqtisad.
McCarthy, however, seems to have struggled to understand or capture the gist of
this passage.
64 Based on the translation in
McCarthy, Deliverance, 140.
65 See also the brief
discussion of these criteria in the analysis of the second and third
introductions of the Iqtisad, above.
66 This point is significant
in the context of the discussion that has emerged over the question of whether
Ghazâlï subscribed to certain fundamental tenets of Aristotelian philosophy as
propounded by Avicenna et al. See the earlier notice of this discussion the
treatment of Ghazâlï's first proposition, above. The same point is also made by
Marmura in his critique of Frank's Creation and the Cosmic System
("Ghazâlian Causes," 100).
68 It is possible that
"being" could also be a tenable translation of dhat as used in
this work, but the structure of Ghazali's book makes it clear that he is
writing in the theological vein that deliberately juxtaposed
"essence" and "accident" on principle and as a point of
argument. Accordingly, I adopt the equivalent English term most consistently
employed in the dialectical idiom: "essence."
69 For a detailed discussion
of Juwayni's thought on this subject, see Saflo, Al- Juwayms Thought,
129 ff. For a discussion of the main Ashcarite position and
the key terms involved see Richard Frank, "Ashcarite
Ontology."
70 Al-Farabi used similar
language relating essence to existence. As translated by Abu Zayd, he states,
speaking of God's essence:
There is no existence which is more perfect or prior to His
and there is no existence which is more ancient than His or on the same level,
and,
therefore, He could not possibly receive His existence from
it; He is totally different by His essence from anything other than He is. . .
. (Al-Farabi,
Kitab al-siyasah al-madaniyyah, ed. F. M. Najjar (Beiruit, 1964), 42-3;
translation in Abu Zayd, Divine Predicates, xi.)
[EXORDIUM]71
[1.1; A 23] In the name of God, the Merciful, the
Compassionate. Upon Him we depend.72
[1.3] The sheikh, the imam, the
proof of Islam, Abu Hamid Muhammad ibn Muhammad ibn Muhammad al-Ghazali said
(may God sanctify his spirit):73
[1.4] Praise to God who has
elected from his choice slaves74 a company of truth, a people of
orthodoxy.75 Out of all the other sects he has specifically
[endowed] them with the qualities of kindness and benevolence. Upon them he has
emanated his guiding light by which he unveiled for them the truths of
religion. He has caused their tongues to speak his proofs, by which he uprooted
the waywardness of the atheists. He has cleansed their mind of satanic
whisperings.76 He has purified their heart of unholy suggestions.
And he has filled their soul77 with the lights of certainty until
they penetrated the secrets brought down by the tongue of his chosen prophet,
Muhammad, chief of all of the other messengers (the blessings of God be upon
him and all his family). They thus came to know the way to reconcile [any]
incongruity between the requirements of revelation78 and the demands
of reason. Indeed, they have confirmed that there is no contradiction between
the revelation of tradition and the truth of reason. They have come to know
that those among the Hashwiyya79 who believe in the necessity of
rigid adherence to imitative belief80 [A 24] and the outward form of
religion only do so because of [their] poverty of intellect and
shortsightedness of vision. [1.12] And those among the falâsifah8
and the inordinate Muctazilites,82 who so commit
themselves to the use of reason such that they end up clashing with the
definitive pronouncements of revelation, do so out of the wickedness of their
minds. Thus, the former group tends toward negligence, the latter toward
excess, and both are far from prudence and caution. Indeed, the norm that must
needs be followed in principles of belief is moderation and restraint upon the
straight path,83 and anything that deviates from the proper intent
of things is reprehensible.
[2.1] How can someone establish a proper course who is
content blindly to accept traditions and reports84 while ignoring
the methods of investigation and theoretical reflection?85 Could it
be that he does not know that reason has no other basis besides the sayings of
the Chief of Men86 and that intellectual demonstration is what shows
the correctness of his report? And, how can someone be guided aright who [A 25]
only follows reason and nothing more, without being illuminated by the light of
revelation87 and without considering [it]? For, let us come to
terms: how can he flee to reason when he is exposed as so feeble and full of
limitations? Could it be that he does not know that the capacity of reason is
very meager and that its sphere of action is narrow? O how one falls short and trails
behind in misguided paths when one does not bring together these differences of
reason and revelation! For reason is like healthy sight that has no ailments or
flaws, and the Qur'an is like the sun that shines abroad.
[2.8] How shabby it would be for you to seek guidance from
those who were lacking in one or another of these two, being in the throes of
ignorance. For, someone who declines to use reason, being satisfied with just
the light of the Qur'an, is like someone who stands in the light of the sun
with his eyes shut. There is no difference between that person and someone who
is blind. For, reason, together with the Qur'an, "is light upon
light."88 Someone who has his eye trained exclusively on only
one of these two will remain bound in delusion.
[2.12] It will become evident to you, O seeker of
instruction in the fundamental dogmas of the Sunnis, who demands to know their
verification through decisive proofs, that the ability to achieve consistency
between reason and its implementation is to be found in only one sect, which is
this [the Sunni] sect. I thank God most high that he has caused you to follow
in their footsteps and affiliate with the community of their order,89
[A 26] to enter into their abundance90 and join company with their
sect. For, perhaps in this way you will be able to be resurrected among their
ranks on the day of reckoning.
[3.1] We ask God most high to cleanse our souls of the
stains of error and that he will illuminate our souls with the light of truth;
that he will cause our tongues to be silent rather than to speak words of
falsity, and cause them to utter words of truth and wisdom. For, he is
bounteous in the effusion of his grace and replete with mercy! [3.3]
71 I adopt this heading from
Asín, who used it aptly to designate this section [1.1—3.3] in which Ghazali
makes perambulatory comments prior to his formal introduction. It praises those
who hold to the truth and reproaches those who have gone astray. It also
introduces the theme of walking a middle road between extremes in religious
views.
72 The various manuscripts
present several different invocations here, and D omits it altogether.
73 Asín omits this line,
following manuscripts D and J. Such an honorific phrase could well be a later
addition.
74 The term ‘ibâdihi is
often translated more palatably as "his servants," but "his
slaves" is not too strong and may in fact be more apt given Ghazali's
acceptance of the traditional Ashcarite belief in God's
omnipotence and total authority over human action. In this rendering of the
passage, then, I take Ghazali to mean all of humanity when he speaks of God's
slaves, not just Muslim believers, as might be implied if the term
"servants" were used here instead. It is thus out of the totality of
humanity that "a company of the truth, a people of orthodoxy" are
chosen, by which Ghazali therefore intends all Sunni Muslims, not just an elite
and learned subset of them.
75 This translation of ahl
al-sunna follows what would have been intended by Ghazali. It could be more
literally rendered as "people of custom." Except where context
demands otherwise (as it does here), I will use the anglicized form of the
Arabic term: the Sunnis.
76 Wasâwis. Al-Ghazali much later devoted a chapter of his cAjâ3ib
al-qalb (in the Ihya3) to the significance of this term
from a primarily Sufi standpoint.
77 For lack of better terms, I
have resorted to "mind," "heart," and "soul" here
to refer to the spiritually perceptive faculties denoted by Ghazali's sarâ3ir,
dnmiTir. and if’adah. But it should be noted that he seems to be
avoiding the more pregnant terms of caql, qalb, ruh, or nafs
that these glosses most frequently indicate. For a discussion of the
specialized meanings of these last for terms, see again his ‘Ajadb al-qalb,
first bayaan or "exposition" (this section available in
McCarthy's translation in appendix 5 of Deliverance, 310 ff.).
78 Shari'ah: this often refers to the code of Islamic law
that is derived from the QuCân and the sayings of the prophet Muhammad. As
such, it contains prescriptions for human action which are based upon
revelation (as opposed to originating from pure reason or custom). In the
context of this work, however, Ghazali seems most consistently to be using the
term in the broader sense of revelation—specifically revelation given through
Muhammad—rather than just the legal code that has been constructed from it. See
the discussion of sharc, below.
79 Al-hashwiyya: These were a traditionalist theological school
who accepted as literal the anthropomorphist language of the Qur'an,
much like—and indeed sometimes identified with—the Hanbalite school. See also
Asín, Justo Medio, 23; and A. S. Halkin, "The Hashwiyya."
Al-Ghazali makes further reference to them at 72.11, below.
80 Taqlïd: For an important discussion of this term, see
Lazarus-Yafeh, "Some notes on the term 'taqlid' in the writings of
al-Ghazzali," appendix B in Studies in al-Ghazalï, p. 488 ff. He
says that Ghazali's use of the term influenced many theologians after him. He
summarizes Ghazali's usage of taqlïd generally to indicate
blind adherence to, or following, ancestral tradition and
pronouncements by teachers, without independent examination, meditation and
reflection.
It has a distinctly negative, derogatory connotation, and
appears as the contrary to the faith which is founded on examination and study
or
personal religions experience" (488-89).
81 These were Muslim thinkers
such as al-Farabi and Avicenna who saw themselves as inheriting and carrying on
the Aristotelian tradition of logical reasoning about matters of ultimate
importance. This is the same group, of course, who were targeted in Ghazali's
famous Tahâfut al-falâsifah (Incoherence of the Philosophers). As with mutakalimün,
I choose not to translate this term in favor of adopting it for its own precise
use in this text.
82 In his note at this point,
Asín calls the Muctazilites "the most liberal
theologians of Islam, strongly associated with the philosophers."
83 Ghazali's language here
recalls the title of this work and of Qawacid al- aqacid.
See my further comments in the introduction.
84 Al-athar wa al-khabar:
"Evidences and
reports." Here Ghazali is referring chiefly to the canonical sources of
Islamic law: the QuGan—which is an evidence of God's intervention in human
affairs and of Muhammad's prophetic calling— and the sunna or practices of the
Prophet Muhammad.
85 Ghazali is here
distinguishing two very different bases for true knowledge: the one is
tradition, which transmits the revealed word of God; the other is reason.
Presumably, though he does not state it explicitly here, Ghazali understands
this to include all aspects of the inductive process, beginning with a priori
principles and direct observations and ending with proofs and logical
conclusions. At 18.4, below, Ghazali will detail theoretical reflection (nazar)
as a syllogistic process.
86 Sayyid al-bashr: This is, of course, is the Prophet Muhammad.
87 Al-sharc: The context of this usage governs how I
translate this important term. Wehr defines it as "the Revelation, the
canonical law of Islam." See the
discussion
of Shari'ah, above.
88 Nür cala nür: "Light upon light" is a quote from
Qur?an 24:35, known as "The Light Verse." This
verse provides one of the themes upon which Ghazali elaborated in his later
work, Mishkat al-anwar.
89 Nizamihim: At the time he composed this work, Ghazali was
the head of the great legal and theological university of Nizam al-Mulk.
Called the Nizamiyya, it was the bastion of Sunni Islamic thought.
Al-Ghazali's choice of word here suggests that he was writing not only to Sunni
students of jurisprudence, but specifically to his own students at the
Nizamiyya.
90
This phrase might also be rendered as "cast your lot
with them."
[EXPLANATORY]
CHAPTER
[3.5; A 27] Let us begin the dialogue91 by
explaining the title of the book and its division into introductions, parts,
and chapters. As pertaining to the name of the book, it is: Moderation in
Belief.92
[3.8] As pertaining to its organization, [this book]
contains four introductions, which constitute prefaces or preambles, and
four main parts, which constitute the aims or objectives [of the book].
[3.10] The first introduction is to show that this science
is one of the things that are important for the faith. The second introduction
is to show that it is not important for all Muslims, but rather for a specific
portion of them. The third introduction is to show that [the study of this
science] is an obligation for the qualified, [A 28] not an individual
obligation.93 The fourth introduction analyzes the methods of proof
that I use in this book.
[4.1] As for its main parts, they are four, and all of them
taken together reduce to the study of God most high.
[4.2] For if we are to consider94 the world, we
will not consider it inasmuch as it is a world, body, heaven, and earth, but
inasmuch as it is a work of God most high. And if we are to consider the
Prophet (peace be upon him), we will not do so inasmuch as he is a man, noble,
wise, and virtuous, but inasmuch as he is a messenger of God. And if we are to
consider his sayings, we will not do so inasmuch as they are sayings,
elocutions, and expressions, but inasmuch as they derive instruction, through
[the prophetic] mediation, from God most high. Thus, we do not consider
anything except about God; and there is no other object of inquiry save God.95
All the limits of this science encompass theoretical reflection on the essence96
of God, the attributes of God, the works of God, and the messenger of God
(peace be upon him) along with whatever of God's instruction has come to us
through the ministering of his tongue. Thus, the basic parts [of this book] are
four:
[4.12] Part One: Considering
the essence of God most high.
In this part we show: the existence of God; that he is from eternity; that he
is everlasting; that he is neither substance, body, nor accident; that he is
not bounded by any limit; [A 29] that he is not specified by location; that he
is visible even as he is cognizable; and that he is one. These are ten
propositions that we will explain in this part, God most high permitting.
[5.1] Part Two: On the attributes of God most high.
In this part we explain that God is living, knowing, powerful, willing,
hearing, seeing, and speaking; and that he possesses life, knowledge, power,
will, hearing, sight, and speech. We will note the governing rules of these
attributes, their requisites, and their divergent and convergent principles. We
will note that all of the [attributes] are superadded to essence, being eternal
and subsistent in essence, and that it is impossible that any aspect of the
attributes is temporal.97
[5.7] Part Three: On the acts of
God most high. Here there are
seven propositions, which are: that God most high is not obliged to give [any]
commandment to men, nor to create [them], nor to reward [their compliance with]
the commandments, nor to observe what is best for his servants; that it is not
absurd that God should give commandments that cannot be fulfilled;98
that God is not obliged to punish sinners; and that it is not impossible for
God to send forth prophets; but that [all of these things] are possible for
him. In the introduction to this part the meanings of the terms obligatory,
good, and bad are also explained.
[5.12] Part Four: On the
messengers of God and what
comes [to men] by the tongue of God's messenger (may God bless him and give him
peace) relative to the resurrection, heaven and hell, [prophetic] intercession,
the punishment of the grave, and the weighing99 of human actions in
the balance, and the path.100 It is comprised of four chapters. The
first chapter establishes [A 30] the prophetic calling of our Prophet, Muhammad
(may God bless him and give him peace). The second chapter is on what has been
delivered by the tongue of the Prophet regarding the matter of the hereafter.
The third chapter is on the imamate and its conditions. The fourth chapter explains
the canonical criterion101 for declaring the apostasy102
of the innovating sects.
91 Al-kalam: While not a dialogue in the sense of Plato's
dialogues, this treatise is certainly dialectical in nature. Al-Ghazali
presents arguments to which an imaginary opponent usually offers objections,
allowing Ghazali to refine his point or to present counter arguments.
92 Asín at this point opts for
a more descriptive title ("The use of reason and of revelation
respectively in dogmatic theology") than the one Ghazali actually gives,
stating that "it expresses with more fidelity and exactness the object and
content of the book, which, as will be seen, is a compendium of dogmatic
theology in which both [rational] proofs and the authority of revelation are
used to demonstrate the truth of Islamic dogmas." For more on the title
and its translation, see the translator's introduction.
93 As will become clear in the
third introduction (13.3 ff.), Ghazali means by this that he sees the study of
kalam as necessary for the good of the Islamic community in general; each area
needs to have access to experts in theology, but it is not something that each
Muslim needs to be proficient in. In fact, in Ghazali's view, that would be
undesirable.
94 Nazara: To view, gaze at, observe.
95 At this point Asín notes
that "coinciding with this point of view is that of St. Thomas Aquinas.
See Summa, c.g. 1.2.c 4: Quod aliter considerat de creatures philosophus
et aliter theologus; and Summa theol. p. 1a, q. 1.a, a. 7: Utrum Deus
sit subjectum hujus scientiae, where he says: Omnia autem pertractantur in
sacra doctrina sub ratione Dei: vel quia sunt ipse Deus; vel quia habent
ordinem ad Deum, ut ad principium et finem: unde sequitur quod Deus vere sit
subjectum hujus scientiae.
96 Dhat: what something is in itself; essence.
97 Hadith: the root sense is of something episodic—that
is, taking place as an
event,
as opposed, in this context, to something that is of infinite duration, without
beginning or end.
98 As he does elsewhere in
this treatise, in each of these points Ghazali is specifically opposing tenets
of Muctazilite doctrine.
99 Al-Mïzan: The root image is of balancing scales,
connoting justice and strict evaluation, or judgment.
100 Al-Sirat: Way or path; in this context, each person's
walk of life. Asín also adds "the trial of the bridge," which does
not appear in the Arabic but is likely his amplification on the previous
phrase.
101 This is, of course, a
reference to the Sharia, which derives its authority from two canonical
sources: the Qur?an and the Hadith or reported words and
deeds of Muhammad, and from the consensus of Muslim legal scholars.
102 Takffïr al-farq
al-mubtida ca.
THE
FIRST INTRODUCTION
[6.6; A 31] Explaining that involvement with this science
is important for the faith.
[6.7] Know that to squander
attention on something that is of no import and to waste time on something that
has no point to it is the height of error and the ultimate ruin, whether this
has to do with things theoretical or things practical. God preserve us from the
study of useless sciences!
[6.10] The most important thing for the whole of mankind is
to obtain eternal happiness and to avoid endless misery. And prophets have come
forth, and they have informed all creatures103 that God most high
imposes duties upon his slaves and has expectations104 for their
actions, their words, and their beliefs. Thus, the person whose tongue does not
speak faithfully, whose spirit does not respect the truth, and whose bodily
members are not adorned with equity—his end will be hellfire, and his fate will
be destruction.
[6.13]
But the prophets have not limited themselves just to
delivering this message, but they have provided a testimony of their veracity
by doing uncommon acts and wondrous works that break with the habitual course
[A 32] [of nature], far from what is possible for men to do. So when someone
has seen such things, or has heard of their happening through a succession of
corroborative reports,105 the possibility of their veracity occurs to
his intellect;106 indeed, it is probable that that thought occurs to
him the first time he hears [such reports, even] before [his] reason is able to
discern between genuine miracles and fabricated wonders. This spontaneous
impression and inevitable suggestion are sufficient to tear peaceful security
from the heart and to fill it with fear [7] and trembling and to move it to
study and pondering. [They can] snatch [the heart] from peace and stillness,
and frighten it with the danger to which one is exposed while living in
negligent ease. [They can] convince him that death will surely come and that
what comes after death is hidden from the view of men, and that what those
prophets have said is not at all outside the realm of possibility. The
realistic thing to do is to forsake one's state of negligence in [an effort] to
unveil the reality of this affair. For, [even] before any inquiry [can be
undertaken] to verify the reality of what the prophets say, the marvels that
they have shown in [support of] the possibility of their veracity are no less
worthy of credit than the words of some person who informs us that we ought to
get out of our house and fixed dwelling because there is a possibility that a
lion has gotten into it, telling us: "Beware, and be careful to stay away
from it." [7.7] Upon merely hearing their warning, upon the mere thought
that what that person is saying is [A 33] within the realm of possibility, we
would not step forward to enter the house. Rather, we would go out of our way
to take precautions.
[7.8] Now, death being our
destiny and our inevitable homeland, how could it not be important to take
precautions concerning whatever lies beyond it? Therefore, the most important
thing of all will be for us to investigate what [the Prophet] has said, the possible
truth of which the mind avers at first glance and prior to any theoretical
reflection. Might it truth be impossible in itself, or is it an indubitable
truth?107
[7.11] Now, one of the things that the Prophet says is,
"You have a Lord who has rightfully imposed certain obligations upon you;
and he punishes you for neglecting them, and he rewards you if you do them. He
has sent me as a messenger to you so that I can make this clear to you."
And so, the obligation is incumbent upon us to know whether or not we have a
Lord. And if there is a Lord, is it possible that he is a being endowed with
speech such that he can command and prohibit, impose duties and send
messengers? And if he is endowed with speech, is he powerful so as to be able
to punish and reward according as we disobey or obey him? And if he is
powerful, [A 34] then is this very person truthful in saying, "I am the
messenger sent to you"?
[8.2] And once all of this has become clear for us, we
would then undoubtedly be obliged—if we were rational108—to take our
precautions and reflect upon our souls and despise this transitory world in
comparison with that other, everlasting realm. Thus, the rational man reflects
on his destiny and is not deceived by his own works [here below].
[8.5] Now then, the object of this science is to establish
apodictic proof of the existence of the Lord most high, his attributes, his
works, and the truthfulness of the messengers [he sends], as we specified in
the summary. Thus, all of this is unavoidably important, to any reasonable man.
[8.7] You might say, "I am not denying this impulse
from my soul to find out [about these things], but I do not know whether it is
the result of a natural disposition and [my] physical constitution, or whether
it is a demand of reason, or whether it is a duty imposed by the religious law.
For, people dispute about the source of obligations."
[8.9] This will only be made
known at the last part of the book, where we turn our attention to the source
of the obligation. To get involved with this right now is unproductive. But,
there is no other course, once the impulse to find out [about these things] has
occurred, than to instigate a quest for salvation. The person who turns from
that is like the man who is bitten by a viper or a scorpion that is about to
strike again [A 35] and who, though he is able to get away, nevertheless
remains there to see whether the viper has come to bite him on the right or on
the left.109 Such is the doing of fools and imbeciles. God save us
from laboring for that which is of no use while neglecting matters of
fundamental importance!
103 Al-khalaq: Literally, "the creation," but the
traditional use intends that portion of God's creation who are answerable to
him—that is, humanity.
104 Wazá’if: I translate this as "expectations"
based on the context; but other glosses, such as "dispositions,"
"assignments," or "appointments" are also possible,
conveying again the idea of God's absolute sovereignty over his creatures.
105 Bil-akhbar
al-mutawatira: Tawatur is a technical
term used in hadith criticism. Difficult to render with any single gloss in
English, it carries the sense of "a tradition with so many transmitters
that there could be no collusion, all being known to be reliable and not being
under any compulsion to lie" (J. Robson, "Hadith," 325). For a
fuller discussion of the concept as used specifically by Ghazali, see Weiss,
"Knowledge of the Past," and the translator's introduction.
106 The root here (caql)
is what in other contexts is translated as "reason."
107 Asín has a note at this
point which reads:
The topic briefly alluded to here by al-Ghazali is a theme
in nearly all ascetic works. The passages from the Ihya>, Mizan, and al-Arbacin,
where he develops them more fully, can be read in [Spanish] translation in my
section entitled Los precedentes musulmanes del pari de Pascal
(Santander, "Boletin de la biblioteca de Menendez y Pelayo," 1920).
108 The Arabic term here, cuqaliV,
is cognate with the important term caql which I usually
translate as "reason" or "intellect."
109 Asín provides a note at
this point which reads, "The theme of this analogy seems to be drawn from
that of the legends of Locman [Luqman?], entitled, La gacela y el
xorro (The gazele and the fox), and El niño que se ahoga (The
boy that drowns)." Qur’an 30, sura "Lokman," is
named for a man "of old" who is noted as having received wisdom from
Allah and then imparting it to his son. This might be the same Lokman al-Hakim
("the wise") of pre-Islamic Arabic tradition to which Asín is referring,
but further investigation of Asin's enigmatic allusion is warranted. It lies,
however, beyond the scope of this study.
THE
SECOND INTRODUCTION
[9.2; A 36] Showing that although involvement in this
science, is [generally] important, it is actually not so for certain people;
indeed, the important thing for them is to leave it alone.110
[9.4] Know that the proofs we will be adducing in this
science are like medications by which diseases of the heart are treated. If the
doctor that uses them is not skillful, having keen intelligence and sound
judgment, he might do more harm than good with his medication. Let anyone know,
then, who desires to get some result from the contents of this book and some
benefit from this science, that there are four kinds of people.
[9.9] the
first GROUP had faith in
God, acknowledged his messenger, believed him to be true and cherished him in
[their] hearts. They engaged in both the devout life as well as work with their
hands. Such persons ought to be left alone just as they are, and their beliefs
[left unshaken,] by [not] insisting that they study this science. In fact, the
giver of the divine revelation (God's blessing and peace be upon him) in his
discourse with the Arabs never required anything more of them than [A 37] belief,
without distinguishing whether that be faith through trusting authority,111
or conviction based on apodictic proof.
[9.13] This is one of the things that is known with
certainty, because of the powerful increase in faith among those rustic Arabs
who [first] believed [the Prophet]. It was not through investigations, nor by
apodictic proofs, but rather simply through circumstance or through some sign
that passed into their hearts and moved them to submit to the truth and to
believe the truthfulness [of the Prophet's message]. Thus, those people [in
this group] are true believers, and one must not confound their beliefs. For if
the apodictic proofs were to be related to them along with the difficulties
that can be raised in opposition to those proofs, and the resolution thereof,
there is no assurance that one or another of those problems might not lodge in
their mind and seize them, and not be erased by anything that might be
mentioned in order to resolve them. That is why there is no evidence that the
companions of the Prophet ever occupied themselves in the study of this
science—neither by personal study, nor by oral teaching, nor by the editing of
works. Rather, their sole occupation was the devout life and inviting others to
practice it, exhorting the people to their guidance, their benefits, their
actions, and their [manner of] living.
[10.5] the SECOND GROUP: This set is comprised of all those who incline
away from belief in the truth, such as the unbeliever and the innovator. The
crude and boorish among them—weak of mind, [A 38] blindly obedient of imitative
belief from his first breath up to his old age—is helped by nothing but the
whip and the sword. The majority of the unbelievers became Muslim under the
shadow of the sword; for, with the sword and the spear God brings about what
does not come about through proof. That is why, when the pages of history are
studied in detail, one never encounters a fight between Muslims and unbelievers
that has not resulted in a group of the people of error bowing down to the
stipulations [of Islam]. On the other hand, one never encounters a group for
theological discussion and argumentation that has not resulted in an increase
of recalcitrance and obstinacy [among the ignorant].112 And do not
think that what we have said is to close our [eyes] to the [high] estate of
reason and its proofs.113 But the light of reason is a divine gift
that God does not bestow except upon a few of his [choosing] while [most]
people struggle in backwardness and ignorance. Such people, due to their
insufficiency, do not comprehend the decisions of reason, just as the light of
the sun does not reach the eyes of bats. Such persons would be hurt by such
learning, just as the rosebud is hurt by the beetle. It is like the saying of
al-ShafiT (may God be pleased with him and give him contentment), "He who
gives knowledge to the ignorant wastes it. And he who prevents those who
deserve it acts unjustly."
[11.3] the third GROUP: This consists of those who believe [A 39] the
truth on the basis of authority and through what they hear; but, endowed as
they are with acumen and perceptiveness, they become aware by themselves of
problems that disturb their faith and shake their confidence. Or some specious
sophistry assailed their ears and lodged within their hearts. It is important
to treat these with benevolence in order to restore their confidence and
dissipate their doubts through whatever arguments are likely to be sufficiently
effective for them, whether through stigmatizing and denouncing [the idea], or by
reciting a verse [from the QuHân], or relating a tradition [of the Prophet], or
speaking a sentence from a well-known person whom they hold in esteem. If that
much is sufficient to remove the doubt, then it will not be necessary to
address them with proofs written according to dialectic protocols. For such
proofs might open other doors to problems. Now, if we are dealing with someone
very perceptive and alert who will only be content with reasoned arguments that
result in settling the dispute, then it will be appropriate to elucidate a
proof of the truth for him; but only to the extent that it is needed, and on
the specific subject of the doubt in question.
[11.14] the FOURTHH GROUP: This is comprised of people in error in whom
may [nevertheless] be detected signs of acumen and perceptiveness and for whom
it might be expected, therefore, that they will [yet] accept the truth, [12]
whether through their being freed of doubts regarding their beliefs, or because
their hearts are softened [A 40] by those doubts so as to accept [resolution
of] the problems due to their natural disposition and temperament. These should
also be treated with benevolence so as to win them to the truth and guide them
to true belief; not with vehement and fanatic argumentation, for that only
increases the impulse to go astray and arouses a stubborn obstinacy and
willfulness. Most errors take root in the hearts of the common person only
because of fanaticism on the part of some group of ignorant true believers who
expound the truth with an air of confrontation and argumentation, looking upon
their weak opponents with contemptuous and disdainful eyes, which causes in
their hearts an impulse to be obstinate and contrary, and so their false
beliefs take even deeper root in their souls. [Thereafter] it is more difficult
for kindly disposed ulama to erase those errors despite the obvious
manifestation of their corruption. Fanaticism has even lead a sect to claim to
believe that the words a man pronounces in the present moment are of everlasting
duration, even after he falls silent.114 Were it not for Satan's
seizing control through the obstinacy and fanaticism [of persons] with
heretical whims, such a belief would not be found lodged in the hearts of a
madman, much less in the hearts of intelligent people. Contrariety and [A 41]
obstinacy are quite simply a sickness that has no cure. So let the religious
person guard against them with all care, avoid hatred and rancor, and look upon
God's creatures with eyes of benevolence. Use gentleness and love as means to
guide fellow believers who are in error, and keep from harshness, which, for
one in error, only stirs the impulse to go [further] astray. Be sure that to
arouse the impulse to willfulness through obstinacy and fanaticism is the thing
that will most surely help [13] willfulness to take root in the soul, and the
one responsible for having lent such "help" will be held to account
on the day of judgment.115
110 The editors of the Arabic
text at this point have a note that reads, "Compare this with what is
found in Faysal al-tafriqah," in particular pp. 69-71 of the Cairo
1319/1901 edition." Ghazali's final work, Iljam al-cawamm can
al-khawd fl cIlm al-kalam (Curbing the Masses from Engaging in
the Science of Kalam) must also be mentioned in this regard.
111 Here the idea of taqlld
is used in a positive sense.
112 For some reason Asín omits
the rest of the paragraph from this point on. The ellipses he inserts here
indicate that this was deliberate, but I cannot discern any obvious reason for
his decision.
113 Ghazali's comment here is
sometimes read as a critique of all kalam schools, including even the Ashcarites,
to claiming that they are ineffective at accomplishing one of their primary
objectives, which is to credibly ward off attacks and to convince detractors of
the validity of the Islamic creed. As I read his statement here, however,
Ghazali seems to be saying simply that even the most orthodox and intelligent
theological minds will not be able to convince unbelievers and innovators (who
are obstinate by nature) of the correctness of a given position, and that it
will be a waste of time to try; but there are other kinds of persons for whom
kalam will be a genuine benefit, thus justifying the position that it is a duty
for the community of believers generally to cultivate experts in kalam insofar
as possible.
114 Asín includes a note at
this point which reads: Al-Ghazali alludes to the doctrine of extreme orthodox
[Sunni ?] theologians who explained the eternity of the word of God—meaning the
QuCan—in such a literal and irrational sense that they even considered the
words of the Quranic text pronounced by a man to be eternal and
uncreated. On the history of the aforementioned polemics on this subject, see
Goldziher, Le dogme et la loi de l'islam, 93, ff.
115 For a broader treatment by
Ghazali of this subject, Asín recommends Iljam al-cawam. Asín
treats this material in his La psicología de la creencia según Algazel.
THIRD
INTRODUCTION
[13.3; A 42] Explaining that involvement in this science is
[only] an obligation for those who are qualified.116
[13.4] Know that to become immersed in this science and
involved in all it entails is not an obligation for individuals. Rather, it is
an obligation for the qualified.
[13.6] As pertaining to its not being an obligation for
individuals, the demonstration of this would have already become apparent to
you in the second introduction, where it was shown that nothing was obligatory
for the common people except to affirm true conviction and to purify their
hearts of all doubt or uncertainty concerning the faith. So, in reality, arriving
at a point where doubt is eliminated is a duty devolving [primarily] upon the
people who are accosted by doubt [themselves].
[13.9] Someone might say, "How can this be an
obligation for the qualified when you previously said that the majority of
those classes of people would be harmed by this [study] rather than it
benefiting them?"
[13. 11] Know that, as was previously [A 43] stated, to
eliminate doubts about fundamental dogmas is an obligation that ought to be
fulfilled. That a doubt should arise is not impossible, though it happens only
rarely except among those of keen intellect. The call to the truth through
rational proof to whoever is languishing in error and who carries within his
intellect the capacity to understand is of religious importance. Furthermore,
it is not unlikely that a heretical innovator will influence and entice
orthodox believers117 into error, suggesting doubts to them.
Therefore it is indeed indispensable that someone should rise up to unmask his
sophistry and put a stop to his enticement by showing its evil. Now, that [14]
cannot happen except by this science. And as there is no country anywhere that
is free from such threats, there must be, in every region and territory, a
defender of the truth who is involved in this science to stand up to the
heretical innovators who are attracting those who are wavering from the truth
and resolve the doubts that arise in the hearts of the orthodox. If there were
no one in the region who could attend to this need, the inhabitants of an
entire region would be in dire straits, just as they would be if there were no
doctors or jurists at all. However, if there were no one that professed either
canon law or theology and someone were disposed to study only one of the two
sciences for lack of sufficient time to study both together, and if we were
asked which of the two sciences he ought to choose, we would say that he [A 44]
should study canon law, because the need for it is more general and there are
more cases to be handled in this discipline. For, there is never a lack of
someone day or night who does not need legal counsel, while, by comparison
there is much less frequent need to alleviate dogmatic doubts through the study
of theology. Likewise, if there is no one in the whole country that practices medicine
or cannon law, it would be more important to concentrate on the study of the
jurisprudence, since it is needed by the masses and common people alike, while
the healthy do not need a physician, and the sick are fewer in number relative
to them; the sick person, on the other hand, cannot do without the
jurisprudence, just as he cannot do without medicine, since the need he has for
medicine is to save his mortal life, while he needs the canon law for his
everlasting life, and the difference between those two lives is substantial.
[14.12] When you compare the fruit of medicine with the
fruit of jurisprudence, you can see how great the difference is between the one
and the other. That jurisprudence is the most important of the sciences will be
shown to you in the fact that the Companions of the Prophet applied themselves
to its study in their councils and conferences. Nor should you let yourself be
misled by the high-sounding name given by those who would give primacy to the
art of kalam [A 45] as being the root and jurisprudence one of its branches. It
is indeed correct, but it is still of no use for the topic that presently
concerns us. The root, really, is correct belief and sure faith, which faith is
acquired [simply] by submission to authority and only rarely by resorting to
apodictic proofs and dialectical subtleties. The doctor would also cloud the
issue saying, "Your existence, your health, the existence of your body
rely upon my art. Your life depends on me. Life and health are the main things;
then after that comes involving yourself with religion." Nevertheless, the
meaning behind these words of misrepresentation by the sophist is not hidden
from anyone, as we have previously alluded.
116 Fard kifáyya: This refers to an obligation within Islam that
is incumbent upon the few who are qualified to perform it for the sake of the
community as a whole.
117 Ahl al-haq, literally, "the people of the truth";
this was a common way the Ashcarites referred to themselves.
THE
FOURTH INTRODUCTION
[15.8] Explaining the methods of
proof that we have used in this book
[15.9] Know that there are a
variety of demonstrative methods. Some of them we have already noted in The
Touchstone of Theoretical Reflection on Logic, and we have studied them in
greater depth in The Standard of Knowledge.™ But in this book, we will
bypass the abstruse ways and the more obscure methods with the purpose of
seeking clarity, looking for conciseness, and [A 47] trying to avoid prolixity.
We will therefore limit ourselves to studying just three methods.
[15.12] the first
method is disjunctive reasoning.119 It consists of our
reducing the question to just the two parts into which it divides; then we
declare one of them false and deduce from that the affirmation of the other.
So, for example, we say: The world is either temporal or it is eternal; but it
is absurd that it should be eternal; therefore it follows indisputably [16]
that it is temporal.120 This is the necessary conclusion we sought;
it is the cognition that we intended to derive from two other cognitions.121
[16.3] One of them is our saying,
"The world is either temporal or it is eternal"; for, the judgment
resulting from that restriction122 is a cognition.
[16.4] The second of them is our
saying, "It is absurd that the world should be eternal." This is
another cognition.
[16.5] The third is the one that
necessarily follows from the other two. It is what we were seeking—that the
world is temporal. No cognition that is sought can be obtained by any other
means than by deduction from two cognitions, which are its two premises.123
But not just any two premises will suffice. Rather, it is also crucial that
there be a certain connection between the two from a particular standpoint and
under particular conditions. Once the connection is made according to its
condition, it will give rise to a third cognition, the one being sought. This
third cognition we will call a claim when we have an opponent and desired
outcome when we have no opponent, for it is just what is desired by
the one who is making the inquiry. We will [also] call it benefit and branch
because of its relationship to the two root premises’™ for, it results
from both [A 48] of them. No matter what the opponent admits of the two root
premises, he will also necessarily and unavoidably have to admit the branch
that derives from both of them, and that is the truth of the claim.
[16.11] the SECOND method consists of stating the two premises from a
different standpoint, such as when we say, "Everything that is not devoid
of temporal things is temporal." This is one premise. "The world is
not devoid of temporal things." This is the other premise. From both of
them follows necessarily the truth of our claim, which is that "the world
is temporal," and that is the desired conclusion.125
[16.15] Consider whether it is possible to imagine that the
opponent would allow the two premises. Then, if it is possible, let him [try
to] deny the truth of the claim, and you will know for certain that that is
impossible [for him to do so].
[17.2] the third
method consists of our proposing not to demonstrate the truth of our
claim, but rather to prove the impossibility of the opponent's claim by showing
that it leads to an absurdity and that whatever leads to absurdity must
undoubtedly be absurd.126
[17.5] For example, we could say,
"If what our opponent affirms were true, that the revolutions of the
sphere have no end, it would necessarily follow that one would also be stating
the truth when he said:
[17.6] "'Something that has
no end has been destroyed and come to an end.'127 But it is well
known that this result is absurd; therefore, from this it indubitably follows
that what gives rise to this absurdity is also [itself] absurd—that is to say,
the thesis of the opponent." Here also there are two premises.
[17.8] One of them is our saying, "If the revolutions
of the sphere have no end, then something that has no end has been
destroyed." The judgment that necessarily follows from the destruction of
something that had no end, based on the statement affirming that the
revolutions of the sphere have no end, is the cognition that we claim and judge
[to be so]. It is possible to suppose [however] that the opponent might admit
it or deny it, saying, "I do not concede that this result necessarily follows."
[17.11] The second [premise] is our saying, "This
result is absurd." And it can also be supposed that [the opponent] will
reject this, saying, "I concede the first premise, but I do not concede
this second one," (that being the impossibility that something that has no
end should be destroyed). But if the opponent admits the two premises, then the
admission of the third cognition that follows from both of them will follow
necessarily—the third cognition being an acknowledgement of the absurdity of
his premise which lead to that absurd conclusion.
[17.16] These are the three clear methods of demonstration
that produce evidence that indubitably yields knowledge. And the knowledge that
is obtained is the proposition that was sought and desired to be proven. The
pairing of the two premises which necessarily resulted in that knowledge is
called, "proof." Knowledge of the manner [by which] the thing sought
results from the pairing of the two premises is knowledge of the manner by
which the proof indicates [its conclusion]. Your thought by which you bring the
two premises into consideration and seek how to infer from both of them the
third term is theoretical reflection.
[18.4] Therefore, in order to
acquire the knowledge sought, you must fulfill two tasks: The first is to bring
the two premises to your mind; this is called thought. The other is to try
fervently to understand the way to derive the desired conclusion from the
relation between the two premises.128 This is called investigation.
Therefore, those who attend only to the first of these [A 50] two requirements
say, in defining theoretical reflection, that it is thought; and those who
attend only to the second requirement say, in defining theoretical reflection,
that it is to seek the most probable cognition or opinion; but those who attend
to both requirements at the same time say, in defining theoretical reflection,
that it is thought which investigates129 the most probable knowledge
or opinion.
[18.10] Therefore, this is what ought to be understood by
proof, the proven, the method for proving, and the true essence of theoretical
reflection. And after this, leave behind you all of the pages blackened with so
many prolix and repetitive admonitions that are of no use to satisfy the
longings of the inquirer and do not satiate the thirsty. For, the meaning130
of these precise technical terms may only be penetrated by someone who, after
perusing many works, realizes the futility of his endeavor. For if you wanted
now to find the truth about everything that has been said to define what
theoretical speculation was, that inquiry would demonstrate to you that, after
long reasoning, you would have not come up with any useful result at all. On
the other hand, if you know that there are only three cognitions, two of which
are premises that must be related one to another in a particular way, and a
third [19] that necessarily follows from them; and [furthermore, if you know
that for all of this] you need to observe but two requirements: one, to have
the two premises in mind; and the other, to seek the way to derive from them
the cognition of the third; then after that, you are free to choose any of the
definitions [A 51] of theoretical reflection—whether you take it to mean
thought (that is, the presence of the [first] two cognitions [in the mind]), or
inquiry (which is seeking to understand, from the standpoint of the third
cognition, how it necessarily follows [from the first two]), or both of these
operations together; for [all] these explanations work, and there is no need to
make too much of the technical conventions.
[19.6] You might say, "But my
purpose is to know the technical terms of the theologians—that is, can they
explain [what they mean by] 'theoretical reflection' or not?"
[19.7] Know that when you hear
someone define theoretical reflection as thought, and another as a search, and
another as the thought by which a search is undertaken, then you will not be
left with any doubt that the differences in their technical terms reduce to
those three senses. It would be amazing if someone still did not understand
this and attributed to kalam a definition of theoretical reflection that
confused the issues because he felt obliged to choose one of the definitions
without noticing that there is no [significant] difference in the basic meaning
of what is said on these issues, and that there is no significance to the
differences between the technical terms. Therefore, if you consider theoretical
reflection carefully and allow yourself to be guided on the right course, you
will know for sure that most captious questions arise from the errors of those
who seek for meaning in words when in truth they ought first to establish the
ideas and then, second, examine words.131 [Such persons] should know
that intelligible concepts do not [A52] change based on the technical terms
used to express them; but it is those to whom success [from God] is denied that
turn their back on the path and reject the truth.
[20.1] But you still might say, "I do not doubt that
the truth of the claim is necessarily inferred from the two premises as long as
the opponent admits their truth. But what would compel the opponent to admit
them? And how are these admitted premises (whose admission is necessary) to be
grasped ?
[20.3] Know that there are various sources [of cognition],
but we will endeavor in this book to limit ourselves to six:
[20.5]
First: Sensations—I mean, [objects of knowledge] attained
[either] by external or internal observation. For instance, if we were to say,
for example,132 "Every temporal thing has a cause; and there
are temporal things in the world; therefore, these necessarily have a
cause." Our affirmation, "There are temporal things in the
world" is one premise whose truth must be admitted by the opponent, for by
the evidence of the external senses he perceives temporal things such as
individual animals and plants, clouds, and rains; and also accidents such as
sounds and colors. And although he imagines that these accidents transfer [from
one subject to another], the transfer [itself] is also a temporal event. For,
we do not claim anything but that there are temporal things without specifying
whether they are substances or accidents, transferences, or something else. So
also, by the evidence of the internal senses he knows the temporality [A 53] of
pains, joys, and the burdens of his heart. He would thus be unable to deny
[this].
[20.13] Second: Pure intellect—when
we say that the world is either temporal or eternal and that beside these two
alternatives there cannot be a third, every intelligent man must necessarily
recognize the truth of this assertion. If we say, for example, "That which
is not prior to temporal things is temporal; and the world is not prior to
temporal things; therefore it is temporal," then the first premise, saying
"that which is not prior to temporal things is temporal" must
necessarily be admitted by the opponent, because that which is not prior to
temporal things must be either simultaneous with them or subsequent to them,
with no possibility of a third hypothesis. And if the opponent should claim a
third hypotheses, he would end up negating something with it that is obvious to
the intellect. And if he should deny that what is simultaneous or subsequent to
what is temporal is not temporal, he would also be denying what is immediately
self-evident.
[21.5] Third: Corroborative
reports. For example, we could say that Muhammad (the blessings of God and
peace be upon him) was truthful133 because everyone that brings
forth a miracle is truthful; he brought forth a miracle; therefore he was
truthful.
[21.8] If someone were to say,
"I do not concede that [Muhammad] brought forth a miracle," we would
respond, [21.9] "He brought forth the Qur'an;4 the Qu'an
is a miracle; therefore he brought forth a miracle." [The opponent] might
concede one of the two premises (that the Qur'an is a miracle) either
spontaneously or after seeing proofs and then want to reject the other premise
(that [Muhammad] brought forth the Qur'an), saying, "I do not
concede that the QuGân was brought forth by Muhammad" (the blessings of
God and peace be upon him). [A 54] But he could not do this, because
corroborative reports give us this knowledge, just as they give us the
knowledge of Muhammad's existence [in the first place], and of his prophetic
mission, and of the existence of Mecca, and the existence of Jesus, Moses, and
all of the other prophets.
[21.14] Fourth: That the premise is
already proven by means of another syllogism that is based on one or several of
the other steps—whether that be [22] evidence of the senses, intellection, or
unbroken historical testimony. That which branches from the root can become the
root of yet another syllogism. Thus, for example, after we have demonstrated
that the world is temporal, it is possible for us to place the temporality of
the world as the premise of a new syllogism, saying, for example, "Every
temporal thing has a cause; the world is temporal; therefore, the world has a
cause." For they135 cannot deny the world's being temporal
after we have already established it with proofs.
[22.5] Fifth: Things that are
heard.136 For instance, we may claim, for example, to demonstrate
that acts of disobedience exist by the will of God and say,
Everything that exists does so by God's will; acts of
disobedience exist;
therefore
they exist by God's will." Now, the existence indicated by our saying
"everything that exists" is known by sensory evidence; and that they
are acts of disobedience is known through the revealed law. If an opponent
denies our affirmation that "everything that exists does so by God's
will," he may be refuted either by means of revelation—as long as he
acknowledges revelation—or by rational demonstration. But we would prove this
premise through the unanimous consensus of the [A 55] Islamic community that
holds as true the following sentence: "That which God wills [to exist]
exists, and that which he does not will, does not exist." It will be the
hearing [of this statement] that impedes the denial of the aforementioned
premise.
[22.12] Sixth: The premise taken from what the opponent
believes or concedes.137 For, although its proof is not established
for us by sensory or rational evidence, we could benefit from it by taking it
for the premise of our syllogism without the opponent being able [23] to reject
that which is destructive of his belief. Examples of this kind abound and it is
not necessary to single out any one in particular.
[23.2] You might say, "Might there not be some
difference between these cognitions in terms of their usefulness for
syllogistic, speculative reasoning?" Know that they are differentiated in
terms of the pervasiveness of their benefit. The truths of intellectual and
sensible evidence are generally acknowledged by all people, except those who
have no intelligence or [are lacking] a sense, the premise being known [to
others] through the sense [he] has lost.138 An example of this would
be a premise that is known through the sense of sight. If used with a blind
person, it will be of no benefit. And if the blind person is the one engaged in
theoretical inquiry, he cannot use it as a premise. The same holds true with
the deaf for what [is known] through hearing.
[23.7] The criteria of corroborative reporting [A 56] is
also useful, but only [in establishing] the truth for those to whom the
corroborative reports have come. For, if someone comes to us in the condition
of being from a distant place, not having heard of the Prophetic call [of
Muhammad], then no matter how much we wanted to show him by means of [these]
corroborative reports that Muhammad (may the blessings of God and peace of all
peace be upon him) showed his calling by [revealing] the QuGân, it could not be
done without our first allowing [the newcomer] sufficient time to be informed
by those corroborative reports, the Lord willing that the tradition be
established without rebellion.139
[23.11] The statement of al-Shafid (may God be pleased with
him) on the question the killing of a Muslim for [his] killing a dhimz140
is known through corroborative reporting according to the Islamic lawyers who
followed him, but not for the commonality of [traditional] imitators. How many
a question in [al- Shâficï's school] concerning individual questions
is not considered to be known through corroborative reports for most of the
Islamic lawyers [of other schools]!
[23.13] As for the premises whose
truth is based on a prior syllogism, they are not useful except with those for
whom the truth of that syllogism is secured.
[23.14] As for the admitted
premises of the [various] schools of thought, they are of no use to one engaged
in theoretical inquiry except to be used in theoretical inquiry with someone
who adheres to that school of thought.
[23.15] As for [premises] from
things that are heard, they are not useful except for persons who accept them
as valid criteria.
[24.1] These are the criteria for knowing the premises that,
through their proper placement and order, generate cognition of matters sought
for but
119
heretofore unknown.
And with this we conclude the initial introductions. Let us now concern
ourselves with the cardinal themes that are the purpose of this book.
118 These are Mihak al-nazar
fl al-mantiq and Mciyar al-cilm. Asín gives an
analysis of the contents of these two manuals on logic in the second appendix
to his translation of the Iqtisad. He also notes that in the
introduction to the Mustasfa, Ghazali summarizes the doctrine of the
aforementioned manuals and that in the first seven chapters of Qistas he
also discusses the rules of the categorical, hypothetical, and disjunctive
syllogism. Finally, the first book of Maqasid is dedicated to logic per
se. This last work was known to the scholastics, having been translated into
Latin at Toledo.
119 Sabr wa al-taqslm. This is a form of argument used mostly by the mutakalimün
which involves enumerating all the alternatives to a proposition and showing
all but one to be invalid.
120 More detailed arguments
against the eternity of the world are offered later in Part 1. See 27.7, for
example.
121 This is an interesting use
of the term (cilm), which is usually translated as science or
knowledge here. Sometimes, however, the context demands a different rendering,
and I have chosen "cognition," because it carries the connotative
meaning of "understanding" while preserving an etymological
connection to "knowledge." For another example of a translator who
opted for this term, see Richard J. McCarthy's translated excerpt from cAjâ3ib
al-qalb in appendix 5 of Deliverance, 312.
122 That is, the restriction to
the two given alternatives.
123 This awkward phrasing
reflects awkwardness in the Arabic.
124 Asl, the word here translated as
"premise," is more literally translated as "root," a basic
connotation that Ghazali was clearly exploiting in developing the analogy he
does at this point.
125 Al-Ghazali refers here to
the categorical syllogism.
126 This is the reductio ad
absurdum method.
127 We seem to be missing a
step here. What evidence forms the basis for the assertion that something that
was not supposed to stop has in fact stopped? Ghazali does not answer at this
point.
128 It is significant that
Ghazali is teaching a system in which the conclusions come first and determine
the argument to be made in support of them. This accords, of course with the
idea that revealed truths are the starting point. But what happens when the
revelations leave room for different rational interpretations?
129 Bahatha is translated here as "investigate"
for the sake of consistency in glossing this term throughout the text. It
should be noted, however, that it carries the connotation of searching, so that
this phrase might also be rendered, "it is thought which searches for the
most probable cognition or opinion."
130 Al-Ghazali uses an
interesting word here; qadr means scope, quantity, value, degree—in
other words, something that can be understood with mathematical precision.
131 This is an important reference
to Ghazali's commitment to giving primacy to ideas over terminology in his
writing. See the translator's introduction for further comments and references
to the work of Lasarus-Yafeh on this subject.
132 The redundancy is in the
Arabic.
133 Sadiq : Meaning, genuine, truly what he represented
himself to be—a prophet.
134 Asín renders this and later
passages as saying that Muhammad was the author of the Qur?an,
a significantly inaccurate translation.
136 For further discussion of
this concept see the translator's introduction.
137 Here is an explicit
statement of one of the methods Ghazâlï used most famously in Tahafut
al-falasifah.
138 Or, if we follow Asin's
rendition of this passage, "In such cases, even though the proposition
continues to be knowable in itself, what is lacking is the faculty to know
it."
139 For some reason Asin omits
this last sentence and the next paragraph, indicating such with ellipses.
140 In classical Islamic
civilization, a non-Muslim who was subject to the protections and regulations
of Islamic law.
PART
ONE
[24.3] Considering the essence of God most high
Consisting of ten propositions
[24.6] The existence of God most
high and holy, and demonstration thereof.
[A
59] We [indeed] say: The existence in time of every temporal thing has a cause;
the world141 exists in time; therefore, it follows necessarily from
this that [the world] has a cause. By "world" we mean every existent
other than God most high. By "every existent other than God most high,"
we mean all bodies and their accidents. The detailed explanation of this is as
follows: We do not doubt the basis142 of existence. Next, we know
that every existent either occupies space or does not occupy space. Everything
that does occupy space but has no composition [of parts] we call a single
substance.143 If, on the other hand, it is compounded with another
[single substance], then we call it body. If it does not occupy space and
requires for its existence a body in which to subsist, we call it accident;144
and if it does not [have such a requirement], then that is God most glorious,
most high.
[24.13] Concerning the existence of bodies and their
accidents, these are known by observation. And pay no mind to anyone who would
dispute the [existence of] accidents, even though he might rant and rave and
demand proof from you, [A 60] for his own arguments, disputes, exclamations and
protests [25] do not exist, then how can one get involved in responding to him
or listening to him?145 And if, on the other hand, they do exist,
there can be no doubt that they are something distinct from the body of the
disputant, since his body existed earlier, when the disputation did not exist.
You know, therefore, that the body and the accident are apprehended by the
senses.
[25.3] As for the existent that is incorporeal and not a
substance that occupies space and that is not accident, its existence cannot be
perceived by the senses. Now then, we claim its existence, and we claim that
the world exists by it and its power. But this is perceived through the proof
of reason, which proof we have previously mentioned, not through sense
perception.
[25.6]
Let us return, then, to verifying [the argument that the
world has a cause]. We had brought together two premises relating to it, either
of which might be denied by an opponent. We say to him, then: Which of the two
premises do you dispute? He might respond: I dispute your saying that every
temporal thing has a cause, for how do you know this? Then we will say: This
premise must be admitted because it is primary and necessary evidence in the
mind, such that, whoever hesitates [in accepting it] does so because it has not
become clear to him what we mean by the ter "temporal thing " and the
term "cause." Once he has understood the significancation of those
terms, his intellect will necessarily affirm that "every temporal thing
has a cause," [A 61] for, by "temporal thing" we mean that which
was nonexistent and which then became existent.
[25.12] Now then, its existence, before existing, was either
impossible or contingent. It is untrue that it was impossible, since that which
is impossible never exists at all. Then, if its existence was contingent (and
by "contingent" we only mean something conceivable as existing and
conceivable as not existing, and if it is not existent it is because its
existence is not necessary in its essence— since if its existence existed
essentially it would be a necessary existent and not contingent); rather, its
existence would require a deciding factor146 for its existence over
nonexistence so that its nonexistence would change to existence. And if its
nonexistence should continue, inasmuch as there was no deciding factor for its
existence over nonexistence, then that which the deciding factor does not bring
into being does not exist. And by "cause" we mean nothing but the
deciding factor.147
[26.2] In short, that nonexistent being which continues in
nonexistence—its nonexistence will never be supplanted by existence so long as
a deciding factor that renders existence over continuing nonexistence is not
realized. Once the idea explained by these words is conceived in the
understanding, the intellect is compelled to acknowledge its veracity.
[26.5] This is the explanation of
that premise,148 which in reality is [just] to explain the terms
"temporal thing" and "cause," not to establish the proof
for the premise.
[26.6] If someone were to say,
"With [A 62] what would you deny [the opponent] who disputes the second
premise—that is, your saying that "the world is temporal?"149
We would say: This premise is not axiomatic; rather we shall prove it by a
demonstration, constructed from two other premises. (Now, when we say that the
world is temporal, by "world" we mean only bodies and substances150
only.) Let us say, then, that no body is devoid of temporal things; whatever is
not devoid of temporal things is temporal; from this it necessarily follows
that every body is temporal. Now, which of the two premises is contested?
[26.11] [The opponent] might say:
Why do you say that "no body or spatial being is devoid of temporal
things?"151 Then we would say: Because it is not devoid of
movement and rest, and those are two temporal things. [The opponent] might say:
You claim their existence and then their temporality; but we concede neither.
[27.1] We say: In the works on
theology the answer to this problem is stated at great length, though it does
not merit such prolixity. For the problem can never at all occur to someone who
sincerely seeks guidance, since it would never at all occur to a reasonable
person to doubt the existence in himself of accident by way of pains,
sicknesses, hunger, thirst, and [A 63] other states, nor their temporality.152
Likewise, when he considers the bodies of the world, he will not doubt that
they are subject to changes of states and that these changes are temporal. If
the opponent is obstinate it will be pointless to contend with him over this.
For to suppose that [such] an opponent will be convinced by what we say is to
suppose an impossibility—to wit, that the opponent is a reasonable person.
[27.7] Now, those who are opposed
to the temporality of the world are the falasifah. [However,] they
maintain that the bodies of the world divide into the heavens (which move
continuously and whose individual movements are temporal but in a continuous
succession from eternity and to eternity) and the four elements153
that are contained within the sublunary world. These share matter as the basis
of their forms and accidents, the matter being eternal while the forms and
accidents are temporal and follow on one another in succession from eternity
and to eternity.154 [The falasifah add] that through heat
water comes to be air and that air is changed by heat into fire, and so on with
the rest of the elements.155 [They also say] that these intermix
through temporal admixtures and thereby the minerals, plants, and animals come
to be, so that the four elements never are separated from those temporal forms,
and [A 64] the heavens [likewise] are never separated from temporal movements.
The falasifah only dispute our saying that "whatever is not devoid
of temporal things is temporal." Hence, there is no point in lingering
over this premise. Nevertheless, so as not to fail to follow the rules of the
discourse, let us still say:
[28.1] Substance is necessarily156
either in motion or at rest, both of which are temporal [states]. As for
motion, its temporal occurrence is sensed. If one supposes a stationary
substance such as the earth, the supposition of its motion is not impossible.
Rather, the possibility [of its being in motion] is known necessarily. For,
when that possibility is actualized, it has a commencement157 and
annihilates what is at rest. And rest also, prior to [movement], is something
that has a beginning, because what is eternal cannot be annihilated, as we will
note when formulating the proof of the eternity of God most high.
[28.6] And if one wished to draw a
proof for the existence of a motion superadded to a body, we say: When we say
that this substance is moved, we affirm [the existence of] something other than
the substance, even though when we say, "this substance is not
moved," what we say is [also] correct, because the substance remains
static.158 For if what is understood by "movement" were
the same as [what is understood by] "substance," the negation of the
former would be the negation of the latter. Likewise, the proof [A 65] can be
extended to the affirmation and negation of repose. But in general, undertaking
to prove what is evident serves only to make it more obscure than to clarify
it.
[28.11] It might be said, "How
do you know that [movement is something that] is originated? Perhaps it is
latent [within substance] and manifest [at different times]?
[28.11] We say: If we were to
operate in this book on topics external to its objective, we would have refuted
the doctrine of the latency and emergence accidents. But we will not bother
with what does not impinge on our objective. But we will [just] say: Movement,
whether latent or manifest, cannot exist but in substance; and both [latent and
manifest movement] are originated; therefore, it is established that substance
is not devoid of temporal events.
[29.1] But perhaps [the opponent]
will say: Maybe movement transfers from some other place [to the body that is
moved]. How do you know it is false to say that accidents transfer [from one subject
to another]?
[29.2]
We say: The proofs that have been mentioned to refute this
theory159 are feeble, so we will not add to the length of this book
by summarizing and countering them. But the correct way to expose its error
will be for us to explain that the explanation of the [correct] theory cannot
be conceived by the understanding of anyone who fails to grasp what accident
truly is and what transfer truly is. He who truly understands [A 66] what
accident is will realize the impossibility of its transference.
[29.6] To clarify this [further],
"transfer" is an expression used for the transit of substance from
place to place. This is established in the intellect if [the concept of]
substance is understood, and place is understood, and the specification160
of substance by place being superadded to the essence of substance is
understood. And, moreover, it is known that accident invariably has a
substrate, just as substance invariably has a place. So it is imagined that
accident is related to substrate as substance is related to place. From this
[notion] arises in the estimative faculty [the fallacy] of the possibility of
[accidents] transferring in [substrate], similar to substance [transferring
from place to place].161 But if this analogy were correct, then the
specification of accident by substrate would be [something] superadded to the
essence of accident and substrate, just as the specification of substance by
place is [something] superadded to the essence of substance and place. The
result is that accident may subsist in [another] accident. But predication of
accident of accident requires another specification that is superadded to the
predicate and what is predicated of it, and so on successively [ad infinitum].
The result is that one accident does not exist without there also existing an
infinite number of accidents along with it.162
[29.15; A 67] Let us examine, therefore, the cause by
reason of which there is a difference between the specification of accident by
substrate and the specification [30] of substance by place, since one of the
two specifications is superadded to essence of specified thing and the other is
not.163 From [this] the error in imagining the transfer [of accident] becomes clear. The secret [to the problem] is that although
substrate is necessary for accident the same as place is necessary for
substrance, there is nevertheless a difference between the two necessary
[requirements] since [one kind of] adherent to a thing is essential while
[another kind] of adherent to a thing are not essential. By "essential"
I mean that which, when it is annihilated, annihilates [also] the thing [to
which it is related]. That is, if it were annihilated in existence, then the
existence of the thing [it was connected to] would also be annihilated. If it is
annihilated in the intellect, then that which is known through it would [also]
be annihilated in the intellect. But place is not essential to substance.
[30.7] Let us first consider body
and substance. Then, after that, we will consider place—whether it is something
fixed164 or something imagined. We come to the truth of this
question through proofs of reason. We perceive the body through the senses and
what is evidenced without a proof. That is why the specific place165
of Zayd's body, for example, does not pertain essentially to Zayd, nor does the
annihilation of Zayd's body follow from [its] vacating that place and [that
place] being exchanged [for another].166 But it is not that way with
Zayd's height, for this is an accident that subsists in Zayd; we do not think
of it per se, without Zayd. Rather, we think of Zayd [A 68] the tall [one].
Zayd's height, therefore, is thought of as consequent on Zayd's existence, so
that from the hypothetical nonexistence of Zayd necessarily follows the
annihilation of Zayd's height. Zayd's height has neither subsistence in
existence or in the mind without Zayd. Thus, the specification of Zayd's
[height] is by his essence. That is, it exists by reason of its essence and not
because of a new concept that is a specification being superadded to it. If
that specification [of height as belonging to Zayd] is annihilated, then [the
height] itself167 is annihilated. Transfer168 annihilates
[this] specification, and thus [the height's] essence is annihilated, since its
specification as pertaining [exclusively] to Zayd is not superadded to its
essence, [and by "essence"] I mean that which annihilates [whatever
pertains to it when it ceases to exist, because it is essential, not
additional].169 So the discussion reverts to the essence of accident
in contrast to the specification of [the essence of substance] by place. For
[the specification of place as it pertains to substance] is additional to
[substance]. Hence, the annihilation of [that specification] through [the
substance's] transfer [to another place] does not [31] annihilate [the
substance] itself.170 And [so] the discussion [now] reverts to
whether transfer annihilates specification by substrate. For if specification
by substrate were something [only] superadded to the essence, then the
[essence] would not be annihilated by [the annihilation of that specification].
But if the specification is not a superadded meaning, [then] with its
annihilation the essence is annihilated. This has been made manifest and the
inquiry comes down to [the fact] that the specification of accident by its
substrate cannot be something superadded to the essence of accident in the way
that substance is specified by its place. And this is for the reason we have
mentioned: that substance is thought of in itself and place is thought of in
terms of [substance], not that substance is thought of in terms of place.171
[A 69]
[31.6] As for accident, inasmuch as it is thought of in and
with substance, not in and of itself, the essence of accident is that which has
its subsistence in specific substance and does not have an essence without it.
Thus, when its separation from that specific substance is reckoned, the
nonexistence of its essence is [also] determined.
[31.8] We have based the
discussion on [the example of] height in order to make [our] intent understood.
For whereas height is not an accident but rather an expression for a large
number of bodies in one respect, it brought our objective closer to the
understanding. And if it is understood, then let the [same] explanation be
applied to accidents.172
[31.11] This precision and probing after truth, though not
really appropriate for this compendium, was nevertheless needed [here] because
what has been mentioned concerning it [up till now] has been unconvincing and
opaque.173 We have now finished proving one of the two premises,
which is that the world is not devoid of temporal things,174 since
it is not devoid of motion and rest, which are two things that are temporally
originated and that do not [come about] through transfers [of accidents or
properties]. But it is not necessary to belabor this point in answering the
opponent who believes it, since the falâsifah are agreed that bodies of
the world are not devoid of temporal things, though they deny the temporality
of the world.
[31.15] But if someone says: The [A 70] second premise
still remains, which is [32] your affirmation that that which is not devoid of
temporal things is a temporal being. What is the proof of it?
[32.2] We say: If the world were
eternal (despite the fact that it is not devoid of temporal things), it would
be necessary to affirm that temporal events have no beginning, and it would
have to be [the case] that the revolutions of the sphere were infinite in
number. But this is impossible because it leads to an impossibility, and everything
that leads to an impossibility is an impossibility. We will explain that three
impossibilities follow [from this hypothesis].
[32.5] The first is that, if it were correct, then that
which is endless would have elapsed and there would have been a finish to it
and an end. There is no difference between our saying "it elapsed"
and our saying "it stopped," nor between our saying "it
finished," and our saying "it ended." It follows necessarily
that one would have to say that something that had no end has ended. What it is
clearly impossible is that something with no end should end, and that that
which was endless should finish and elapse.175
[32.9] The second [absurdity] is
that if the revolutions of the sphere were unending, they would either be even,
odd, or neither even or odd, or both even and odd at the same time. But these
three176 alternatives are [all] absurd, and so what results from
them is absurd. It is clearly absurd to have a number that is neither even nor
odd, or that is both even and odd at the same time. Even is that which is
divisible into two equal parts—such as ten, for example. Odd is that which
cannot be divided into two equal parts—such as seven.177 [In the
case of] every number composed of units, it is either divisible into two equal
parts or unequal parts, and is either prone to division or to no division, or
it is devoid of any of these [properties], which is impossible.178
It is not true that it can be even, because the even is [33] not odd for lack
of only one [unit]; when one unit is added, it becomes odd. But how, how can
one unit be lacking from a number that is supposedly infinite? It is [equally]
absurd that it should be odd, for odd becomes even with the addition of one.
Therefore, if it remains odd it is for lack of this unit. But how can a number
that is supposedly infinite be lacking one unit?
[33.4] The third [absurdity] that follows for the aforesaid
hypothesis is the existence of two numbers both of which are infinite [in and
of themselves] and of which one is smaller than the other. Now, it is
impossible that one infinite be smaller than another infinite, because
"smaller" is that which lacks something which, if that something were
added to it, it would become equal. But how can anything be lacking from the
infinite?
[33.8] The demonstration179 of the aforesaid is
that Saturn, according to the [falasifa], makes one revolution [around
the earth] every thirty years, and the sun makes one every year. Therefore, the
number of revolutions of Saturn is like one thirtieth of the revolutions of the
sun, since it makes thirty revolutions every thirty years while Saturn makes
only one, and one is one thirtieth part of thirty.
Now,
the revolutions of Saturn are infinite, but nevertheless their number is less
than those of the sun, since it is known necessarily that one thirtieth of
something is smaller than the thing itself.
[33.13] The moon makes twelve revolutions in one year.
Therefore the number of the revolutions of the sun would be like one twelfth of
those of the moon; and notwithstanding that both numbers are infinite, one of
them is smaller than the other, which is an obvious absurdity.
[33.16] It might be said [by someone] that things within
the power of God most high are [A 72] infinite according to you as well,
likewise the objects of his knowledge. But the objects of his knowledge [34]
are greater [in number] than things within his power, since neither the essence
of the Eternal, his attributes, nor likewise the continuously existent being,
nor any such thing are within [God's] power to enact.180
[34.2] We say: When we say that
the possible objects are infinite [for God] we do not mean to say the same as
when we say that the cognizable objects are infinite for him. Rather, what we
mean to say is that God most high has an attribute called power by virtue of
which he bestows existence upon beings and that the efficacy [of this
attribute] is never annihilated.
[34.5] Now then, this last phrase, "the efficacy [of
this attribute] is never annihilated," does not imply in any way any affirmation
of things, much less the predication of finitude or infinitude of them. Thus,
no one falls into this error except those who examine ideas through words and
who, upon seeing that the morphology of both terms "the cognizable"
and "the possible" are of the same [grammatical] type suppose that
the meaning of both is one and the same. Not at all! There is no analogous
relationship whatsoever between the two of them. On the other hand, our saying
that "the cognizable [objects] are infinite [for God]" contains a
hidden meaning that is completely the opposite of the one that initially occurs
to the mind upon hearing the phrase for the first time. The first [thing] that
occurs to the mind is that the existence is affirmed of various things called
cognizables that are infinite, which is absurd. Rather, the things that are
spoken of here are existents and they are finite. But the demonstration of this
point would require prolonged explanations.
[34.12] Anyway, the problem has
been dispelled by explaining in what sense [A 73] objects of [God's] power are
infinite. A consideration of the other extreme [of the objection], which has to
do with cognizable objects, is not necessary in order for it to be refuted. And
with this the second premise has been established as correct through the third
demonstrative method of those that we expounded in the fourth introduction to
this book.
[34.15] At this point you will know the existence of the
Maker, since [this] has become evident in the aforementioned proof—namely our
saying, "The world is temporally originated; every temporal thing has a
cause; therefore, the world has a cause."
[35.1] This first proposition has
therefore become established through that proof. But nothing seems clear to us
as yet except the existence of the cause. Now, whether this cause is eternal or
temporal we cannot yet clearly discern. So, we will turn our attention to that.
[35.3; A 74]
[35. 4] We propose that the cause which we have established
for the existence of the world is eternal181 [a parte ante].
If [the cause] had a beginning, it would require another cause, which would
require yet another cause, and so on in a chain that is either infinite, which
is absurd, or that terminates without absurdity in an eternal [being]. Now
then, this is what we were seeking, and we call this [eternal being] the Maker
of the world, whose existence must per force be acknowledged. By "eternal
[being]" we do not mean anything but a being whose existence has not been
preceded by nonexistence. Thus, nothing comes under the term
"eternal" except the affirmation of a being and the negation of a
prior nonbeing.
[35.9] Do not think, then, that eternal [being] indicates
something superadded to the essence of the eternal [being], for in such a case
you would have to say that this is something that was eternal by virtue of
another eternity that was superadded to it, and the chain would continue thus
without end. [35.11; A 75]
[35.12] We propose that the Maker
of the world, in addition to being an existent [from eternity] also has no end.
He is of an everlasting duration because it is impossible that his eternal
existence should lead to his nonexistence.
[35.14] We say this because if it were to cease to exist
its annihilation would require a cause, since it passes away after its
existence had persisted from eternity. And we have already noted that
everything that passes away requires a cause, not in that it is an existent but
in that it passes away.
[36.1] Just as the change from
nonbeing to being requires a deciding factor for being over nonbeing, so also
the transition from being to nonbeing requires a deciding factor for nonbeing
over being.
[36.3] But that deciding factor182
is either the agent that [actually] annihilates [it] by way of power, or is an
opposite, or is the suppression of one of the necessary preconditions for the
existence of that [thing]. It is impossible that it would change due to the
power [of an agent] since existence is a positive thing that is considered to
[A 76] proceed from183 the power [of an agent], and the one having
power thus becomes, through the use of that power, the active [cause] of
something. Nonbeing [on the other hand] is not a [positive] thing and therefore
it is absurd that it should be an actual thing resulting from power. For we
say: Is the agent of nonbeing the maker of something? If yes is the answer,
then that is absurd because nonexistence is not a thing.
[36.8] If the Muctazilite
says that the nonexistent is a thing and an essence, that essence would not be
the effect of an [divine] power. It is inconceivable for him to say, "the
act that comes about from [divine] power consists in enacting that
essence," for [according to the Muctazilite], it is eternal.
Rather, [God's] act is the negation of the existence of [such] an essence. The
denial of the existence of [such an essence] is not [the negation of] a thing.
Hence, [God] did not enact anything.
[36.11] Now if what we have said is true, that "It has
not done anything," then our other statement is also true that the agent
has not exercised power to leave any trace or effect, and, therefore, it has
remained as it was, and has not done anything.
[36.13] It is [also] false to say
that an opposite annihilates it.184 For if this opposite being is
temporal, then it will [first] be destroyed due to the contrariety of the
eternal [being]. This [actually] takes [logical] precedence over its destroying
the eternal [being]. [37.1] And it is impossible that an eternal being should
have an opposite that is eternal [also], coexisting with it from eternity and,
having not already annihilated it, annihilates it now.185
[37.2] [Finally,] it is false to
say that the eternal [being] is annihilated by the annihilation of some
condition for its existence. 186 Actually, if the condition [A 77]
were temporal, it would be impossible that the existence of the eternal [being]
should be conditional upon something temporal. And if it were eternal, then the
same thing must be said of the condition as was said of the being that is
conditioned by it: it is impossible that either of them are annihilated, being
eternal.
[37.5] Someone might say: And how
is it that, according to you, substances and accidents are annihilated? We
answer: As for accidents being annihilated, we mean that they are annihilated
in themselves and in their essence, it being inconceivable that anything
remains.
[37.7] Understand this school [of thought] by applying it,
for example, to movement [which is an accident]: The different states that
follow one another in successive instants are not considered to be movements
[in themselves] but rather inasmuch as they are in continuity by way of those
states being continually originated and continually annihilated. Actually, if
[such states] remain everlastingly, they then would constitute rest, not
movement. For the essence of movement cannot be conceived without also
conceiving of annihilation following existence. This is understood in [the case
of] movement, without any further proof.
[37.11] And as for colors and the other accidents, if what
was just said is understood about what [would follow] if they remained
everlastingly, it would be impossible that they should then cease to exist
(whether through power, or an opposite being) the same as [we said] before with
respect to the eternal [being] and the example of that [being's] annihilation.
[A 78] It is impossible in the truth of God most high.
[37.13] We have shown first God's187
eternity [a parte ante] and the continuity of his existence without end.
And there is no being that is necessary for his reality or that determines [his
existence] in succession like there necessarily is for movement wherein there
is a successive annihilation of existence. And as for substances, their annihilation
consists in that neither movement nor rest is created in them. Thus, with the
indispensable condition [for them] to exist being supplanted, their continuity
or permanence [in being] cannot be conceived. [38.1]
[38.2] We propose that the Maker
of the world is not substance occupying space because his eternity has been
established. Thus, if he occupies place, he cannot but be in movement or at
rest in that place, and therefore, he cannot but be affected by temporal
things, and he consequently would also be temporal, according to what we said
previously.
[38.5] But someone might say: And
why do you reject those who call [God] substance, even when they do not affirm
a spatial nature for him? We say: in our judgment, human reason cannot see any
problem with the use of these words in referring to him except for what is
correct in language and what is correct for revelation.
[38.8] Regarding the language: If
[the opponent] claims that this accords with the usage of the [Arabic]
language, this calls for investigation. If someone who submits this claims, [A
80] that this is [God's] name—that is, that the one who has set down the
language applied that it to God most high—this would be a lie against the
language. Should he claim that this is a metaphor that views the meaning shared
with that from which the metaphor is taken, then, if this is appropriate for
the metaphor, one would not disavow it for lexical reasons. But if it is
inappropriate, it would then be said to him, "you have sinned against the
language," though [his] sin may not be that serious unless and to the
extent that he is one of those literati who use symbols of dubious analogy. Now
then, the discussion of this topic does not correspond to intellectual studies.
[38.14] With respect to divine
revelation and the permissibility or impermissibility of [using the term
"substance" as applied to God], that is a debate among jurists, since
there is no difference between the inquiry into the permissibility of the use
of words without meaning to indicate something evil by them, and the inquiry of
the permissibility of other acts. And there are two opinions on this:
[39.1] It might be said that a [given] term should not be
used in reference to God most high without the allowance [of revelation], and
such allowance is not found in [the revealed text]. Or it might be said that
[the use of a given term with respect to God] should not be forbidden except by
prohibition [in the revealed text], and such prohibition is [also] not found,
therefore there is a debate. For if there is danger of error [about God], [A
81] then one should guard against it, since the mere hint of error about the
attributes of God most high is forbidden. On the other hand, if there is no
danger of error then there should be no judgment forbidding it. Both solutions
might then be admissible. What is more, the hint of error will vary according
to the terms in question and the norms for their use: Sometimes a word might be
suspect to some people but not to others. [39.6; A 82]
[39.7] We propose that the Maker of the world is not
corporeal, because every body is composed of at least two substances188
that occupy space. But it is impossible that God is substance;189
therefore, it is also impossible that he is corporeal; for by "body"
we do not mean anything else but this. If someone called [God] corporeal but by
"corporeal" meant something other than this meaning, then there would
have to be a debate with him over the intent of the language or the intent of
the revelation, but not with arguments from natural reason. For natural reason
does not adjudicate in matters of the use of terms, nor does it study the
letters and sounds that are conventionally used. Furthermore, if God were
corporeal, he would have a specified quantity. He could, therefore, be
conceived of as being lesser or greater [in quantity that what he is]. Now
then, one of two equally possible things is not realized except through the
choice of a [third] party that is capable of specifying one of them over the
other, according to what we previously have said. Therefore, God would have
need of some specifier who would have influence over him in order to give him
the specific quantity [that he has]; therefore, God would be something made
instead of being the Maker; and he would be created instead of being creator.
[40. 1; A 83]
[40.2] We propose that the Maker
of the world is not accident because by "accident" we mean that whose
existence requires an essence in which it subsists—and that essence is either
body or atom;190 therefore, being innovated, as every body
necessarily is, the conditional thing that subsists in it must also, without
doubt, be innovated, since [the notion] of transfer of accidents is false.
[40.5] We have already
demonstrated that the maker of the world is eternal; therefore, it is not
possible that he be accident. If "accident" is understood to be
something that is an attribute of a thing that does not occupy place in space,
we would not deny the existence of a such a being; rather, we would [take it in
that sense] to demonstrate the attributes of God most high. Verily, the
argument reduces to the absolute sense of the term "maker" or
"agent," since the absolute sense is applied to the essence which is
endowed with attributes, the priority of its absolute sense being with respect
to the attributes.
[40.9] If we say that the Maker is
not attribute191 we mean that the making refers to the essence in
which [A 84] the attributes subsist, not to those attributes themselves.
Likewise when we say that the carpenter is not an accident nor an attribute, we
mean to say that the art of carpentry bears no relation to the attributes, but
to the essence of which the aggregate of the attributes must necessarily be
predicated in order for that essence to be an artificer. Thus it must be said
also of the maker or artificer of the world. If our opponent understands
"accident" as a thing that is neither a state or mode of being that
resides in body, nor is it an attribute that subsists in essence, then the duty
to refute it belongs not to intellectual reason but to lexicology or
revelation. [41.1; A 85]
[41.2] We propose that [God] has
no specified aspect from any of the six sides [of a three-dimensional body]. He
who knows the significance of the term "side" and the meaning of the
term "specification," will surely understand the impossibility of
sides with respect to [beings that are] not corporeal substances and accidents,
since space is actually something that is conceived of as that by which a body
is specified. But space only becomes a "side" when it is related to
something else that is spatial.
[41.6] The sides are six: top, bottom,
front, back, right, and left. "The thing is above us," means that it
is in a space that is contiguous to the head. "The thing that is below
us," means that it is in a space contiguous with the foot. And so on with
the other sides.192 Thus, anything that is said to be on a side, is
said to be in a space, but with the addition of a relation.
[41.9] Our saying "Something
is in a space" may be understood in two ways.
One
of them is that [the thing] is specified by [that space] in the sense that another
thing like it is impeded from existing in its stead [in that space]; and that
[is what is meant] by corporeal substances. The other way is that [A 86] [that
thing] is a state that resides in the corporeal substance, because it has been
said to be on a [given] side—even though it is [really only so] because of the
setting of the corporeal substance. Thus, the existence of the accident on a
[given] side is not the same as the existence of the corporeal substance
[there]. Rather, the side pertains to the corporeal substance first and
foremost, and to the accident through the setting [of the corporeal substance
to which it pertains]. These are the two aspects in which [something] can be
said to be specified in space.
[41.14] If the opponent intends one of these two
[meanings], prove his error to him with the [same] proof of error [for the
claim] that God is corporeal substance or [42] accident. And if the opponent
intends anything other than these two [understandings], his interpretation will
be incomprehensible. The truth about the correct use of his term will rest upon
what is understood [by it], on lexicology193 and revelation, not on
intellectual reason.
[42.2] Now, it may be that the
opponent says: "In affirming that [God] is on some side I mean it in a sense
that is different from this [that you have said]." But we will [still]
refuse to allow this and say, with respect to your term, that I reject it if
you are using it in [any] way that adopts its plain meaning, for this [plain
meaning] connotes the idea of corporeal substance and accident, which is an
untruth regarding God most high. Nevertheless, it is still possible that I
might not reject what you intend to say; for how could I reject that which I
cannot comprehend? It might be that by this term you intend [A 87] God's
knowledge and power. In such a case, clearly, I will not deny that God is of
some aspect194 in the sense that he has knowledge and power. Yet
once you have opened this door—that is, the door of using the term in a sense
other than its obvious meaning and what people give it in order to understand
[one another]—then it is no longer possible to restrict it from any number of
meanings you might want to give it. Nevertheless, I will not reject them as
long as those meanings do not imply concepts that lead to temporality, for
whatever leads to [the idea of] origination in time [with respect to God] is in
its essence impossible and leads, furthermore, to the falsehood of saying that
[God] has sides, because this would occasion contingency in God, giving him a
specific aspect, particularizing him to [just] one of the possible sides. This
would be impossible in two aspects:195
[42.11] The first of them is that
the side on which God would be specified would not be specified by him
essentially, since all sides are equal to one another with respect to priority.
Thus, to specify just one of these various is not essentially necessary; [43]
only possible. It requires, therefore, a specifier to specify it, and this
specification of it will be superadded to its essence. And whatever implies
contingency [with respect to God] is incompatible with his eternity, since he
is a necessary [A 88] existent in all aspects.
[43.4] It might be said that [God] is on the top side since
it is the noblest of the sides. To this we say that if one of the sides has
come to be the top side, it is so because [God] created the world in space such
that [the top side] was created there. Prior to the creation of world, above
and below did not exist at all, since both sides are derived from the head and
the foot. But at that time there was no animal at all with respect to whose
head "above" could be named as the side contiguous with it and
"below" as its opposite.
[43.8] The second reason is that if God were on a [given]
side, he would be in a spatial [relation] with the world, and every spatial
thing would either be lesser than, greater than, or equal [to him in size]. All
this necessarily implies a determination [of the size of things] by one who
determines, and reason conceives it to be possible that that determiner may
require [something] to be lesser or greater than what it [actually] is.
Therefore, [God] would need a determining and specifying agent.
[43.11] Someone might say, "If
something is specified as being on a side, then there must be one who
determines [which side]; but accidents are determined."196 We
say: Accident does not exist on any side in and of itself [essentially], but
through its inherence in a substance.197 So of course it is also
determined by that inherence. If we know [A 89] that ten accidents cannot not
exist except in ten substances, then it cannot be conceived that they exist
[44] in twenty. The determination of the accidents to be ten [in number] must
come by way of [their] inherence in the determining substances, just as the
determination of [something] to be on a side must [come about] by way of [its]
inherence [in substance].
[44.3] Someone might say, "If
[God] is not specified as being above, what is the point of raising the face
and hands to the heavens in supplications, whether as a prescribed action or by
natural impulse? And what is to be made of what [Muhammad]—God's blessing and
peace be upon him—said to a slave whom he intended to manumit but wanted first
to be sure of her faith, [asking her]: Where is God? And she responded with a
gesture toward the sky, and he said that she was a believer?
[44.6] The response to the first
[question] is that it is similar to someone saying, "If God is not in the
shrine of the Kacaba, which is his house, then what does it
matter if we come to this shrine on pilgrimage in order to visit him? And why
are we orienting ourselves in the direction of that shrine when we make the
ritual prayer? And if God is not in the earth, then why do we humble ourselves
to the point of touching our face to the earth when we prostrate ourselves in
ritual prayer?" To this it should be said: The reason revelation has
inculcated the precept that people should face the shrine of the Kacaba
in their ritual prayers is to require a single, fixed direction, because it is
indisputable that it brings a greater submissiveness and [awareness of] the
presence of God in the heart [A 90] than irresolution in the direction [of
prayer]. Therefore, since all of the directions are the same with respect to
the possibility of being selected for the direction of prayer, God most high
specified a certain area, ennobled it and magnified it, establishing special
relationship between himself and it and kindling within the hearts of the
faithful a certain affection towards it deriving from the nobility with which
he had distinguished it in order to establish the orientation [for worship]. In
like manner, the sky is the qibla for the stars, just as the shrine [of the Kacaba]
is for ritual prayer even though the one who is worshiped and the one to whom
we direct our pleas is unbounded by shrine or sky. There remains, however, in
this direction of our gaze heavenward as we pray, a subtle mystery that very
few are capable of penetrating. It is that the salvation of man, his definitive
victory in the life hereafter, shall be achieved only by humbling himself to
God in his soul and acknowledging the greatness of his Lord.
[45. 3] Now then, this humbling oneself and acknowledging
[God's] greatness are acts of the heart whose instruments are the intellect and
the members of the body inasmuch as these are used to purify and cleanse the
heart. The heart actually has been created by God so as to be influenced by the
action of the body's members. Likewise he created the members to be influenced
by the beliefs of the hearts. If the [A 91] goal to be achieved is that man
should humble himself—in his mind and in his heart—recognizing how
insignificant he is so that he can then become aware of the nobility and
excellency of the being of God most high in relation to this, his baseness; and
as one of the greatest proofs of his own lowliness and one of the most
effective ways to induce in his own soul feelings of humility, [let him
recognize] that man has been created from the dust of the earth and that is why
the religion demands, as a ritual, that he place upon the dust (the most base
of all things) his own face, which is the most noble of his members, in order
that his heart might be humbled on bringing the forehead into contact with the
earth. In this way the humbling of oneself affects not only the body to the
degree and manner that it is able, that is, being embraced by the base and
detestable dust, but also with the intellect in the way that corresponds to its
being, that is, recognizing its lowly condition and its base estate upon
recognizing the thing of which it has been created.
[45.12] The same should be said of
reverence for God most high, which is as indispensable as humility for the
salvation of the soul. The members [of the body] must also participate in this
sentiment to the degree possible [46] and in the way that they are capable of.
Heart-felt reverence consists in believing and acknowledging the exalted
station of the respected person. Respect in the members [of the body] consists
in attitudes or gestures upwards, which suggest the elevated class of the
respected person. It is so much so that in the language of familiar
conversation it is usual to express the elevated social status of a person and
the respect he deserves by saying of him that he is in the seventh heaven, by
which is metaphorically indicated not just [A 92] the material elevation of a
place, but also the elevation of status. Also the head is moved toward the sky
in order to signify the respect merited by the person of whom we are speaking,
and this gesture indicates that the esteem of that person is in the
heavens—that is to say, on high—so that the heavens in these cases indicate
what is high.
[46.7] See, then, with what
subtlety religion has known how to guide hearts and bodies to the respect and
reverence that are due to God most high. [See] also how ignorant a person is
shown to be who sees only superficially the members of the body and,
negligently, does not bother to delve more deeply into the mysteries of the
hearts. Such an ignorant person supposes that the most important thing in all
of this is what is indicated by the organs of the body in their gestures and
attitudes without noticing that, on the contrary, the first and principal thing
is to know the sentiment of respect within the heart, a sentiment that, in
having respect for [God], indicates high esteem, not a high place in space, and
that the organs of the body fill no role here other than simple subjects and
servants of the heart, serving it in that task of showing to [God] the respect
that is his due—but only to the degree that such is possible—that is, through
gestures or indications in the direction of [47] certain points. This is the
subtle mystery that abides in raising our faces to the heavens when we want to
show respect and reverence to God most high. And prayer cannot but be a plea [A
93] or petition for any one of the divine mercies or benevolences. The keep of
those blessings are the heavens, and the guardians charged with distributing
them are the angels whose fixed abode is the kingdom of the heavens. That is
why God most high says "And in the heaven is your providence and that
which ye are promised."198 Now, instinct moves us spontaneously
to turn the face in the direction of the closet in which is kept the food that
we desire. The subjects that hope to receive something from the rulers, when
they know that the gifts will be apportioned, gather at the door of the
treasury and their faces along with their hearts are inclined to the place
where the treasure is found, even though they do not believe that the king is
personally present at the place of the treasure. This is the same thing that
turns the faces of religious people in the direction of heaven by instinct and
by the revealed law. Clearly the common people simply believe that the Lord
whom they worship is in fact in the sky, and this belief is also one of the
causes that moves them to raise their faces in prayer. The Most High is Lord of
all lords. I affirm that those who deviate [from His truth] greatly err.199
[47.10] As for [Muhammad's] judgment that that slave was a
believer for the simple act of facing heavenward, this also has a clear
explanation, for it is evident that the world has no other way of expressing
the high station of a person besides the gesture towards what is high. Now
then, according to what is said, that slave was dumb, and as it is supposed
that she was an idolater—that is to say, of those who believe that [God] dwells
in the temple of idols—then, when it was required of her to clearly indicate
what her belief was, she let it be known through that gesture, signaling [A 94]
towards the sky, attempting thereby to say that her Lord, whom she served, did
not dwell in the [48] houses of the idols as the idolaters believed.
[48.2] Someone might say, "To
deny [that God is in some] place leads to absurdity, which is affirming the
existence of a being that is not in any place, that is neither within nor
without the world, and that is neither united with nor separated from it, which
is absurd." We say: It is granted that for any existent capable of
relative position to have an existence that is not relative and not divisible
is absurd. [This is so] because it is absurd that every existent capable of
occupying a place in space should have its existence without the six sides [that
are possible] for it. But if there is an existent that is not capable of
relation, nor of occupying a place in space, then it is not absurd that such
should be devoid of that condition.200 It is as if someone were to
say, "It is absurd [to suppose] an existent that was neither powerless nor
powerful, neither knowing nor ignorant, for one of these options must obtain
for that thing." To someone [who reasoned thus] it might be said: If that
being is capable of the two opposing attributes, it is actually absurd that it
should exist without one or the other of them. But if it is not capable of
either of them, then it is not absurd that it should exist without them.
[48.10] As for inanimate body,201 for which not
one [of the opposing attributes] obtains because it is lacking in the
precondition for them—which is life—its existing [in spatial relations] without
them is [certainly] not absurd. Therefore, the essential condition for being
contiguous [with another body] and for occupying a place in space is fully to
be in space or to subsist in a being that is. [49; A 95] If this [condition] is
lacking, then the being with opposing [attributes] cannot exist either. The
question then reduces to whether or not an existent is possible that does not
occupy place in space, neither subsists in another being that occupies it but
rather is in fact devoid of the condition for relation and of having parts.
[49.4] If the opponent supposes that such a being is absurd
or impossible, we would prove it to him by [saying] that, insofar as every
being that occupies place is temporal, and every temporal being [ultimately]
requires an atemporal agent, then from these two premises there necessarily
follows the certainty that there is a being that does not occupy place. As for
the two premises, we have already demonstrated them. And as for the conclusion
that we claim to derive from both of them, there is no way to deny it, once
they are admitted.
[49.8] The opponent might say:
"A being like the one your proof has lead us to admit must exist cannot be
understood." Then say to him: What is it that is meant when you say
"cannot be understood?" If you mean to say that that being is
inconceivable, unimaginable, and beyond comprehension, then you speak the
truth, because nothing enters into the conception, the imagination, and the
comprehension except body endowed with color and extension. That which is
devoid of color and extension cannot be represented by the imagination, because
the imagination has been attuned to visible objects, so that it cannot conceive
of anything if it is not so as to be a visible being, and therefore, the things
[A 96] that are not amenable to sight cannot be conceived of by the
imagination.
[49.13] But, if what the opponent means is that such a
being is unintelligible, or rather, that it cannot be known through rational
proofs, then what he says is absurd, since previously we have set forth the
rational proofs that demonstrate the existence of that being which is God.
Intelligible only means that to which the intellect is obliged to assent by the
power [50] of a proof that is impossible to deny. And we have already
demonstrated this.202
[50.2] Now, if the opponent should
say that what cannot be conceived by the imagination does not exist, we would
judge that imagination has no existence in and of itself. And we say: The
imagination cannot undertake imagining in and of itself if seeing does not
enter the imagination and likewise knowledge, power, hearing, smell, and
motion. And if imagination203 were obliged to affirm a being of
sound, it would per force have color and extension; likewise its image.204
[50.6] The same can be said of all
of the affections of the soul: shame, fear, passion, anger, happiness, sadness,
and vanity. One who tried to impose upon his fantasy the difficult task of
forming an exact concept of the being of those states of the soul after having
perceived those states of the soul in themselves through all their evidences,
would find that he was incapable of doing it without supposing some error. And
then he would afterwards deny the existence of a being that did not come within
the conception of his own fantasy. That is, then, the way to resolve the
objection.
[50.15] We propose that God most high has nothing to do
with the characteristic of being seated upon the throne. For every [51] being
that is situated upon a body and abides thereon certainly has extension, since
[that being] must either be greater, lesser than, or equal to [the body in which
it resides], all of which cannot but imply extension. For, if it is possible
for him to contact the body of the throne on that upper side, then it is [also]
possible for him to contact the other sides and he turns out to be spatial. But
the opponent does not in any way suppose this, even though it may be logically
inferred from his doctrine. In sum, [God] does not abide upon any body [as a
body], and there is no [other] condition by which he could except as accident ,
and it has already been shown that God most high and holy is neither body nor
accident. Therefore, this proposition has no need of being demonstrated further
than this.
[51.7]
It might be said: Then what do these divine words mean,
"The Merciful is established on the throne"?205 And what
do those other [words] of Muhammad mean: [A 98] "God most high descends
each night as low as the heaven of this lower world"?
[51.9] We would say: The
discussion that would be required to explain this issue would be lengthy.
Nevertheless, we will suggest the straight path through those two citations
that leads to their correct interpretation, and that is for us to speak of
people as being of two kinds: common and learned.
[51.12] For the common people we believe it best not to
impose allegorical interpretations of those texts upon them, but to eliminate
[52] from their beliefs anything that would imply anthropomorphism or argue for
temporality [in God], and verifying that God is a being "like unto whom
there is nothing else; he hears and sees [all]."206 When the
common people ask the meaning of these verses, rebuke them and say to them,
"That is beyond your capacity. Continue on your own path. Each science has
its practitioners."
[52.4] [Our response] should conform to what some of the
forefathers207 said when questioned about [God's] sitting [upon the
throne]. They said, "That he is seated is known, in what manner is not
known. To ask about it is heretical innovation, [A 99] but it is incumbent
[upon us] to have faith in it." This is because the intellects of the
masses are not capable of understanding intelligibles208 and they do
understand them through words, for they are also incapable of perceiving the
many various meanings that the Arabs give to words, taking them metaphorically.
[52.7] On the other hand, for
those who are learned, it is appropriate to explain the [intellectual] meaning
to them and cause them to understand it. But I do not mean by this to say that
such a method is obligatory for everyone, for there is no obligation imposed
except the obligation to deny any resemblance between God and his creatures.
But as for the meaning of the Qur?an, the revelation does not
oblige everyone to comprehend all of the Qur?an. Nor do we
agree with the opinion of those who say that this pertains only to obscurities,
such as the single letters that open certain chapters of the Qur?an.209
These single letters have not actually been placed there as though they were
words whose meaning was based on the usual value that the Arabs gave to them of
old; therefore, we are in the same case as if someone were to speak to us with
single letters that were words for him, but without having previously agreed
with us [53] about their meaning. It is clear that that meaning would be
unknown by us.
In
the way he uses them, [A 100] those single letters come to be the same as a
language newly invented by him.
[53.3] On the other hand, those
words of Muhammad (the blessing and peace of God be upon him), "God most
high descends to the heaven of this world," have an intelligible meaning,
and it can be seen that they have been given in order to make something
understood, since, upon hearing them, any person understands that they mean
either what they literally express or some other metaphorical meaning. How,
then, can it be said that this is ambiguous? Rather, it is a text about which
the ignorant will imagine an erroneous meaning while one with understanding
will grasp the correct meaning. It is like the saying of the Most High,
"He [God] is with you wherever ye are" (Qur'an 57:4). An
ignorant person will imagine it in an associative meaning, contrary to the
meaning of the position of God on the throne. The wise person, on the other
hand, will understand it in the sense that God is with all things inasmuch as
he knows and comprehends all with his knowledge. Likewise with [Muhammad's]
saying (upon him be peace), "The heart of the believer is between two
fingers of the All-
Merciful."
The ignorant person imagines two members made of flesh, bone, and nerves ending
in cuticles and fingernails and originating in the palm of the hand. The wise
person, on the other hand, interprets that meaning metaphorically, excluding
the literal value of the words. That is to say, in this text the fingers
indicate the end for which fingers serve—the mystery, the spirit, and the
reality of [the fingers] is the power [A 101] to turn things around whatever
way the subject desires. So also, in the previous saying of the Most High,
"He [54] is with you," the union expressed by the word
"with" is the union that is had in the understanding between subject
and object.
[54.2] But one common expression210 of Arabic is
for the effect to be expressed by the cause, and the means to the end to denote
the end. As God most high says in a sacred hadith, "Whosoever will draw
near to me a handbreadth, I will draw near to him an arm's length; and whosever
will come to me walking, I will go to him running."211 Here
"running" means to the ignorant person the motion of moving the feet
with great rapidity, and in the same way "come" means for him the
action of coming closer in distance. On the other hand, for the intellectual it
means the end or object which the physical coming closer is trying to achieve—
that is, grace or favor. Thus, the metaphorical meaning of the text is this: My
mercy and my grace are poured out upon my servants with much more promptness
than that with which they serve me. This is also like what God most high says
elsewhere, "Verily, great is the desire with which the pure of heart have
to come to meet me, but my desire to meet them is unsurpassed."212
The Most High is certainly above the literal meaning of that word
"desire" here, which is a kind of [A 102] moral pain and a need that
demands to be satisfied so that the subject can rest and be comforted—that is,
an actual imperfection. But, on the other hand, as desire causes the person
desired to kindly welcome the desiring person and to pour out favors upon him
then it will turn out that the word "desire" here comes to be used to
mean that effect produced by desire. Likewise, the words "wrath" and
"pleased" express the will to punish and to reward, [55] which are
ordinarily two effects of the same. So likewise, when [Muhammad] said,
"The black stone is the right hand of God upon his earth,"213 the
ignorant person believes that by this was meant the hand as opposed to the left
hand—that is, a corporeal member made of flesh and blood and divided into five
fingers. But if this same ignorant person were to open the eyes of his
intellect, he would know that if [God] is seated upon a throne, his right hand
could not be in the shrine of the Ka?aba, nor would that hand
be a black stone. He would notice, therefore, if he had the smallest amount of
aptitude, that the term "right hand" is a metaphor for the means of
receiving guests. It is commanded that the stone should be touched and kissed
in the same way that it is commanded for the hand of the king to be kissed, and
it is in this sense that the word is used. The man of perfect intellectual
insight into language does not make too much of such things, because he
understands right away their true import.
[55.8] Let us return, then, to the
meaning of [A 103] "sitting" and "descending." As for
"sitting," that it indicates a relation to the throne is not
impossible; but it is not possible that the throne should be related to God
except inasmuch as the throne is an object of the knowledge of God or of his
will, or of his power; or inasmuch as it is a substrate similar to the
substrate of accident; or inasmuch as it is a place such as is occupied by [physical]
body. But some of these relations are intellectually inadmissible and several
do not accord well with the meaning of the word taken metaphorically. But there
should be, among all of these relations—besides which there are no other—a
relation [56] that reason would not disallow and that would not be incompatible
with the meaning of the term. Now then, that [the throne of God] is a place or
a substrate, like substance is to accident, is not incompatible with the
meaning of the word, but reason insists that it is impossible, as has already
been demonstrated. That it is the object of God's knowledge and will, reason
does not contradict, but it is incompatible with the meaning of the word. As
for the throne being an object of God's power—that is, something that falls
within the realm of his determining and dominion even though it is the greatest
of the created beings214—this brings praise to God [A 104] because
it points out and emphasizes the greatness of the one besides whom there is no
greater. This is something that does not contradict and is consistent with the
meaning of the term. That the metaphor is consonant with its literal meaning is
obvious to anyone who knows the Arabic language. The only ones who will find
any difficulty in understanding it are those who, because of their lack of
philological training consider only vaguely the import of the Arabic
vocabulary, similar to the way an Arab would understand the language of a Turk
knowing only the rudiments of it. One of the phrases that are well said and
common is: "The ruler sat over his kingdom." And the poet says:
In Iraq did Bashir establish his seat,
Sans sword, sans bloodshed, he accomplished the feat.
[56.10] On this subject some of the companions of the
Prophet said that the meaning of "The All-Merciful is seated upon the
throne," encompasses the same [56] idea as "Then went he to set
himself in the heaven, which was then a vapor of smoke."215 As
for what pertains to the words of Muhammad, "God descends to the heaven of
this lower world," they also admit of metaphorical interpretation for two
reasons. The first is because the attribution of the descent of God himself is
a metaphorical attribution, since in reality [A 105] it must be attributed to
one of his angels, the same as in the text in which God says, "inquire of
the city," where those inquired of are actually her inhabitants. And this
also is a very common metaphor in the language—I mean, the metaphor that
consists in attributing acts to the lord that belong to his subject. Thus, it
is said, for example, that "the king has halted at the gate of the
city," when what is meant is his army. For if it were said to the person
who had informed us that the king had halted at the gate of the city, "Why
have you not gone out to meet him?" he might respond, "I have not
gone out because the king has left to hunt and he has not stopped yet," to
which no one would then say, "Then how can he have halted if you now say
that he has not yet stopped?" The reason is that the meaning of the first
phrase was that not the king but his army had halted at the gate of the city.
This is obvious and evident.
[57.11] The second reason is because the word
"descend" is often used in the sense of stooping benevolently,
graciously condescending to one's neighbor, just as, on the other hand, the
word "lift oneself up" is used in the sense of pride or haughtiness.
It is said, for example, "So and so lifts his head to the clouds of
heaven," to indicate that he is haughty. And it is also said, "He has
lifted himself up on high" to indicate that he has become haughty; and if
his social status has become elevated, it is said that he is in the seventh
heaven. On the other hand, if [58] his position declines it is said, "He
has fallen to the depths." And if he shows himself to be benevolent and
kindly toward his neighbor it is said, "He lowers himself to the ground
and abases himself even to the lowliest degree." [A 106] Once this is
understood—once it is understood that the word "descend" can be
interpreted in the sense of coming down in position, or in rank because of
having lost status, or in the sense of "condescend," which is to
lower oneself through humility and benevolence by omitting all of those acts
that bring with them the high status of the noble and rich, then it only remains
to consider in which of the three senses to which the word "descend"
is given may it reasonably be permissible to refer [to God].
[58.6] As for descent being a downward path, reason holds
it to be impossible [that this would apply to God], as we said previously. For,
that movement is not possible except with respect to beings that occupy a place
in space. As for [it being] a lowering of status, that is also impossible,
since God most high is eternal in his attributes and in his glorious majesty,
of which it is impossible that he should be deprived. As for descent understood
in the sense of condescension, benevolence, and the omission of those acts that
are [usual] for one who is wealthy and in need of nothing—this sense is
possible, that descent may be predicated of God.
[58.10] And it is said that when
the speech of God most high came down saying "[His is] the highest estate
and he hath the throne," the companions of the Prophet were overcome by a
[A 107] great fear. They lost the confidence needed to make their pleas to a
being endowed with such overwhelming majesty. But then it was explained to them
[by the Prophet] that despite his majesty and the exaltedness of his state
above his servants, God most high was merciful to them, and solicitous of them,
and would listen to their petitions. Now then, answering petitions is a
veritable condescension in relation the height of God's majesty and
self-sufficiency. And so the use of the term "descend" was to
encourage the hearts of people to offer their petitions and even to bow and
prostrate themselves before him. For, someone who is overcome with fear before
the majesty of God most high, will feel inadequate [even] to bow and prostrate
himself before him.
[59.4] The [collective] offerings of all men, when compared
to the majesty of God most high, would be something more base and contemptible
than the meager movement of just one finger made by a slave in order to endear
himself to the king of the land. And if that slave were to attempt to honor any
king in such a way, it is certain that he would be deserving of lively
punishments for it. In fact, it is the custom of kings to sever from their
service men of base condition, not allowing that such people should prostrate
themselves to them and that they should not even kiss the doorpost of their
palaces, because it is beneath them that any other than princes and nobility
should serve them [A 108], as has been the custom among some caliphs. And if
the Most High did not condescend from his exalted majesty in mercy and benevolence,
it is for certain that the hearts of men, astounded by the majesty of his
glorious presence, would lose their command of reason so as to think, their
tongues so as to make mention of him,216 and their members would
lose the power of movement. Thus, whoever reflects on how great the divine
majesty is and, at the same time, how great the divine condescension, will
understand without any kind of doubt that the metaphorical sense of the word
"descent" is in perfect harmony with the majesty of God and with the
semantic value that that term has in the Arabic language, though it is not just
as the ignorant would understand it.217
[60.1] But someone might still say, "Is it not the
case that [the QuGan] specifies that the heavens [belong to] the world?"218
We would say this refers to [the world's] rank as last, below which there is no
other, such as when it is said, "He has come down even to the earth and he
has ascended even unto the Pleiades," in the supposition that the Pleiades
are the highest stars and the earth the lowest place of all.219
[60.4] Does it not specifically say [in the QuGan] that
[God] descends by night, saying, "He descends every night"? We would
say this is because in solitude is the most appropriate condition in which [A
109] to pray, and the night is precisely the best time to be alone, since that
is when all the world sleeps and when, therefore, the remembrance of created
things is most easily erased and the soul of one who prays feels more inclined
to the remembrance of God most high. Such a prayer is precisely the kind that
might most be hoped to be heard by God, not [the prayer] that comes from
distracted hearts full of mundane concerns.
[60.9] We propose that God most exalted and high, is
visible, contrary to [the claims of] the Muctazilites. There
are two reasons why we treat this problem in this first part, which is
dedicated to the study of the being of God most high: First, is because to deny
visibility with respect to a being logically leads to a denial of all spatial
relation for him.220 But we want to show how the negation of all
spatial relation with God can be reconciled with the affirmation that he is
visible. Second, because the most high [61] is, according to us, visible in his
being, by the existence of his essence and not by reason of some of his acts or
attributes. Indeed every being of actual essence must necessarily be visible,
just
as he
must be cognizable. But I do not mean to say by this that he has to be
cognizable and visible in act, but rather in potency—that is, by reason of his
essence he can be the object of vision without there being in his same essence
any obstacle or impossibility to his being seen, so that if some obstacle were
to impede the reality of the vision, it would be an obstacle that was extrinsic
to his essence, such as when we say that the water in the river is capable of
quenching thirst and [A 111] that the wine in the vessel is capable of
intoxicating, when that is not exactly so, because drunkenness and satiety are
effects contingent upon the act of drinking. Nevertheless, it is correct
because it is understood to mean that both liquids are capable of
producing those effects. This [proposition that God is visible] can be shown in
two ways:
[61.8] The first is by showing that it is logically
possible. The second is by the actual fact [of the vision of God], which can
have no greater demonstration than that of revelation.221 Once the
fact is demonstrated, the possibility is also demonstrated, but let us
nevertheless first prove the possibility [of seeing God] through two rational
arguments.
[61.11]
In the first we say that the Creator most high is a being
and an essence having reality and positive [existence] and differing from all
other beings only by the impossibility of his being temporal, as they are, or
of possessing any attribute that entails this temporality or that contradicts
[62] the divine attributes of knowledge, power, and so forth.222 As
a consequence, everything else that can in truth be affirmed of [other]
existent beings is also true for the reality of God, so long as it does not
argue for temporality or contradict any of the [divine] attributes. And so it
goes with God's "cognoscibility." God can be the object of knowledge
without this causing any change in his essence or implying any contradiction
with respect to his attributes or suggesting temporality in his existence. Thus
there exists between God on the one hand and bodies and accidents on the other
a perfect [A 112] equality with respect to the possibility that their essences
and attributes be objects of knowledge. And vision is a kind of knowledge that
does not imply any kind of alteration in the attributes of the object that is
seen, nor does it suggest temporality; therefore, [the possibility of vision
with respect to God] must be concluded, as with respect to every other being.223
[62.7]
But someone might say, "God's being visible requires that he be in a
place, and that requires that he must be accident or substance, which is
absurd. Put in the form of a syllogism, the argument is as follows: If God were
visible, he would have to be on one side [or another] of the observer; but this
result is absurd; therefore, so is the visibility of God." We say that we
concede to you one of the two premises of this syllogism, to whit: "This
result is absurd"; we reject, on the other hand, the first premise, which
is that that result of necessity derives from the dogma of divine visibility.
[62.12] Why do you affirm that
"If God were visible, he would have to be on one side [or another] of the
observer?" Do you know the truth of this premise by immediate evidence or
by reasoning? There is no way to claim it is by direct evidence, and if it is
by reasoning then surely you can show it to us. Now then, the closest the
opponents have come to making such a demonstration is to affirm that they have
never up till this time seen anything that was not on some specific side [A
113] with respect to the observer. But to that demonstration it may be replied
that from what has never been seen no judgment can be made about what is [63]
impossible, since if that were allowed it would also be allowed for the
anthropomorphist to affirm that God most high is body, because he is active. It
is just that we have never yet seen any actual being save it was a body. But now
[the Muctazilites] might say that if God is an actual and
existent being, he must be either in or out of this world, either contiguous
with or separated from it, and so he cannot but have six sides, since no
existent is known that is not thus. And so there is no difference224
between you and those [anthropomorphists]. Thus the essence of their objection
[always] reduces to proclaiming that [given] what is seen and known, it must be
that nothing else can [ever] be understood except on that same basis. It is
like someone who knows bodies and yet denies accident saying that if such a
thing existed it would occupy a place of its own in space that would preclude
other accidents from being [in that same place] by reason if its being a body.
Now then, this is the same as claiming that it is impossible for beings to
exist as distinct from other [beings] in certain essential properties that
pertain to them while [at the same time] sharing other properties in common.
Such an affirmation is without any foundation, to say nothing of the [other]
argument against them, which they cannot have failed to notice, that God can
see himself and see the world with no need for being on any [particular] side
[A 114] with respect to himself or with respect to the world. If that be the
case, then their objection is demolished, and this is what the majority of the
Muctazilites now recognize, for there is no escaping it for
any who admits that God knows himself and knows the world. And if someone
denies that this is true, still he cannot deny that at least man can see
himself in the mirror, and it is well-known that this happens without the
viewer being in front of himself. And if the opponents claim that the man does
not actually see himself but rather that he only sees an image that is a copy
of his form that is thrown on the mirror in the same way that the shadow image
of a person is thrown on a wall, then one should respond to them saying that
that is obviously impossible.
[64.1] If the observer distances
himself two cubits from a mirror hanging on a wall, he will see his image
distanced from the body of the mirror by two cubits; and if he goes three
cubits, so shall [the image]. Now then, that image that is distanced from the
mirror by two cubits, how can it at the same time be imprinted in the mirror
when the thickness of the mirror is no more than the thickness of a grain of
barley? That the image is being held by something behind the mirror is
impossible, since behind the mirror there is nothing more than the wall, or
air, or another person that is hidden from the viewer who cannot see him.
Likewise with the right and left, the above and below and all of the six sides
of the mirror: when the observer sees the image distanced two cubits from the
mirror and that image is sought on any of the [six sides] adjoining the mirror,
it is [always] found [in front of] the mirror. [A 115] Now then, that image
that is seen has nothing that causes it to resemble any of the bodies around
the mirror except the body of the one looking in the mirror; so that person
must be the object seen, without any need for him to be standing in front of
himself, nor, therefore, in a specific place in space.225
[64.10] The Muctazilites
have no way out of this. We know of necessity that if a person had never seen
himself or known what a mirror was, and he were told, "You can see
yourself in a mirror," he would think that was impossible and would say,
"That could not happen except I myself see myself being inside the mirror,
which is impossible; or I see something like my form that is inside the body of
the mirror, which is [also] impossible; or [65] I see a resemblance to my image
in the body of the mirror—that is, in the body [of the mirror] while I am
looking at it, which is [also] impossible. [This is] because the mirror in and
of itself has a form, and bodies that are around it [A 116] have [other] forms,
and it cannot be that the two forms combine in one body. For it is impossible
that the forms of man, iron, and wall should exist in one body.226
That I should see myself as myself is absurd. For, if I am not in front of
myself, how can I see myself, since there must be an opposing relation between
the viewer and what is seen?"
[65.5] Now, this is a correct
analysis according to the Muctazilites, and yet it is well
known that it is false. Its falsity comes, in our opinion, when he says,
"If I am not in front of myself, I cannot see myself."227
Except for this point of the foregoing analysis, the rest of the arguments are
accurate. In this way is shown the ease with which those [Muctazilites]
are prone to assent to the truth of facts to which they are not accustomed and
which their senses have not discerned.
[65.8] The second method [for showing that God is visible]228
is the open vision. It consists in saying that if the opponent refuses to admit
the visibility of God, it is only because he does not understand what is meant
by "vision," nor has he been able to penetrate what it really
signifies. He thinks that by "vision" we mean a state equivalent to
the state that occurs with an observer when he looks at bodies and colors. But
it is no such thing. For we know the impossibility of that with respect to the
essence of God most high. So we must analyze the meaning of the word
"vision" in relation to the context to which it is being applied, to
[A 117] formulate it [properly], and then discard from it those [meanings] that
are incompatible with the essence of God most high. If there should remain of
those meanings one that is not incompatible with the essence of God most high
and that can be called "vision" in all truth, then we shall affirm it
[66] with respect to God most high and we shall conclude that he is truly
visible. On the other hand, if it is not possible to use the name
"vision" except in a metaphorical sense, then we shall use that word
when revelation enjoins us to, but understanding it in the sense that reason
indicates to us that it should be understood.229
[66.2] An analysis [of the process
of vision] shows that it basically consists of a locus,230 which is
the eye, and an object, which is color, extension, body, and other visible
things. Let us consider, then, the reality of its meaning—of its locus and of
its object—and let us determine which of all those elements might be true for
the word ["vision" with respect to God].
[66.6]
Now, as for the locus [of vision], we say that that is not
where the true meaning of the word lies, for if the phenomena that we see with
the eye through sight were [instead] perceived by us with the heart or the
forehead,231 for example, we would also certainly say that we had
"seen" the thing and "beheld" it, and we would have spoken
accurately, because the eye—locus and organ of vision—has no meaningful value
in itself except that the phenomenon of vision takes place in it. As long as
the phenomenon [of vision] takes place [whether in the eye or in another
subject,] the reality of that condition is fulfilled and that word
["vision"] can rightly be applied to it.
[66.10] Since we say that we know
with our heart [A 118] or with our mind when we perceive something through the
heart or through the mind; so likewise we can "see" with the heart,
or with the forehead, or with the eyes.
[66.12] As for the object232 [of sight] in its
essence,233 here [also] there is no support for the use of the word
["vision,"] nor any real certainty about it. For, if vision were
vision [just] because its object was black, then it would not be vision when
its object were white. If [67] [vision were vision only insofar as] its object
were color [in general], then whatever had movement as its object would not be
vision. If its object was accident, then whatever had body as its object would
not be vision. This demonstrates that the particular qualities of the object
[of vision] are not the essence upon which this actual phenomenon rests, or the
basis for the use of the word ["vision"]. Rather, there is a basis
for it insofar as it has as its object any quality that has actual existence,
whatever it be, or any essence, whatever it be. Thus, the basis upon which the
word "vision" depends will be the third element—that is, the reality
of the meaning without any relation to its subject or its object.
[67.6] Let us consider, then, this
reality. What is it? There is no reality to it except a kind of perception that
is more complete and lucid than imagination. If we see a friend, for example,
and then close our eyes, the image of the friend is there in our mind in an
imaginative and representative way. But if we then open our eyes again, we will
note well the difference. [A 119] This difference, however, does not consist in
that now we see a completely different figure than what we had before in
imagination; on the contrary, the image seen with the eyes exactly corresponds
to the imagined one without any difference. There are no differences between
the two other than that the second is like the perfection of the imaginative
state and a clarification of it. The image of the friend is renewed in clarity
within us upon opening our eyes and is more complete and perfect [than before].
But this image that reappears upon [opening] the eyes coincides with the image
that existed in the imagination. Therefore, imagination is a kind of
perception, [but] to a degree beyond which there exists another degree of
perception more perfect in terms of clarity and lucidity and which is like its
completion. This completion [68] of perception with respect to the imagination
is sight and vision.
[68.2] So it is [also] with things
we know and do not just imagine—and [among such] is the being of God most high,
his attributes, and anything that has no form, neither color, nor
extension—such as, for example, power, knowledge, love, sight, and imagination.
We know all of these things—we do not imagine them—and the knowledge that we
have of them is a kind of perception. We now see, then, that if reason has its
limits, it may have a completing mode of perception that is to it what sight is
to imagination. If this is so, then we might call that perception that is lucid
and perfect in relation to knowledge "vision," just as we use the
word [A 120] "vision" in relation to imagination.
[68.7]
Now then, it is known that this idea of the existence of a
degree of greater perfection in clarity and lucidity than simple knowledge has
nothing absurd in it with respect to cognizable existents that cannot be
imaged, such as knowledge, power, and so forth, and likewise with respect to
the being of God most high and his attributes. Indeed, it might be said that
human nature itself instinctively seeks to achieve that greater clarity about
the essence of God and his attributes and about the essence of all of those
ideal realities.
[68.11] And we affirm that such
[clarity] is not impossible, not only because there is nothing incompatible
with it, but because reason demonstrates its possibility—indeed, insists on it.
It is just that such knowledge most perfect and clear is not granted in this
world because the soul, preoccupied in the governance of the body, its native
purity and cleanliness tainted by the impurities of the world, is hindered as
though by a veil from having such perception. For just as it is not absurd [69]
that the eyelid or the veil or darkness over the eye are causes that ordinarily
hinder vision of imaginable objects, neither is it going too far [to say] that
for the soul the accumulation of preoccupations are like veils that ordinarily
hinder the sight of intelligible objects and that, when the dead return from
the graves and what was in the breasts of men [A 121] is brought forth and
hearts are cleansed by drinking the water of purification and are purged with
many kinds of cleansing and expurgation,234 then there will be no
more burden preventing them from achieving that greater perception and clarity
concerning the essence of God most high, or of the rest of intelligible things.
And that elevation to a superior degree [of intellect] will be comparable to
the way sight [perfects] imagination. And let it be referred to as "the
encounter with God most high," or "the witness of him," or
"the vision of him," "the sight of him," or whatever you
like, for there is no need to argue over terms once the intended meanings are
understood.235 And if all this is possible, and if [God] were to
create within the human eye [the ability to see him], then the word
"vision," would be the most preferable when the obvious meaning of
the language is considered. Now, it is not impossible for him to [thus] create
in the eye, just as it is not impossible for him to create in the heart. And
thus, if it is understood what the orthodox236 mean when they use
the word "vision" [with respect to God], it will be known that reason
does not reject it, but indeed requires it, and that revelation bears witness
to it. No reason remains, then, to reject this view except for the sake of
disputation or to cast doubt on the appropriateness of the word
"vision" or because of the inability of [A 122] the opponent to
perceive the nuanced ideas that we have mentioned. So, in this compendium we
will limit ourselves to this.
[69.14] The second part237 of [this proof] is
established by revelation.
Revelation
has demonstrated that the vision of God does occur. Many are the revealed texts
that attest this. [70] Their great number is an indication of the unanimity
with which those first believers of Islam humbly asked of God most gracious
that he would grant them the pleasure of beholding his beautiful face. We
verily know from their declarations of faith that they were seeking as much,
that they understood that it was permissible to seek for it, and that they
asked it of God most high according to the recitation238 of the
foremost messenger of God (may the blessings and peace of God be upon him). [We
know this, further, by] an [almost] innumerable collection of his very clear
sayings and a consensus that demonstrates [this fact] beyond the limitations of
sense perception.239 One of the most powerful [witnesses] that
demonstrates this [possibility of seeing God] is Moses' saying (peace be upon
him), "Show yourself to me, that I might behold you."240
It [seems] impossible that one of the prophets of God most high—a prophet whose
station was such that God (to him be glory) would speak directly to him—would
be ignorant about something with respect to the divine essence that the Muctazilites
are not. This "knowledge" [on the part of the Muctazilites]
is necessarily [A 123] a vanity on their part, because, according to them, for
their opponents not to know that in his being [God] cannot be seen must be
called heresy and error since it is ignorance of an attribute of God. For, the
impossibility [of the vision of God] proceeds, according to [the Muctazilites],
from the divine essence in that he is not in any place. But then, how is it
possible that Moses (peace be upon him) could know that [God] does not occupy
place and yet not know that a vision of a being that does not occupy place is
impossible? What is it that the opponent would prefer to suppose escaped the
notice of Moses [peace be upon him]? [71] Would he prefer to suppose that he
sincerely believed that [God] is a physical body, endowed with color and
occupying a place? To do so would be to accuse the prophets of heresy, since
such an accusation against the prophet (peace be upon him) would itself be
blatant heresy. To say that God most high has a body is the same thing as to
worship idols or the sun.
[71.3]
On the other hand, perhaps [the opponent] would say that
[Moses] knew that it was absurd that God should occupy space, but that he did
not know that what does not occupy space cannot be seen. This would make the
prophet (peace upon him) as one ignorant, since the opponent considers that
this premise is based on immediate evidences, not on theoretical reflections.
Now then, O seeker of truth, it is up to you to decide. Either you are inclined
to call a prophet ignorant, or you would prefer to call the MuTazilites
ignorant. Chose for yourself what you think is most appropriate and be settled!
[71.7] If it is said, "If these [words of Moses] argue
in your favor they may also argue against you, because [A 124] he asks if he
might see [God] in this world. Also arguing against you are when the
Most High says, "You shall not see me."241 Likewise, his
words (may he be praised), "No vision can apprehend him"242
also argue [against you].
[71.9] We say: [Moses'] asking to
see [God] in this world is proof that he did not know when the vision should
take place but that it was a possible act as far as he was concerned. Prophets
(upon them be peace) do not know about future events except the ones that they
are informed of [by God], which are few in number. How, then, would it be
incongruent that the prophet should seek the revelation of a mystery or relief
from distress, hoping for it in a time that was not appointed for it to be
revealed in the knowledge of God most high? As for God's saying, "You
shall not see me," this was a denial to the request of Moses in that he
asked for [the vision] in the here and now, not the hereafter. If [Moses] had
said, "Show yourself unto me that I might behold you in the
hereafter," and [God] had said, "You shall not see me," then
this would indeed have been an evidence against the visibility [of God]. But
even in this case it would have only been with respect to Moses in particular
and not in general with respect to all other people. Therefore, not even that
would have been proof of the impossibility of the vision. And how much less
could it be [A 125] if [that response] were in answer to a request [to see him]
in the present moment?
[72.6] As for the other text that says, "No vision can
apprehend him," it means that they do not comprehend him or embrace him
from all sides, like [ocular] vision comprehends or embraces bodies, and this
is true. Or it might well mean generally to know [him] in this world, and this
is also true, as it is precisely the same as the meaning of his saying (exalted
be he), "You shall not see me,"—that is, in this world. But let us
curtail this study of the problem of the visibility [of God], only let the careful
reader note how the different theological sects are divided by this question
into parties for one excess and another.
[72.11] The Hashwiyya243 cannot comprehend a
being that does not exist in a place, so they affirm that God exists in a
place, which obligates them to predicate corporeality, extension, and the
[other] specificities of temporal beings [of him].
[72.13] The Muctazilites, on the other
hand, deny [that God is in] a place, but being incapable of comprehending the
vision of a being that has none, they openly contradict the revealed doctrine
on this point, believing that by allowing [the vision of God], they would have
to also allow that God has a place. These last, then, in order to avoid the
danger of falling into anthropomorphism, commit themselves to the via
negativa244 but fall into excess [therein]. On the other hand,
the [A 126] Hashwiyya affirm that [God is in] a place in order to avoid the
danger of denying the divine attributes245 and so fall into
anthropomorphism. Only unto the ahl al-sunna, has God most high granted
[grace] in order to establish the true doctrine and to discern the just balance
[in belief] in order to do so. They know that [being in] a place should be
denied of God because it is a consequence and complement of corporeality. [On
the other hand, they maintain] that the vision of God is something real because
it is a kind of knowledge, coming afterwards [in the next world], being the
perfection [of knowledge]. Now, denying corporeality of God impels them to deny
place [with respect to God, which is one of the inseparable characteristics of
[corporeality]. But to affirm the cognoscibility [of God] impels them to affirm
his visibility, which is a consequence and the perfection of [cognoscibility],
partaking of its basic nature in that it does not imply any change in the
essence of the thing seen, but rather relates to it only in that the result is
like knowledge. There can be no doubt to someone with intelligence that this is
moderation in belief.246
[73.9] We propose that God most
high is one and that his being one pertains positively to his essence and is
excluded from any other. It is not to be considered as an attribute that is
superadded to the essence [of God], so mention of it should occur in this [first]
part [of the treatise].
[73.10] We say that [the word]
"one" can be taken and understood in the sense of that which does not
admit of division—that is to say, it has no quantity, no perimeter,247
and no extension. Thus, the Creator most high is one, meaning that he is not
quantifiable, meaning that quantification denies something's wholeness by
dividing it. But [God] is not divisible, since divisibility pertains to things
that are quantifiable.248 Quantification results in division into
parts, becoming smaller. [74] But that which is not quantifiable cannot be
described as divisible. Furthermore, ["one"] can be understood as
that which has no equal in its rank, such as when we say that the sun is one [A
128]. In this sense also the Creator most high is one, since he has no peer.
And that he has no complement249 is also clear, since what is
understood by complement is that which follows another in the same substrate
without joining to it; and a being that has no substrate also has no
complement. The Creator most high has no substrate; therefore, he has no
complement.
[74.5] As for our saying that [God] has no peer, we mean
that he is the creator of that which is other than he, none other. The
demonstration for this is that if an associate [to God] is posited, [the associate]
would either be like him in all aspects, superior to him, or inferior to him.
But all of this is impossible, and so is the hypothesis that leads to the
impossibility. The impossibility that another should be like him in every
respect consists in that each of the two beings is distinct from the other. For
if there were no distinction between the two beings then they could not be
conceived of as being two. For we do not think of two black colors unless they
are in two [different] substrates, or in one substrate at two different times.
Thus, one of the two must be distinguished, differentiated, and diversified
from the other—whether by substrate or whether by time. The two things may also
be distinguished from each other by differences in definition and essence,250
such as differences in movement and color. For, though combining in one
substrate at one time, they are nevertheless two, since one of them is
distinguished from the other in its essence. But if two things coincide in
their essence and definition, such as black, then the distinction [75] between
[A 129] them would have to be in the substrate or in the time [of their
occurrence]. For if we were to suppose two instances of black in a single
substance and circumstance, it would be absurd, since their duality would not
be distinguishable. If it were possible to say that they were two and yet not
different, then it would also be possible to point to one man and say that he
was two or even ten men, only that they were all alike and equal in quality, place,
in all of their accidents and accessory properties, without any distinction,
which is necessarily absurd. Now then, if the supposed peer of God most high
were the same as him in essence and in attributes, his existence would become
absurd, because he would be indistinguishable in space (since [God is] devoid
of place) and time (since [God] is timeless and eternal). Thus, there would be
no distinction between either of them. And with every distinction erased, then
number necessarily is erased and singularity follows per force.251
[75.7] It is also absurd to say that [God's supposed peer]
is distinguished from him in that he is superior or of a more elevated status,
since that being who is higher [than God] would then be God, since
"God" indicates the most noble and sublime of all beings. Therefore,
the other [of the two] would necessarily be imperfect and, therefore, not God.
For, if we negate number with respect to God it is because God is the being [A
130] who is affirmed in absolute [terms] to be the most noble and excellent of
all beings that are.
[75.10} Furthermore, if [God's supposed peer] were inferior
to him, [the hypothesis] would also be absurd because he would be imperfect,
and as we understand God to be the most noble of all beings that exist, there
cannot be save one being that is most noble, and that is God. It cannot be
conceived that there are two which are equals in the attributes of this highest
excellence, since in that case the distinctions between the two would be
eliminated, thus, the number would be done away, as we previously said.
[76.2] If it is said, "Why do
you reject someone who does not dispute the existence of a being to which the
name God applies (understanding by "God" the most excellent of
existent beings) but who nevertheless says that the world, taken as a whole, is
not the creation of just one creator, but rather the work of two creators of
which one might be, for example, the creator of the sky, and the other the
creator of the earth; or perhaps, one the creator of inanimate beings and the
other the creator of the animals and plants? Where is the impossibility in
this? For if there is nothing that proves the impossibility of this hypothesis,
then what does it help you to say that the name of God does not apply to those
beings? For such an opponent understands "god" to mean
"creator." Or he says that one of those two is the creator of good
and the other of evil, or one the creator of substances and the other of
accidents. It is, therefore, indispensable that you demonstrate the impossibility
of this hypothesis.
[76.10]
We say: The proof of its impossibility is this: All of
these divisions of creatures between two [A 131} creators posited [by the
opponent] can be reduced to two options. Either the creation of the totality of
substances and accidents is divided between the two of them, so that one of
them creates some bodies and accidents without the other, or all bodies are
said to be [the creation] of one and all accidents [the creation] of the other.
[76.13] But it would be an error to say that some bodies
were created by [just] one of them, such as the sky, for example, without the
earth. [77] For, we ask: Is the creator of the sky capable of creating the
earth or not? If he is as capable of doing the one thing as he is the other,
then there would be no difference between the one agent with power and the
other, and no difference between one act of power and another. Both agents
would be capable of the same act, and there could be no relationship between
them in which one was preeminent over the other. And so the same absurdity that
we discussed earlier comes about by positing the simultaneous existence of two
beings that are like one another without any difference. This is absurd.
[77.4] Now, if [the creator of the heaven] is not capable
[of creating the earth], then the hypothesis is also absurd since corporeal
substances are in themselves all the same in terms of the mode of existing that
is proper to them for their particular relations. So someone who is capable of
creating such things must also be able to create their like, since his power is
eternal in the sense that he can have various created things as his object. Now
then, the power of both of these two [creators] pertains to a certain number of
bodies and substances, so it is not limited to one object. Therefore, if the
relation [A 132] between [that power] and one object of power is be applied to
other temporal objects, then there is no reason to limit its reach to one set
of possible objects rather than another; rather, it must be concluded that the
number of its possible objects has no limit or is infinite—that is to say, that
all substances may come about through his power.252
[77.10] The second part [of the
objection], saying that one of the two [creators] has power to create
substances and the other to create accidents and that the power of the one is
necessarily different from that of the other is also absurd. For, accident
cannot exist without substance, nor can substance exist without accident.253
The actualization of each one of them is dependent on the other. If the creator
of accidents desires to create one, how will he be able to create it? Perhaps
the creator of substance does not want to help the creator of accident, and
when he wants to create the accident, the other might refuse to create the
substance and the other would be incapacitated [78] and foiled—that is to say,
powerless. Likewise, if the creator of substance desired to create it, the
creator of the accident could oppose him and keep him from doing so resulting
in a mutual hindrance.254
[78.3] If it is said,
"Perhaps one of them [A 133] wanted to create substance, and the other
assisted him by creating accident, or vice versa." We would say: Is such
help so necessary and mandatory that human reason cannot conceive its
nonexistence or not? Because if you claim it to be necessary, that is how you
want to resolve the problem. But it also denies the power [of both creators],
because the creation of substance that is brought about by one would require
the other to create the accident, and visa versa. So [neither] would have power
to refrain, and therefore, there is no real power under such conditions. In
summary, if the help can be withheld, then it is contingent, and the act will
be unlikely, which annuls the meaning of power. And if the help is necessary,255
then the agent that cannot do without it would be a compelled agent devoid,
therefore, of power.
[78.10]
It might be said, "Let there be, then, one creator of
good and another creator of evil."
[78.11] We say: This is foolishness
because evil is not evil essentially. Rather, in terms of essence evil is
equivalent to good and is like it.256 The power to bring something
about is [also] the power to bring something that is like it about. The
cremation of a Muslim's body is an evil; the cremation of the body of an
unbeliever is a good and an avoidance of an evil. So, according to this, if a person
pronounces the profession of faith,257 [79] then cremation in his
case [A 134] becomes an evil. But it is the same power to burn flesh in fire
that exists whether the subject has not uttered or has uttered the profession
of faith. The sound of [the voice uttering] the formula does not change the
essence of the flesh, the fire, or cremation and does not transform genera.
Thus, cremations being all alike, the power to cause all of them must also be
the same.
[79.4] [Furthermore, if true, the
opponent's proposal] would lead to the same mutual hindrance and reciprocal
impediment [between the two creators that we spoke of before]. Thus, in
summary, however the matter is cast it will always backfire and engender [its
own] destruction, which is what God most high means when he says, "If
there were in both [the heavens and earth] other gods besides God, [surely
both] would be destroyed."258 Nothing exceeds the QuGân in
clarity.
[79.6] And with this tenth proposition we close this first
part; for of the subjects that belong to it none remain to be discussed except
the impossibility that [God] is subject to temporal things. But to this problem
we will allude in the course of the treatise on the divine attributes as we
refute those who affirm the temporality of knowledge, will, and other
[attributes of God].
141 Al-Calam: This could also be translated as
"cosmos." The whole created order is intended.
142 Asl: I usually translate this term as premise, but
in this context "basis" or "principiality" is more apt.
143 Jawharan fardan: This could also be rendered as
"atom," however, unless the context demands otherwise, my preference
is to translate jawhar as "substance." See my discussion of
this in the introductory essay.
144 Here I adopt the singular
rather than the plural form of this term, following the alternate reading given
in the critical apparatus of the Arabic editon.
145 Ghazâlï is having a bit of
fun here at his opponent's expense by pointing out that his very protests
against the existence of accidents—and all of the other actions he mentions—are
themselves accidents by definition.
146 Murajjih: An alternative gloss of this term would be
"that which gives preponderance."
147 In Creation and the
Cosmic System, 28-29, Richard Frank discusses this passage. He is working
to show how Ghazâlï varied in the language and concepts he used when discussing
causality in different contexts. He suggests that Ghazâlï's use of murajjih
(which we translate here as "deciding factor") is a borrowing from
Avicenna (see in particular his note 44, loc. cit.). But this is rather beside
the point. No one disputes that Ghazâlï borrowed terminology from the falasifah,
but this is not to say he adopted their cosmology or theories of causation. In
other writings, Ghazâlï uses this term to refer to God, a reading that is not
at all inconsistent with his less explicit usage here.
148 Referring to the premise
that the interlocutor first chose to have investigated, to wit: "every
temporal thing has a cause," at 25.6, above.
149 Ghazali has not yet
addressed this hypothetical objection, let alone rejected it. The question
posed here simply allows him to examine in greater detail the second of the two
premises mentioned earlier—the one that was initially passed over for
discussion.
150 By this usage Ghazali
presumably means single atoms—that is, single substances—the irreducible
constituents of bodies.
151 This is not exactly a
precise restatement of the premise as just presented. In particular the
identification of "spatial being" with "body" is notable.
This would be based, presumably, on the acceptance by the opponent of the
definition of body offered earlier (at 24.13) as that which occupies space and
is differentiated (having parts).
152 This argument is an example
of a proclivity Ghazali will demonstrate throughout this work—that is, to cut
to the chase. He is here arguing from a pragmatic perspective. He does not want
to get bogged down trying to prove something that he seems to feel nearly any
reasonable person would concede as true on its face anyway. He wants to get to
the more interesting, substantive questions.
Al-Ghazali's pragmatic brevity in the Iqtisâd, which
contains his first account of physical theory from a kalam point of view,
sometimes means that we are left with not enough information to determine what
he actually believe on certain points. For an example, Aloor Dhanani notes that
"Al-Ghazali's pragmatic view of kaldm is far from the convictions
of al-Juwayni and other mutakallimün who hold that the discussions of kaldm
are about the way things really are" rather than about "guiding some
errant souls to right practice and belief." Thus, he says, "the text
[of Iqtisad] does not allow us to draw conclusions about Ghazali's
endorsement of theories of discrete space, time, and motion, nor about his
acceptance
of void" ("Al-Ghazali's Attitude," 18-21).
153 Al-Ghazali uses al-anasir
al-arbacah here rather than the al-ustaquss (of Greek or
Syriac derivation?), the preferred term among the falasifah. Thus, even
when discussing their doctrines he avoids their technical terms. See the notes
to 19.7 above, and cf. Walzer, On the Perfect State, 136-137, and 564,
s.v. "element."
154 Thus, though they are
temporal, they nevertheless have the appearance of something everlasting, like
the heavenly spheres alluded to just before.
155 The notion of four elements
from which all things are composed has its roots in the earliest traces of
Greek philosophy. Thales, Anaximander, and Anaximenes all proffered theories of
underlying element or elements from which all the varieties of nature arise. And
the cosmology of Plato and the physics of Aristotle both offer accounts for
earth, water, fire, and air as basic forms of matter.
156 Bi'l-darüra: Throughout his oeuvre, Ghazali uses this term
both in the usual kalam way—when logical necessity that is beyond any further
need for proof is meant—and more idiosyncratically "when he talks of
empirical or emotional phenomena, and when he puts forward theories based on
assumptions or feelings only" (Lazarus-Yafeh, Studies, 60-61).
157 Kana hadithan: The term I usually translate as
"temporal" here needs to be given its specific connotation of
originating in time.
158 In other words, movement or
rest occur to substances without altering their basic essence or being,
so movement and rest must be something in addition to substance. Asín
translates this passage rather differently and confusedly.
159 Presumably, in other works
of kalam.
160 cIkhtisas: The idea is of something that particularizes substance,
differentiating it from other substance. Here, the substance's location
distinguishes it from other substance, adding specificity to it.
161 This is a difficult passage
and I have tried to retain some of its vagueness in the translation.
Nevertheless, I have added interpolations that give a reading that I believe to
be borne out by the rest of Ghazali's discussion.
162 The result is an infinite
regress of accidents subsisting in accidents, a consequence that was generally
considered impossible by the mutakalimün.
163 As I follow this argument,
Ghazali means that the specification of accident by substrate is essential
while the specification of substance by (a given) place is something superadded
to its essence (and therefore, not essential). This analysis of his argument
informs some of the interpolations I make in the passages that follow,
particularly in supplying referents in place of pronouns that would otherwise
be ambiguous.
164 Presumably thabit
here should be regarded in its fully nuanced sense of something that is fixed
not only with respect to position, but also—and more importantly—with respect
to its ontological status as something real rather than mawhüm,
imaginary.
165 Al-hayyiz al-mucayin: This is an important point that helps us to
understand Ghazali's meaning. In speaking of substance being specified by place
nonessentially, Ghazali means that the essence of substance does not
depend on its being in any one particular place or another. Its specificity
there is something superadded to the essence. The argument might go rather
differently if Ghazali were speaking of place in general—i.e., if he were
addressing the question as to whether substance is essentially spatial (always
existing in some place or not at all). On that count Ghazali has a very
different point to make, for which, see his definition of substance earlier in
this section.
166 This description of motion
as being a transfer of substance from one place to the next is pertinent to the
occasionalism to which Ghazali subscribed as an Ashcarite. Ghazali
discusses occasionalist motion in greater detail below (37.5 ff.).
167 More literally, "its
essence;" the intent is that the height is annihilated in its essence.
168 Recall that Ghazali has
indicated that by "transfer" he means "the transit of substance
from place to place" (29.6).
169 These interpolations
represent my understanding of what is admittedly a very terse passage. My
thanks to Michael E. Marmura for his efforts to help me decode it, though I
remain responsible for this reading.
170 Again, more literally,
"the essence."
171 I disagree with Frank's
reading of this passage, which he cites to show that Ghazali's intention here
"might well have been to eliminate the occupation of space from the
conception and definition of the jawhar as such" (Frank, Al-Ghazal!
and the Ashcarite School, 49). On Frank's reading, it would
seem, Ghazali intends to say (contrary to Ghazali's own claim early in this
same section) that substance is not spatial. This seems to do violence to the
integrity of Ghazali's discussion solely for the purpose of establishing a
claim that remains as yet unpersuasive— that Ghazali was, at least in part, a
crypto-Aristotelian.
172 This is admittedly a rather
curious ploy. Ghazali, rather than using a more precise example (involving
something that squarely fits the definition of accident), has opted to use an
approximation. Several questions pertaining to his choice might be raised. For
instance, how might the example of color rather than height (as accident) have
affected (weakened) his claim that accidents inhere essentially in their
substrates and that as one is annihilated, so must the other be?
173 I read this as meaning that
the explanations of other theologians have been unsatisfactory and that Ghazali
is therefore pausing to answer a desideratum, not that his own admittedly
labored explanation has been found wanting.
174 This premise is first
stated in [16.11].
175 Ghazâli's use of so many
synonyms here is somewhat unusual, especially since they are cognates of one
another and, as he himself admits, make no difference in the argument of his
point. Perhaps he is using them precisely to make the point that it is the
concepts that matter, not the terms used to express them.
176 I count four options, based
on Ghazâli's own syntax. (He sets each phrase off with wa camma).
The options are: even, odd, neither, or both. Perhaps key to the way Ghazali has
numbered them is in the word aqsâm, "divisions," which you
could read as meaning "odd or even" as one, "neither" as
two, and "both" as three.
177 The manuscript followed by
Asín (given in the critical apparatus of the Ankara edition) read
"nine" as the example here.
178 Asín seems not to have
translated this sentence fully. Rendered into English, his translation at this
point reads: Now as for [the number of these revolutions] being divisible into
two equal parts or not, it is absurd and false that it is even [A 71] because
even misses being odd for the lack of just one unit.
179 The examples that follow of
counting the revolutions of the spheres are restatements of the same argument
Ghazali makes in Tahafut. See Marmura, Incoherence, 18. See also
my comments on the argument against the infinite motion of the spheres in the
introduction, the section on Ghazâli's fourth introduction, where this issue
first arises.
180 In other words, the items
in this list are known to God, but not within his power, resulting in one infinite
set (things known by God) that logically must be greater than the other
infinite set (things within God's power), an apparent example of the logical
misstep Ghazali has just charged the falasifah with committing.
Ghazali's response (34.5 ff.) is an impressive display of this critical style.
181 A note by the Arabic
editors here refers to Ihya, 5.1 (p. 106).
182 See, again, the same
passage as the previous note.
183 Or "originate due
to"? (yusadara 'an al-qadra), 36.4
184 This is the second of the
possible sources of annihilation that Ghazali lists for investigation at 36.3
185 Ghazali offers no further
explanation for this assertion. Presumably it would be that two eternals would
have infinite extension in both time and space and so would have been in
contact with one another from eternity. The possibility that two exact
opposites might make contact at a point in time and mutually annihilate one
another is not entertained at all here.
186 This is the third of the
possible sources of annihilation listed for investigation at 36.3.
187 God was the being
understood in all the previous discussion of "the eternal [being]."
188 Ghazali obviously intends
"single substances"—that is, atoms—here.
189 Ghazali uses both jism
and jawhar in this discussion. The first is translated as
"body" (or "corporeal" in its adjectival form), the second
as substance; but later in the treatise Ghazali shifts to using just jawhar,
and seems to intend it to indicate basic corporeality. Accordingly, hereafter I
translate the term as
"corporeal
substance." See 40.2 and passim.
190 In this and the following
passages, "essence" (dhat) might best be understood as
referring to "being." I here translate jawhar as
"atom" rather than "substance," since it is juxtaposed with
body (which is defined as compound, rather than single substance).
191 More literally: "is
not by way of attribute."
192 A note by the Arabic
editors is given here to Ihyn} 5.1 (p. 107).
193 Here and in previous
utterances we have an indication of the place lexicology had in Islamic
society, since it was linked to the interpretation of the divine word revealed
in Arabic.
194 This phrase translates bi-jahah,
which is basically the same phrase that is rendered as "on a side" at
previous points in the discussion. The change is to accommodate Ghazâlï's own
effort to discuss possible variations of meaning for the same term.
195 Here the root word is wajh,
cognate with jiha and also meaning face, facet, side, or aspect.
196 The language here becomes
obscure. Asín has glosses that deal with quantity and other matters that seem
to be the result of confusion on his own part. As I read the passage, the
interlocutor is advancing a syllogism with an unstated conclusion. The
completed argument would be: Things on a side require a factor that determines
their position; accidents make determinations; therefore, spatial position
is (or at least could be) a kind of accident. The implication here is that
that sort of accident would entail an essential spatial position that is
ontologically distinct from the substrate of matter. Otherwise it could not
come to be applied to material substances. Thus, for example, there
would be accidents of being up or being down, just as there are for being green
and being cold. The argument suggests that if directional accidents can exist
separate from material substrates, why could it not be the case that God is essentially
"up," without any basis of spatial relation? He could posses the
characteristic essentially (not as an accident in himself). It is to this implied
argument that Ghazali next responds.
197 Tabaciyyatihi, given here as "inherence," also
implies subordination to and dependence on.
198 Qur'an 51.22,
Pickthall's version.
199 These last two sentences
were not translated by Asín.
200 Ghazali seems to be saying
that if something can be spatial, then it must be spatial and
does require dimension.
201 Jamad means "inanimate" but also
"inorganic" or "mineral." It is the latter meaning that
Asín adopts.
202 Here is a strong claim of
having made irrefutable proofs with respect to the existence and nature of God.
203 Here Ghazali uses al-wahm
instead of al-khayal for "imagination," interchanging terms
presumably to reinforce the point he made earlier that it is the concept that
matters, not the language in which it is couched.
204 This is an ambiguous
phrase. It is not clear whether Ghazali was referring to the image of a being
of sound, or to the imagination's ability to have an image generally, or
something else.
205 Qur'an 20:4,
modified from Pickthall's version.
206 Qur’an 42:11. My
translation.
207 See further comments on
this passage in the translator's introduction.
208 This term is intended in
the sense of things understood or apprehended only by the mind.
209 Asin's note at this point
reads: Many chapters begin with various Arabic letters (alif, lam, mim;
alif, lam, sad; alif, lam, ra, etc.) whose meaning is not known.
210 In citing "common
expressions," Ghazali is in the Aristotelian tradition of using logemena,
"things people say," as evidence from which to derive his arguments.
211 Asin notes: This is not a
Qur’ânic text but rather one of those from the traditions of the
mystical Muslims which was supposedly communicated directly by God to Muhammad,
many of which have an origin in the Christian gospel. Thus, this is inspired by
the epistle of the apostle James (4:8): "Appropinquate Deo et
appropinquabit vobis." Asin was often faulted by his critics for positing
a Christian source for most of what was substantive in Islam. This note may be
read as an example of that ideology at work. See Monroe, "Islam and the
Arabs in Spanish Scholarship," 191-92.
212 Asin notes that this text
also is not found in the Qur'an.
213 The editors of the Arabic
have a note here referring to Ihya' 1:108.
214 Asin notes: "The
throne of God is identified with the outermost celestial sphere according to
Islamic theology." For a controversial reading of Ghazali's cosmology, see
Richard Frank, Creation and the Cosmic System, and Ghazalï and the
Ashcarite School. Frank's contention is that Ghazali went beyond
the cosmological ideas accepted from Neoplatonism by the Ashcarites
and tacitly revealed his acceptance of a version of nearly the entire cosmology
á la Avicenna.
216 Dhikr: This is an important term in Sufi practice with
which Ghazali was already well acquainted at the time he wrote this treatise
and which he would eventually come to advocate with great persuasiveness. Its
basic meaning is "to remember"—that is, to remember God worshipfully.
217 As Asín mentions in a note
at this point, Ghazali's doctrine on the metaphorical interpretation of the
revealed anthropomorphic texts can be seen more fully developed in his treatise
Iljam al-cawamm, a summary of which Asín gives in an
appendix.
218 This has reference to the
geocentric cosmology that Ghazali inherited from Aristotle and Plotinus, the
broad outlines of which had long since been generally accepted. In that model,
the cosmos was a nested series of concentric heavenly spheres revolving around
a common center—the earth—which, though at the center of the cosmos, was also
its basest member. The revolutions of the heavenly spheres were thought to
condition events and outcomes in the sublunary world. The thrust of the
question posed at this point, then, allows Ghazali to clarify that though it
was spatially at the center of the cosmos, in terms of ontological hierarchy,
the sublunary world came very last.
219 This saying employs a play
on the Arabic words tharan and al-thurayya, meaning the ground
and the Pleiades, respectively. Thus, two ontological extremes—one base, the
other heavenly—are indicated by close cognate terms. There is a sense, then, of
bringing the two ends of a chain of being together or of bridging the distance
between them and emphasizing the totality and wholeness of creation.
220 In other words, the claim
that God is visible has implications for the argument that God has no spatial
relation—an ontological issue that is properly discussed in this first part of
Ghazali's treatise.
221 The demonstration of
logical possibility follows immediately. The discussion of evidence from
revelation begins at 65.8.
222 Here Ghazali has in mind
the five other attributes that were traditionally ascribed to God by the Muslim
theologians (life, will, sight, hearing, and speech).
223 At this point Asín sees a
parallel between Ghazali's argument and that of Thomas Aquinas. See Summa
theol: p. 1a, q. 12, a. I: "Respondeo dicendum quod cum unumquodque
sit cognoscibile, secundum quod est in actu, Deums, qui est actus purus....,
quantum in se est, maxime cognoscibilis est."
224 Reading fasl instead
of fadl as given (without variants) in the text. If fadl is
correct, then the phrase might be rendered as, "And so there is no
preferring you over those [anthropomorphists]." But the construction
really seems to call for fasl.
It is not certain that this last observation is precisely
attested in the Arabic text, which offers a great deal of obscurity, perhaps
the result of changes made by copyists. More than on the letter of the text,
then, we have relied on the context of the passage, which itself is none too
clear in its organization. The main idea is nevertheless evident: To
demonstrate that it is not an indispensable condition for the phenomenon of vision—even
corporeal vision—that the object seen should be in front of the viewer, nor
that it should be, therefore, on a specific side with respect to the viewer,
since a person that looks at himself in a mirror will see himself without being
in front of himself. Extrapolating this to the larger argument, then: It is
possible for a person to see God without his being present in front of him or
on one particular side of the viewer either.
226 The iron here refers, of
course, to the polished material from which mirrors were made prior to the
modern period.
227 Ghazali phrases the
opponent's question slightly differently than at 65.4, but the meaning is the
same.
228 The first method, just
concluded, was to show the logical possibility of seeing God (see 61.8 for the beginning
of the discussion). The second, which now follows, is to show from the evidence
of revelation that God has in fact been "seen" in the attenuated
sense Ghazali elaborates below.
229 This is an important
summary of Ghazali's exegetical methodology. For further discussion of it see
the translator's introduction.
230 Mahall (elsewhere translated as substrate).
231 Presumably Ghazali is
alluding to the intellect here metonymically.
232 As noted at 66.2, the
object of vision is typically thought to be something with color, extension,
body, and other visible things and it is this common understanding that Ghazali
is now addressing.
233 Translating bi-cainihi,
an interesting word choice by Ghazali given that it derives from the word for
eye.
234 Asín comments here that
"Al-Ghazali is alluding to the eschatological legend of the entrance of
souls into Paradise, which is preceded by a double ablution: external and
internal."
235 Here is a cogent statement
of Ghazali's belief in the supremacy and even independence of thought over
language, as well as a description of the encounter with God that resonates
with the Sufi teachings of dhawq and kashf.
236 The term here is ahl
al-haq, or more literally translated, "the people of truth." By
it Ghazali would presumably have intended the Sunny branch of Islam in general
and the Ashcarite school of theological thought in
particular.
237 The first part, though it
was not explicitly enumerated, was to show the possible range of meaning
associated with "vision" and so on. Now the task is to show from
revelation that, in at least one proper sense, God has been seen.
238 The term here, of course,
is qur'an.
239 Thus, the Qur'an,
the Hadith, and consensus (ifmaca) are all invoked as
revelatory or canonical witnesses to the possibility and desirability of the
vision of God.
243 See 2.4. Asín glosses this
term as los verbalistas.
244 The Arabic term is tanzih.
Asín translates it as "via de la eliminación." He notes that
of the two scholastic approaches to speaking of the divine essence and
attributes, Thomas Aquinas called the first via remotionis because it
consists in distinguishing God from the other beings por negativas
differentias, for example, "Deus non est accidens, corpus," etc.
245 The word tactïl
was an established theological term for "denying God all attributes."
Again this might be connected with the via negativa.
246 Al-iqtisad ft
al-i'tiqad, the phrase that
Ghazali used for the title of his book.
247 The term is hudd.
There could be other ways to render this, including "no limit" or
"no bound." Asín glossed it as "no parts," but this does
not seem faithful enough to the original term. Abü Zayd translated this
sentence and rendered hudd as "definition," which is correct
in a literal sense, but seems too strong a claim here, unless one is prepared
to argue that Ghazali was referring here to the unknowability of God. (For Abü
Zayd's translation, see his Divine
Predicates, x.)
248 Unless I have misread it,
this statement seems circular: God is not quantifiable because he cannot be
divided; and he cannot be divided because he is not quantifiable.
249 Translating didd,
meaning an opposite or contrast.
250 The Arabic word here and in
the discussion that follows is haqïqa rather than dhat.
251 Asín notes that "this
same demonstration is used by St. Thomas in his Summa, c.f. 1.1, c. 42, 'Quod
Deus est unus,' summarized thus: Praeterea ostensum est (c. 28) Deum esse
omniono perfectum, cui nulla perfection desit; si ligitur sunt plures dii,
oportet esse plura hujusmodi perfecta. Hoc autem est impossibile; nam si nulli
eorum deest aliqua perfectio, nec aliqua imperfection ei admiscaeatur, quod
requiritur ad hoc quod aliquid sit simpliciter perfectum, non erit in quo ab
invicem distinguantur. Impossibile est igitur plures deos ponere."
252 There may be a logical
problem here. Just because a being has absolute power does not mean that he
exercises it in an absolute way. If it is possible for a being, though
all-powerful to nevertheless exercise power in a limited way (and it must be,
if the agent is truly free), then can there be no reason why that limitless
power is not used in its full possible extent?
253 This might be a
problematical statement. If substance cannot exist without accident, then why
speak of them as essentially separate? The answer, presumably, is to
distinguish between actual and possible existence. In this way, all forms and
all accidents might exist separately, but only in potential. To become actual,
they require each other. Ghazali does not explicitly address this nuance in the
passage at hand, but it is within the context of their
"actualization" that he refers to their interdependence.
254 Asín notes that this
argument for the singularity of God and in opposition to dualism or polytheism
was traditional in the dogmatic theology of Islam and was technically called the
method of mutual hindrance. Asín also notes that Aquinas basically relies
on the same principle when he says in Summa c.g. 1.1.c. 42, "Melius
est per unum fieri quam per multa." It is not clear to me why, according
to Ghazali, substance could not be created or could not exist without accident,
as he here asserts without any supporting logic.
256 Presumably Ghazali means by
this that evil and good alike are moral qualities that depend upon the same
absolute standard for their definition.
GLOSSARY
This glossary follows the order of the Arabic alphabet.
Root letters are given first, derivates after a slash. Multiple glosses for the
same derived term are separated by colons. Notes on grammar or morphology are
given within brackets next to the terms. Notes contain further discussion and
references to other authorities. The numbers indicate page and line
numbers of an occurrence in the Arabic text.
>BD / abadan : to eternity, 27.9. See also azal and qadlmah
ZL / azal :
from eternity, 27.9. See also abadan and qadlmah
>SL / asl
(dual=aslayn) literally, "root," but usually translated here
as "premise."
NS / anisa bi- : is attuned to, 49.12
WL / awwali
: axiomatic, 26.7
BDD / la budd
: invariably, 29.8
BDL / tabaddul : change, 27.4
BHTh / bahath
: investigation, 2.1 / bahatha : argues, 38.8
BRHN / burhan
: demonstration
BTL / bail
: untrue, 32.14 : annihilate(d), 30.5
TB' / taba'an
: (a) given (fact), 30.11 / taba'ïya : inherence, 43.12
TQL / intaqal
: transfer, 30.2
ThBT / thabata : (athbata) to prove, 31.12 : to establish, 29.6 / thabt
: fixed, 30.7 : correct, 32.5 : positive, 36.4 / thubüt (thawabit) :
certainty, 24.13
JMD / jamad
: inanimate body, 48.10; also means mineral or inorganic body.
JWZ / jüz :
to be conceivable, 25.13 / j(l3iz : possible, 43.1 / jawaz
: contingency, 42.9 / ijaza : compendium, 31.11
JWHR / jawhar
: substance,259 24.10; corporeal substance, 40.2 and ff.
HDTh / hadith
: temporal thing or event, 20.7 : existence (or existing) in time and
temporal thing, 24.6 : having a beginning, 35.4
HRK / haraka
: motion
HSY / hasiyyat (from bass') : sensations, 20.6
HQ / tahqïq
: verify/verification, 25.6; confirm, 26.5 / haqiqa : truth
HLL / mahall
: substrate, 29.8, 74,3; locus, 66.3 ff.
HWZ / hayyiz
: place, 29.6; space, 41.4 / mutahayyiz : that which occupies space,
24.13 (Tahafut, Arabic 5.9); spatial being, 26.11
HWT / tahïi
: to fully comprehend, 72.6
HWL / hala
: to change, 36.4 / muhal : impossible, 27.6 (see Hans Wehr, 255).
KhS /khasa
: specify / ikhtisas : specification,260 29.7, 10; 41.3; vt. ikhtasa
; single out, 42.11; occupy (a place in space), 48.2
KhSM / khasm
: opponent, 27.5 (and much earlier)
KhLF / khilaf
: contrasting, 30.16
KhLW / khuluw can : is devoid of, 26.9
KhYL / mutakhîl, conceivable, 49.9 / al-khayal, (intellectual)
conception, 49.10
DRK / daraka
: perceive, 25.5 / madarik/mudarik : sources [of cognition]261,
20.3 : that which is perceived, 20.6; perceptible (adj.) 25.3
DM / da^ima
: continous, 27.8
D!W / ada(l [form 4, which Wehr does not list; but see form
6, "call each other forth"] : summon, 26.12
DL / dalll
(pl. adillah) : proof
DhHB / madhhab : school, but can also mean "doctrine" and some cases in the Iqtisad
might warrant a revision to this effect.262
DhW / dhat
: essence
RTB / martaba, rutba : rank /See Walzer, Perfect State, 359.
RJH / murajjih : deciding factor, 25.15
ZHL / zuhal
: The planet Saturn, 33.8
ZWL / zala
: to end, 35.11
SB / sabab :
[inferior] cause263; see also ‘illa
SR / sirr :
secret 30.2
SLF / salaf264 : forefathers265, 52.4
SM‘ / sam‘a (sam‘iyyat) : things that are heard (discussed in the translator's
introduction), 22.6
ShBH / tashbih : anthropomorphism, 52.1 / shabha : to be anthropomorphist, 73.1
ShRH / sharh
: (detailed) explanation, 24.6, 26.5
ShRT / sharat
: precondition 36.3
ShF‘ / shif‘a
: even, 32.9
ShHD / mushahidah : the witness
ShWF / tashüf
: inquiry, 19.3
ShY‘ / shd>i‘ : well-known, common
SDR / sadara
: to proceed (from), 36.4
SF / saffah266 : attribute, 40.6
SN‘ / san‘a
: Maker (i.e., God), 34.15
SLH / istilahat267 : technical terms, 19.6
SNF / tasânïf
: (literary) works, 27.1
DD / dad :
an opposite, 36.3 : complement, 74.3 / madâdah : contrariety, 36.13
DL / dalâl
: error
TLB / talib
: desired (or sought for), 18.6
TLQ / itlâq
: absolute sense (meaning), 40.7
TYR / tar :
to pass away, 35.14
ZHR / zahïr
: apparent meaning
CBR / cibdra :
(verbal) expression, 29.6
‘DM / Didam
: nonexistence, 25.15, 30.12
CRF / macrifa
: gnosis268
CTL / tactïl :
"a theological concept denying God all attributes (as opposed to tashbïh)",
73.1
QB / caqïb : one who or that which succeeds or is subsequent, 37.14
QL / Diq! :
intellect : intellectual reason, 40.9, 41.14 / maculât : intelligibles,
52.6 /
Diquï : intellectual, 54.5
CLM / (ilm :
knowledge (wherever possible) : cognition (referring to each of the three parts
of a syllogism), 15.12 / mucalümât : cognizable things, 33.16
!LW / Mlla : superior
[cause]269; see also sabab
CNSR [quadriliteral] / ‘anasir : elements (the four), 27.9
CYN / mucayin
: specific, 30.9 / individual
GhRD / gharad
: objective 31.9
GhLT / ughlutah : captious question, 9.12
FTN / fatina
: to understand, 18.5, 19.3
FQD / faqada
: be deprived; privation
FK / infakka
(form 7) : to be separated, 32. 14
FCL / fdcal : agent 36.6
QDR / qadar
: extension,270 49.11 / qadara : to determine, 31.7 / qddir
: possessing or having power, 36.5 / qudra : faculty : power, 36.3 / muqdar
(?) : (having) extension, 50.5 / maqdur : compassable, attainable271
QDM / qadlmah
: eternal (in the generic), 27.10 /see also abadan and azal / aqdam
: prior to272
QR / mustaqarra : abide (in or on s.th), 51.1
QCR / muqacr falak al-qamr : the sublunary world, 27.9
QLD / taqlid273 : blind following
QWM / quwam
: basis, 30.12
QYS / qiyds
: syllogism (in philos.), deduction
KNF / iktanafa : to embrace, encompass s.th., 72.6 (c.f. HWT)
KLM / kalam
: I have prefered not to translate this term, but if it must be translated, I
incline to "defensive apologetic" or perhaps "apologetic
theology?"274
LZM / lazim :
to follow necessarily, 24.7
LFZ / lafz
: word, 9.12
LHQ / mutlahiqa : a succession (of things or events), 27.8
MD / maddah
: matter, 27.10
MS / massa
(form 3) : contact
MKN / mumkinan : contingent, 25.15 /mutamakkin : situated, 51.1
NZH / munnazah
: have nothing to do with, 50.15 / tanzih : deanthropomorphism, 72.14
NZR / nazar
: theoretical reflection, 1-18 (in general), 24 : rational speculation (change
this to one or the other of the above), 19.2 / nazara25 to
consider / nazir theoretical inquiry (active participle of nazar),
23.2
NQD / naqada
to be destroyed, 17.6
WTR / watara
: odd (in number), 32.9 / tawatur (mutawatir) : corroborative reports
6.13, 21.6. (See Weiss's discussion of this in "Knowledge of the
Past," esp. p. 100; also my translation note 36.)
WJD / mawjüd
: existent : being, 49.4 / wujüd : existence
WJH / jihahh7 : fl jihah wahida : in one repect, 31.9 : fï
jihah makhsüsah : specified aspect, 41.2 (perhaps it should be
"place", a good generic term) / wajh : of this term, Marmura
(personal correspondence) writes that it translates in various ways. In Muctazilite
kalam, for example, it can translate at times as "aspect" or
sometimes as "ground," such as what renders uttering a falsehood an
evil. "In logic," he writes, "it refers to mode and hence to
modal arguments, modal syllogisms." In the kalam context encountered in
this work, Marmura has suggested "manner" as an appropriate
translation, and I have tried to follow his suggestion.
WSF / wasf
: characteristic, 50.15 (cf. saffah) / ittasaffa bi (form 8) : to be
characterzed by, 32.13
WD‘ / wadc : usage (of language), 38.8 / wadï : originator (of
language), 38.9
WFQ / tawfïq
: success (granted by God), 19.14
WQF / tawaqqufa fï (form 5) : be undecided, 25.9
259 In both kalam and falsafah;
see Lane, Lexicon, and Walzer, Perfect State, 337.
260 Based on context more than
the Wehr definition of "jurisdiction, special province or domain." If
the basic meaning of the form 8 verb is followed, this choice is defensible.
Asín at 42.2-3 had "determination," but "specification" is,
I think, more accurate.
261 Following Weiss,
"Knowledge of the Past," 86 (in the note).
262 Based on McCarthy, Deliverance,
113 n. 134; see also Saflo, Al-Juwaynï's Thought, 120.
263 There is a useful note with
references on this term in Walzer, On the Perfect State, 336-37 nn. 24,
25. He says "The notion of 'First Cause' [sabab al-awal] does not
exist in... Kalâm." And in Muctazilite theology, sabab
means proximate or intermediate cause. See also the discussion in the glossary
at cilla (CLW).
264 This is a collective noun
that is commonly understood as a plural even when the grammatical form is
singular. For example, the context at 52.4, "some of," makes it clear
that such is the case with that passage. For salaf as a "quasiplural,"
see both Lane and Wehr.
265 Meaning, the Companions of
the Prophet and early believers. See Martin et al., Defenders of Reason,
15.
266 This is an interesting
term. Lane says "an appurtenance of a house"; in particular a porch
or other extended roof or awning, such as one attached to a mosque where people
sometimes took shelter. In Ghazâlï's context, "fixture" might be apt.
267 See also lafz and
the note to 19.7
268 This gloss is not
uncontroversial, but it serves to make the distinction between rational
knowledge (cilm), and knowledge that is brought about through
mystical perception or unveiling (kashf).
269 See Walzer, On the
Perfect State, p. 337 and n. 33 there. "Al-Ghazzali. . .
assigns
different meanings to ‘illa as a superior and sabab as an
inferior cause."
270 Following Asín and based on
context. Wehr has "measure, quantity, amount," etc.
271 See L. E. Goodman,
"Did al-Ghazali Deny Causality?," 1
272 Walzer adds, "often in
the sense of 'eternal a parte ante'" (Perfect State, 337).
273 See Lazarus-Yafeh,
"Some notes on the term 'taqlid' in the writings of al- Ghazzali,"
appendix B in Studies in al-Ghazâlï, p. 488 ff.
274 For the argument for this
gloss, see McCarthy, Deliverance, 100 n. 6.
275 This term is often
associated with bahatha; see 2.1 and 18.4.
276 Also, see the discussion of
side and aspect as pertaining to God at [41 ff.], where this term is important.
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